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! \ ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF HABERMAS 9 S DISCOURSE rnncs A TIOESIS SUBMITIED TO THE FACUL1Y OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF TIOE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY MIRAJOHRI DEPARTMENT OF PIDLOSOPHY McGILL UNIVERSITY MONTREAL9 CANADA ©Mira Johri 1996 1+1 National Ubraryof Canada Acquisitions and Bibliographic services 395 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A ON4 canada Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions et services bibliographiques 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1 A ON4 canada Your liIfI varre ,.fèrence aur liIfI Notre 'eférflnal The author has granted a nonexclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada ta reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in mîcroform, paper or electronic formats. The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or othetwise reproduced without the author' s pemnsslon. 0-612-30304-7 Canadri L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis was written under the auspices of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Doctoral FeUowship and Doctoral Fellowship Renewal Awards 752-92-1002. Early research was supported by a Stipendium and Travel Grant offered by the Gennan Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst), and by the McGill University Departrnent of Philosophy in the forro of a Dow-Hickson Fellowship in Theoretical Philosophy. 1would like to thank all three institutions for their support. A number of people have contributed in diverse ways to the realisation of this projeet. 1 am very pleased to have this opportunity ta acknowledge their assistance. 1 would like first to tbank the members ofmy Thesis Committee, Professors Charles Taylor, David Davies, and James Tully, with whom 1 have been uniquely fortunate to study. James Tully provided me with invaluable discussions of Habermas's work as weIl as of my O\1.n. Moreover, his commitment to the importance of cultural diversity in political pbilosophy served as an ongoing source of inspiration and encouragement in the execution of this projeet. Whatever degree of argumentative cogency this thesis possesses is largely due ta David Davies, whose philosophical standards have long since become those by which 1 measure my OWll work. The integrity he brings to academic research is matched ooly by bis dedication to pedagogy. My debt ta Charles Taylor is bath more profound, and more difficult ta articulate. As a philosopher, bis writings have shaped the tenns of my engagement with the discipline. His influence upon me is omnipresent in titis thesis, and that is perhaps the MOst sincere forro of gratitude a student can express. Yet 1 find myself wishing MOst to thank him for bis example ofphilosophic and personal authenticity, for showing me through the strength ofhis intellectual vision that my own fonn ofexistential angst bas a place in philosophy, and in life. 1 would also like briefly to thank a nwnber of teaehers, students and friends for their participation in the conception and writing of this thesis. Severa! members of the Philosophy Department at McGill, among them Marguerite Deslauriers, Susan Dwyer, Elizabeth Ennen, Alison Laywine, Stephen Menn, Natalie Oman and Paul Pietroski, have contributed to my philosophical development. 1 am also grateful to John Gould (Yale), Tony Laden (Harvard), David Kahane (Harvard), and especially Rebecca Pates (McGill) for companionable discussions of political philosophy, and the students in the Wednesdayaftemoon Habennas seminar at McGill for their interest in both discourse ethics and my projeet. Invaluable editorial assistance was provided by Cecilia Grayson, Milka Mydliar, and especially Harriet Nowell-Smith. As Aristotle recognised, friendship is "most necessary with a view to living." 1 would like to thank a number of true friends: Andrea Berti, Juliet and Steven Cloã Julie Custeau, Annette Doyle, Daniel Lamontagne, Rebecca Pates, Seetal Sunga and Karen Vanderheyden, who have made a solitary tirne less so. 1 owe a special thanks and my sincere admiration to Randi Tychsen, who provided tea and squares at crucial moments. The writing of this thesis would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my parents, Ors. Hari and Seema Jobri. They have my deepest gratitude. 1 would also like to thank the Sharma and Sinha families for ongoing support. 1 have dedicated this thesis to the memory of my grandmother, who died during the period of its being wrinen. ln remembering her 1Mean to recognise my ties ta bath sides of my family, in Canada and in India, as her courage made possible the accomplishments ofus aIl. ii TABLE Of CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............... Il ABBREVIATIONS Of HABERMAS'S WORK............................................................. v ABSTRACT............ vi ABRÉGÉ........................................................................................................................ VII CHAPTERONE 1.1 Introouction . 1.2 Neo-Aristotelian Critiques of Kantian Abstraet Universalism...... 4 1.3 A Reinterpretation of Kantianism in Intersubjective Tenns. II 1.4 Habennas~s Assessment of the Relative Merits of Discourse Ethics............................ 20 1.5 Excursus: The Rawls-Habennas Debate................................................................... 27 1.6 The Claim to Uttiversalit)'.......................................................................................... 33 CHAPTER 1WO 2.1 Introouetion '" 44 2.2 The Principle of Universalisation and the Defence of Ethical Cognitivism................... 46 2.3 The Transcendental-Pragmatic Justification of the Principle of Universalisation.......... 54 2.4 Assessment of the Success of the Transcendental-Pragmatic Argument....................... 66 CHAPTER THREE 3.1 Introouction............................................................................................................... 71 3.2 The Concept of Communicative Rationality................................................................ 77 3.21 Characteristics of Communicative RationaIity....................................................... 77 3.22 The Role Played by the Concept of Conununicative Rationality............................. 82 1lI 3.3 The Development ofMoraI CODSciousness................................................................. 87 3.31 La\\Tellce Koblberg & the Acquisition of the Individual~sCapacity for Moral Iudgernent......................................................................................... 88 3.32 The Discourse Ethical Reinterpretation ofKohlberg~s Theory 100 3.4 Habennas's Theory ofSocial Evolution 122 3.5 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 133 APPENDIX 1: KOIaBERG~S MORAL STAGES 141 CHAPTER FOUR 4.1 Intr<:>duetion.............................................. 143 4.2 The RationaIity DebateI: Preliminaries 147 4.21 Rationality and Relativism in Cross-Cultural Understanding................................. 147 4.22 Sorne Contrasts Between Mythical and Modem Worldviews 151 4.3 The Rationality Debate fi: Peter Winch on Understanding a Primitive Society 161 4.4 The Notion of Optimisation in Developmental-Logical Accounts 178 4.5 Three Perspectives on the Debate Conceming the Rationality of Zande Magical Practices 183 4.51 Strong Relativism 183 4.52 Haberrnasian Universalism 188 4.53 Contextualist Non-Relativism 216 4.6 Conclusion 232 CHAPTER FIVE '" 245 BIBLIOGRAPHY 253 iv ABBREVIATIONS OF HABERMAS'5 WORKS CES Communication and the Evolution ofSociety. translated by T.McCarthy. &acon Press, 1979. J&A Justification and Application: Remaries on Discourse Ethics, translated by Ciaran P.Cronin. MIT Press, 1990. KHI Know/edge and Human Interests. translated by J .Shapiro. Beacon Press, 1971. MCCA Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. MIT Press, 1990. RECONCIllATION "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remaries on John Rawls's Po/itica/ Liheralism," in The Journal ofPhilosophy. VoI.XCII, No.3. (1995): 109-131. REPLY "Reply to My Critics," in J.Thompson and D.HeltL eds. Habermas: Critical Dehates. Macmillan, 1982: 219-283. TCAJ The Theory ofCommunicative Action. vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety. Translated by T.McCarthy. Beacon Press, 1981. TCA2 The Theory ofCommunicative Action. vol.2, Lifêworld and System. Translated by T.McCarthy. Beacon Press, 1987. v ABSTRACT This thesis investigates Habennas ~s attempt to establish a credible form of universalism in moral and political philosophy by means of the theoretical approach which he terms "discourse ethïcs.n The central question motivating this study is whether Habermas succeeds in this ambition. Discourse ethics specifies a procedure which purports ta enable all agents involved in a confliet of interest in which issues of justice are al stake to come to a rational and cooperative resolution. It proposes a position unique among contemporary approaches to justice in the strength and cbaracter of its anti-relativist stance: the plurality of human cultures and the situated charaeter of human understanding do nõ according to this theory, bar the way to arriving at a minimal fonn of moral universalism. A1though the procedure specified in communicative ethics elucidates only a narrow range of concems-those pertaining to justice in the strict sense-it aims to do 50 in a way valid across ail human cultures. Habermas's strategy for the defence of a species-wide moral universalism is, 1 argue, bath the key feature of his position, and the least well understood. Discussion of discourse ethics to date bas focussed aImost exclusively on the question of its appropriateness to the context of modem, Western pluralism. An important reason for this focus bas been the intricacy of Habennas's argumentative strategy, wbich links the recent work on discourse ethics to bis longstanding projeet of developing a theory ofcommunicative action. The principle aim of this thesis is to c1arify Habennas's position by explicating bis programme ofjustification. In 50 doing, 1 draw attention to severa! problems in bis approach as a mcchanism for cross-cultural confliet adjudieatiõ and endeavour to provide a more perspicuous account of the relation of Habennas'5 theory to its main philosophical competitors, especially Rawlsian deontology, and contextualism. VI ABRÉGÉ Cene dissertation examine la tentative de Habennas d'établir une fonne plausible de l'universalisme dans la philosophie morale et politique par le moyen d'une méthode théorique qu'il appelle uéthique communicativen • Cette étude est motivée par la question de la réussite de cette ambition de Habennas. La théorie de l'éthique communicative spécifie une procédure présentée comme permettant à tous ceux qui sont impliqués dans un conflit d'intérêts entraînant des questions de justice à parvenir à une résolution raisonnable et coopérative. Une position unique panni les descriptions contemporaines de justice est proposée par cette méthode par la force et le caractère de son anti-relativisme. Selon cette théorie, la pluralité des cultures humaines et le caractère situé de l'entendement humain n'empêchent pas qu'il soit possible d'aboutir à une forme minimale de l'universalisme moral. Bien que la procédure spécifiée dans l'éthique conununicative éclaircit seulement une gamme restreinte d'intérêts • ceux regardant la justice dans le sens précis du mot elle aspire à faire ceci d'une façon valide pour chaque culture humaine. La stratégie de Habennas pour défendre un universalisme moral valable pour l'entière l'espèce humaine est, selon moi, et ce qui rend sa position particulière, et ce qui a été le moins bien compris. La discussion de l'éthique communicative rot jusqu'ici presque exclusivement concentrée sur la question si elle est convenable dans le contexte d'un pluralisme moderne et occidental. Une raison importante pour cette convergence est la complexité de la stratégie argumentative de Habennas en ce qui concerne le lien entre ses ouvrages récents sur l'éthique communicative et son projet long-terme de développer une théorie d'action commwùcative. Le but principal de cette dissertation est de clarifier la position de Habermas en expliquant son programme de justification. Donc, j'attire l'attention sur plusieurs problèmes de sa méthode en tant que mécanisme pour juger les conflits interculturels, et j'essaie de VII fournir une explication plus perspicace de la relation de la théorie habennasienne avec ses plus importants concurrents philosophiques, en particulier, la déontologie de Rawls et le contextualisme. viii In memory ofmy Dadi _________C_'h_apter One The greatest problem for the human species. Ihe solution ofwhich nature compels him to seek. is that ofanaining a civil society which con administer justice universally. lnunanuel Kañ "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" Claims ofjustice have aIways been the prefê"ed examples ofmoral daims that are to be recognized by reason, as founded in the nature ofthings, as not essentially diverse. and as not contingent upan any sort ofsocial order. Stuart Hampshire, "Morality and Convention" ... the development ofhuman civi/ization [should be] conceived not as a linear movement. now rising. now declining. nor as a dia!ecnca! movement ofclashing opposites always resolved in a higher synthesis. but as the rea/ization lhat cultures are many and varlous, each embodying scales ofvalue difJérenlfrom those ofolher cultures and sometimes incompatible with them, yet capable ofbeing understood, lhal is, seen by observers endowed with sufficient/y acule and sympathetic historlcaJ insight. as ways ofliving which human beings could pursue and remainJully human. Isaiah Berlin, "Giambattista Vico and Cultural History" 1.1 Introduction Habermas's discourse ethics delirnits a position unique among contemporary moral theories. Although it bears the distinctive features of a moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition, discourse ethics bas from the outset been ftamed through an engagement with Kant's foremost critics. Critiques of agency inspired by the works of Aristode and Hegel have been pre-eminent in influence. The moral agent pictured by Kant generates unconditionaI moral denwtds on the basis of ber rational will alone, in virtue of the requirements which recognition of the equal capacity for autonomous agency of all rational agents places upon praetical reason. These requirements are expressed in the procedure of the categorical imperative. Its aim is ta provide a method for verifying that a proposed course of action is conunensurate with wbat all moral agents could rationally afIinn. In contrast, the various fonns of communitarianism and contextualism which Habermas refers to onder the rubric uneoAristotelianismn emphasise the deep sense in which human agency is socially situated. NecAristotelian critics have brought to the fore the manifold consequences ofthe abstraction which Kantian deontology, in its pursuit of a morality valid in aU tintes and places, imposes on lived ethical experience; consequences which in their view reflect a distorted understanding of the nature of the ties between individual and community. The deliberations and actions of an individual moral agent must of necessity, they argue, clraw upen a background of values embodied in coocrete communal traditions and fonns of life. Many have, as an outgrowth of this view, asked whether the goal of universal rational agency espoused by Kant is not a chimerical one, unsustainable once the metaphysical illusions of Kantian philosophy have been left behind. Habermas's critical engagement \\ith contextualist opponents bas borne fruit in the fonn of an innovatively revised deontological approach. The power and originality of discourse ethics lies in its ambition ta accommodate the legitimate objections of Kant's critics while preserving the fundamentai features of moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition. 1 The most crucial of these is the clairn to universalisme The aim of communicative ethics is 10 specify a procedure which \\;11 enable ail agents atTected by a conflict of interest in which issues of justice are at stake ta come to a rational and cooperative resolutioo. Although the procedure elucidates only a narrow range of concerns-those penaining ta justice in the strict sense-it aims to do so in a way valid across all human cultures. Habennas explicitly links the 2 procedure of discourse ethics to the cIarification and justification of interests which reflect what ail could rationally will; interests which are, in bis tenninology, "generalisable.n Moreover, he views 50ch interests as exemplified in what we commonly refer to as ~'human rights.'* Habennas's strategy for the defence of a species-wide moral universalism is, 1 shaH argue, both the key issue at stake in the debate with bis contextualist critics, and the least weU understood aspect of bis project. This introductory chapter begins with a summary of what Hahennas views as the most important of the criticisms raised by neo-Aristotelians, and indicates why it is essential for the cogency of Habermas's project that they he addressed. The following sections give an account ofdiscourse ethics which displays its unique position within the network of contemporary English-Ianguage debates in moral philosophy. Section 1.3 introduces the principal features of Habermas'5 discourse ethics as a response to the problems raised by contextualists, while 11.4 examines Habennas's assessment of the strengths of bis position vis-a-vis these opponents. In bis debate with the neo-Aristotelians, Habermas argues for the superiority of a procedural forro of justice such as that advocated by discourse ethics on the basis afits appropriateness to the context ofmodem plura/ism. He argues in essence that, since no shared scheme of values exist5 in contemporary Western societies, no retum to an ethics focussed on substantive notions of the good, such as that of Aristotle, is feasible. Notwithstanding the very impressive accomplishments of Habermas's reworked Kantianism, 1 will argue that neither Habermas nor bis expositors bas yet directly addressed the key point at issue. Whatever the merits of discourse ethics as a theory adapted for the context of modem Western pluralism, to focus on this issue seems 10 me ta obscure the boldness of Habermas 's lThis is the stated aim of many of the essays in Justification and Application. See. for example. "On the Pragrnatic. the Ethical. and the Moral Employments ofPractical Reason.... in J&A; 1. See also, 3 approaeh. The limited range of issues it addresses implies that the principal potential use of cliscourse ethics is as a mechanism for confliet resolution valid for groups who do not share similar cultural horizons. We hence in Il.5 find Habermas distinguishing himself from his chief competitor among proponents of Kantian-style deontology, John Rawls, by defending the appropriateness of a procedural concept ofjustice universally, and DOt simply for the specifie societies, modem., Western and late-<:apitalist, from wbose traditions these theories stem. ln light of these ret1ections 1 would like in Il.6 ta refocus the debate between Habermas and his contextualist critics on the issue of Habennas's strategy for defending a strong fonn of moral universalism. 1 will as~ in essence, how a theory freed of Umetaphysical illusions" cao pursue universalist daims. Must sueh a theory employ substantive conceptions of value drawn from our own societies? If so, does the use of these societally specifie notions impair the effectiveness of the procedure as a device for the resolution of issues of justice cross-eulturally? ln my view, until these questions are drawn from the periphery ta the centre of the present debate, we will not fully acknowledge the uniqueness of Habennas•s philosophical progranune. Only then will we stand in a position ta evaluate its merits. 1.2 Neo-Aristotelian Critiques of Kantian Abstract Universalism The term "neo-Aristotelianism" as employed by Habermas does not denote one philosophical approaeh, but rather several eriss-erossing positions united by a set of shared sympathies.z Habennas's relationship to this philosophical tradition is complex. It is perhaps best deseribed as one of productive tension. Because he largely agrees with the neoAristotelians in their eritieisms of Kantian transcendental philosophy, and yet wishes to resist what he sees as the relativistic implications of their conclusions, Habermas bas been impelled ULawrence Kohlberg and neo-Aristotelianism." inJ&A: 16. 4 1 l to develop a novel philosophical approach. The cogency of this alternative depends in large part on Habennas ~5 ability to show that it can adequately address what he regards as the legitimate criticisms raised by neo-Aristotelians. Many ofthese problems can he phrased as a rejection of the apparent decontextualisation of reason and agency in a Kantian approach to moral philosophy. These objections take bath a general and specifie fonn. Recent critiques in several philosophical disciplines have challenged the paradigm of Kantian epistemology and its accompanying notions of transcendental reasõ universal~ necessaryand historically invariant truths~ and atomistic agency. In their place~ these critiques bave underscored how closely conceptions of knowledge and normativity are connected to the practices of particular communities. Their recurring themes are the socially dependent character of our "conceptual schemes," the historical and cultural variability of our criteria of knowledge and our standards of normative acceptability, and the extent to which these structures are interwoven \\ith the variable patterns through which societies reproduce themselves bath socially and materially.3 These criticisms are often phrased in terms of a rejection of philosophical foundationalism. The airn of Kantian epistemology was to provide a principled method of ascertaining the scope and validity of all claims to knowledge. By providing a means of separating legitirnate from illegitirnate claims, Kant hoped to clarify the philosophical foundations of the various sciences, and thereby to place them on a finn footing. We might generally describe a foundationalist position as one "which claims that philosophy ZUte lack of a clear separation between the various neo-Aristotelian positions contnbutes to a lack of clarity in the present debate. 1will return to this issue in Il.6. 31 have drawn here on the very helpful oveniew of these critiques of Kantian foundationalisrn containOO in Thomas McCarthy's "General Introduction" to After Phi/osophy, 00.• Kenneth Ba}nes. James Bohman and Thomas McCanhy. (MIT Press. 1987): 1-18. 5 can, by sorne meth~ demonstrate the absolute, universal validity of sorne conception of knowledge or morality.'~ This view is rejected equally by Habennas and the neo-Aristotelians. Yet while both positions recognise the character of human agency as socially situated within specific historical fonns of life, they have drawn different conclusions from these shared insights. Among contextualists this rea1isation bas usually been taken 10 point to the inherent spccificity of the linguistically acquired value concepts employed by different groups, and henoe to support a non-universalist approach to moral theory. Neo-Aristotelians remind us that the interpreter is also an embodied agent, occupying a specifie historicaI, cultural and social position, and that this position fonns the horizon from whieh she attempts ta understand the beliefs and practices of others. The understanding achieved by such an agent is, it would appear, ineluetably linked ta her initial interpretive situation. This position entails the potentially relativistie consequences eschewed by Habennas, for on it there would seem to be no neutra1 standpoint from which 10 assess or to eriticise the practices of a particular community, and indeed, no uniquely correct way ta assess these practices. Contextualists have generally argued that moral philosophy should proceed by rneans of a dialogue with others oriented to thernes of general hurnan concem, and employing "thick concepts" of value phenomena which are explicitly culturally specifie, rather than from the sorts of fonnal or universalistie claims which charaeterised Kant's approach. 5 A nurnber of powerful criticisms of Kantian moral theory have been advanced from this perspective. These criticisrns dra\\' closely upon Aristotle's conception of practical reasoning. Aristotle's ethics aims ta ascenain the nature of the end or ends at which men ;ms definition is Stephen White's. See Stephen White, The Recent Work ofJurgen Habermas: Reason, justice & moderniry. (Cambridge, 1988). SI am indebted in the fonnulation of this point to Thomas McCarthy's presentation of the relationship between Habermas's position and Gadamer's philosophical henneneutics in McCarthy, "Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's "Overcoming" ofHermeneutics," in Habermas: Critical Debates, 0: 57-78. See especially the description ofhenneneutics on pp. 57-58. 6 ought to aim in living a life, in the hopes that a clearer understanding of this goal may faeilitate its realisation. The good for human beings is defined by Aristotle as a life ofeudaimonia. that is 10 say, a life Iived in accordance with virtue or excellence. He defines the excellences of which human beings are capable into two kinds, intellectual and moral. Aristotle regards theoretical activity or theoria as the best activity of which we are capable, as it reflects the excellence of the best part of us, that îs, the excellence of rationality in the strict sense. Theoria takes as its object the study of the unchanging features of the universe, and its truths are bence viewed by Aristotle as correspondingIy etemal, immutable, and not in any way relative to the context of buman life and language. The intellectuaI excellence exhibited in ethics, described as praetical wisdom or phronesis. is by contras! essentially concemed \\;th change and contingency, as ethics must ref1ect and he responsive to the changing social situations in wbich our actions unfold. For Aristotle, practicaI wisdom must of necessity go beyond a knowledge of the generally accepted rules for morality to encompass an intelligent understanding of the reasons for them. 115 concem with particular actions in bis view precludes its attaining a bigh level of certainty or generality. Moreover, the exercise of phronesis requiTes more than intelligence in the narrow sense of clevemess. Both accurate perception of the relevant features of a situation and correct action require that an agent possess a stable personality exhibiting virtues or excellences of charaeter in the proper proportion. These excellences of character are acquired through induction into the values, beliefs and practices of the polis. The capacity for ethical agency is, in consequence, dependent upen this background ofconununal traditions.6 Kantian moral theories are generally viewed by neo-AristoteIians as suffering from a number of impoverishing abstractions which reflect their misguided theoretial orientation ~y description is indebted to Ciaran Cronin'5 "Translator's Introduction," to J&A: xxi. His article, which focusses on the debate between Habermas and neo-Aristotelianism. bas been very helpful in 7 toward highly abstraet notions of reason and agency. Although Habennas does not affinn the characterisation of Kant's work given by many of bis critics as accurate in all instances, he nonetheless regards their criticisms as capturing sorne important limitations of this position. Three appear ta him to he particularly salient.7 First, Kantian moral theories isolate from the fabric of human ethical experience a narrow set of questions viewed as amenable 10 rational resolution by ail concerned. This set of questions is illuminated by ~~e moral point of view," which Habennas defines as "...the perspective from which we cao decide among controversial normative claims impartially, solely on the basis of reasODS.,,a It is articuIated through a procedure which enables an individual moral agent ta test the pennissibility of ber proposed plan of action. Because the moral agent recognises that her plan cao ooly be legitimately pursued if such pursuit is commensurate \\oith ail other rational agents acting sirnilarly, she adopts the procedure established in the categorical imperative. This imperative, which stipulates that "1 should never aet except in such a way that 1 cao also will that my maxim sbould become a universal law,"9 provides a means for generating exceptionless rules of conduet. The narrow focus of Kantian moral theory reflects the central position it accords the question of what one ought to do. This unavoidably forces a separation between what one ought to do or what is "right," and what one views as good or desirable. Kantian-style moral theories constrain the moral agent to subordinate her pursuit of a particular end or plan of action in light of the limits placed upon action by a procedure for universalisation. TIlis prioritisation of the right reflects a homogeneisation of different goods which is problematic preparing this introduction. 7These criticisms are dra\\n from Habermas, "Neo-Aristotelianism," inJ&A: 116-126. Cf. Croni~ "Translator's Introduction," inJ&A: xxi-xxii. BHabermas, "Neo-AristoteIianism," inJ&A: 118. '1mmanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMora/s, trans. James Ellingtõ (Hackett, 1981): 14; Ak. 402. 8 bath in its falsification of our ethical experience and in the problems it gives rise to with respect to moral motivation. As Habermas explains~ the prioritisation of the right appears to have the unhappy consequence tbat "[a]ll goods~ including the highest good of my life project or ofthe fonn of life to which we collectively aspire, are deprived of their moral status and are lumped together with things designed to satisfy contingent needs and wants; henceforth, goods fulfill ooly subjective preferences. ,,10 This approach appears 10 set obligation against inclination in a way which requires an implausible degree of abstraction from the motives underlying an agent ~s interest ~ and perfonnance ot: right or appropriate actions. In Kant's view our rcasons for acting morally should reflect our recognition of the claims of practical reason itself if they are to he of moral worth. Moral actions must depend neither upon inclination, nor upon prudential considerations of self-interest. This conception seems te presuppose a moral agent constituted prior to all social interaction who tan fonnulate "coherent practica1 intentions in isolation from natura! desires and a socially conditioned identity.nll The centrality of questions of moral obligation stands in sharp contrast to the approach taken by c1assical ethics. As noted carlier~ Aristotle's ethical theory revolves around the question of eudaimonia or "living weIl." He sougbt to show that living an excellent human life, that is, a life exhibiting the highest virtues and oriented towards the highest goods, is compatible both with our obligations and with our truest self*interest. Secoñ Kantian moral theories, through specifying a procedure for detennining which actions are right in principle~ focus on the issue of normative justification. This focus upen the justificatory basis for general mies bas often been conjoined with an insensitivity te the relevant features of particular situations, and perhaps especially towards the needs of I~bennas,"Neo-Aristotelianism," in J&.A: 119. 11The phrase is Ciaran Cronin 's. See Cronin, "Translator's Introduction," in J&A: xxii. 9 individuals. 12 It bas moreover allowed problems of the sensitive application of nonns to recede into the background. Kantian-style moral theories hence seem te run the twin dangers of fonnalism and rigorism. Because universal principles cannot presume te capture aIl of the practically relevant features of any unique situatiõ it seems likely that such principles MaY fumish somewhat crude instruments in responding to such situations. This danger MaY be compounded by the rigid application of principles without regard te relevant contextual features. As Habennas notes, on the Kantian approach "[mloraI justification seems to amount te nothing more than the deductive application of an abstract basic principle to particular cases, with the result that the specific context of the given situation lases its peculiar relevance.n13 Third, the procedure of the eategorical imperative represents an attempt to transcend the limitations of particular social institutions and the values, practices and beliefs of a specifc fonn of life. 14 The categorical imperative requires that moral questions be decided with respect to what could he impartially willed by all moral agents. In this attempt to encounter all human beings as individuals on the same footing, the moral subject is required imaginatively to go beyond her fonn of life. The individual is conceived as essentially capable of disengagement from the social bonds which invest ethical life with its significance or meaningfulness. This viewpoint coheres with an atomist conception of agency and a contraetualist conception of society. These features are often linked te a conununitarian critique of modemity that sees the tendencies toward fragmentation and alienation in modem societies as ret1ections of the loss of a coherent sense of community .IS l1ltis defect of an approach directed towards universal rules bas been stressed by the proponents of an ethic of cafe. see many of the essays by Martha Nussbaum in Love 's Knowledge. 0 for a particularly fine presentation of this point. J3Habermas. "Neo-Aristotelianism:' in J&A: 120. 14Habennas, "Neo-Aristotelianism,n inJ&A: 121. lSCroni~ **Translator's Introductiõn inJ&A: xix. 10 In Habermas~s view these criticisms admit of ooly t'Wo paths of resPQnse: we must either pursue a retum to Aristotelianism, or adopt a Kantian approach modified in response to legitimate objections. For reasons which 1will explore in sorne detail below, Habennas views a revival of ethical approaches inspired by Aristotle and Hegel as unfeasible in the present context. In lieu of this alternative he opts 'la revise the fundamental premises of Kantian moral theory in such a way that neo-Aristotelian objections can be accommodated within a deontological framework."J6 1.3 A Reinterpretation of Kantianism in Intersubjedive Terms Communicative ethics aims to capture the key features of a Kantian moral philosophy within a framework which explicitly recognises the dialogical character of knowledge and agency stressed by the contextualists. At its centrepoint is a reinterpretation of a Kantian conception of practical reason in intersubjective terms. The need for such a reinterpretation manifests itself in certain deficiencies ofthe procedure of the categorical irnperative. In Habennas's view, the effectiveness of the eategorical imperative is vitiated by its solitary or "monological'" nature. The procedure as developed by Kant constitutes a test of moral pennissibility able to be perfonned by each agent in isolation. An individual asking whether she may adopt a plan of action must inquire only whether she herself could will that such a course of action he adopted universally. However Habennas argues thã insofar as we inquire into the legitimacy of nonns from individually isolated perspectives, the procedure specified must, in the nature of the case, he insufficient. Two examples MaY help to ilIustrate the problem. In the Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMoraIs, Kant takes up the problem of a man who finds hirnself forced to borrow money without any hope of being able to repay it. J7 l~bermas, "Neo-Aristotelianism," inJ&A: 116. l'Kant (1981): 31, Ak. 422-23. 11 Such a policy cannot in Kant~s view be universalised consistently, as a moral agent contempJating the corresponding maxim would find himself involved in a species of contradiction. The ability to make a false promise relies upon there heing a practice of honest prOlJÙSe.making, and the universal practice of tàlse promising could Dot fail 10 undennine thîs. An agent could hence Dot consistently will that aIl others adopt the maxim he himself wishes ta pursue, and thus finds himself conftonted in choosing titis course of action with a contradiction ofthe will. The problem which Habermas sees with the procedure of the categorical imperative can he illustrated by contrasting the previous case with another also given by Kant. Kant considers the situation of a man who is satisfied with bis own life and unconcemed \\ith the needs ofothers. lbis man wishes to adopt a maxim ofgeneral non-intervention towards others even when inñ and accepts that others would pursue a similar policy. Although bis polie)' is COnsisteDt~ Kant argues that one could not will the possible world in which a maxirn is universalise<!, essentially because this world would he an undesirable one. 18 Kant explains: For a will which resolved in this way wouId contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a la\\' of nature springing from bis o\\n wil1~ of all hope of the aid he wants for himself. 19 This creates a fundamental problem for Kant in that it appears to make the outcome of the procedure of the eategorical imperative contingent upon the agent ~s aetually possessing certain traits of character, or valuing certain things. Were a given agent to have different preferences~ dispositions or values, the procedure of the categorical imperative wouId issue in a different lBnte argument that one is unable to will the adoption of a maxim due to the undesirable nature of the possible world resuIting from its universalisation is a highly problematic one for Kañ as bis theory attempts to eschew appeal to consequences altogether. l~t (1981): 32. Ak. 423. 12 result. Yet the universal validity ofa particular set of preferences and values is precisely what cannot he assumed under conditions of social and ideological pluralism.2O Acknowledgement of the importance of pluralism leads Habennas ta adopt a procedure for universalisation which is explicitly dialogical in its structure. Understanding how dialogue is incorporated into discourse ethics will allow us to see in precisely what sense it constitutes a minima/ist theory. Habermas argues that bis programme of discourse ethics constitutes a minirnalist theory in two senses: fi~ in the modesty of its conception of what moral theory should accomplis~ and second, in the restrieted range of questions or the object domain ta which it is applied. Both points will be taken up in tum. In Habennas ~s view, philosophy oversteps its role when it aspires to provide any forro of substantive moral guidance. The role of moral theory is rather, '~ explain and ground the moral point of viev.'. n:!\ Moral theory must confine itself to articulating a procedure capable of adjudicating the justness of proposed norms, and to demonstrating i15 validity. This demonstration will require showing that the daims of justice, as specified by the procedure in question, take priori~' over other daims. The moral point of view is defined by Habermas as that point of view from which daims involving interpersonal contliets of interest can he impartially resolved. He regards this point of view as embodied in intersubjective practices of argumentation. The test of universalisation proposed by discourse ethics asks whether a proposed norm is acceptable in aetual, as opposed to hypothetical, practices of argumentation involving ail individuals potentially affected by the norm. The acceptability ofa norm tums on its ability to satisfy the interests of each participant in the dialogue. Philosophy hence cannot itself specify what nonns will he just in a given setting in advance of a process of actua/ 2OSee? e.g. Habermas?s discussion of the monological nature of Kant's categorical imperative in "Remaries on Discourse Ethics," in J&A: SI-54. 21Habermas, "MEL," in MCCA: 211. 13 argumentation among ail those affected.22 It should a1so be noted that moral theory as conoeived by Habennas focusses solely upon the j~1ifieation of norms. The question of how they should he applied is treated separately. The success of this procedure depends in Habennas ~s view upon two features; first, 'ihe individual's inalienable right to say ')'es" or "no", and second, "bis overcoming of bis egocentric viewpoint.n23 The first feature ensures the protection of the .interests of the individual agent. In the context of moral argumentatiõ each individual is free to express assent or disseñ and is hence able to influence the outcome arrived at. The second point captures the intuitive link between moral agency and the capacity ta engage in aets ofempathy, or what Habennas following G.H. Mead caUs "ideal role-taking." Participants in the dialogue envisioned by Habennas are not abstraet Kantian moral subjects, but rather real, socially embodied agents. The goal of entering into such a discussion is to Uenjoin those involved to an idealizing en/argement of their interpretive perspectives.,,24 This enIargement is fostered by the structure of the dialogue itself, which compels each agent to take the perspective of all other participants. The process of reciprocal perspective-taking provides a forum wherein the needs and interests of participants are open to transfonnation through discussion. Habennas describes the dialogical procedure as follows: Under the presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus projeet herself ioto the understandings of self and world of an others; from titis interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideallyextended we*perspective from which ail cao test in common whether they wish to make a controversial nonn the basis of their shared practice; and this should include mutuaI criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. In the course of 22Habermas, "MEL," in MCCA: 211. ~bennas, "MEL," in MCCA: 201-203. 2~bennas, RECONCILATION: 117-18. 14 successively undertaken abstractions, the core of generalizable interests can then emerge step by step.25 A Donn affinnable by aIl participants in dialogue is one which can he viewed as involving a legitimate ordering of the satisfaction of the competing interests at issue in the debate. Such a nonn incorporates a shared or ugeneralisable" interest. Yet not aIl dialogues involving disputes of value issue in generalisable interests. Our aim in entering into processes of moral argumentation is to arrive at a peacefuI resolution of a conflict of interest through developing a consensus, where consensus is secured through adhering to a procedure for dialogue in which every individuai is compelled to adopt the persPective of every other. According to Habennas, the only nonnative questions which are struetured in such a way that they can be rationally resolvable tout court are questions of justice, as these must by definition meet with universal agreement. He therefore believes that moral theories, if they adopt a cognitivist approach, must restrict themselves essentially to a narrow segment of vaIue phenomena. This constitutes the second sense in which discourse ethics is a m.inimalist theory. Habermas expIains: If we do not want to settle questions concerning the nonnative regulatioo of our everyday coexistence by open or covert force-by coercion, influence, or the power of the stronger interest-but by the unforced conviction of a rationally motivated agreement, then we must concentrate on those questions that are amenable to impartial judgment. We can't expect to find a generally binding answer when we ask what is good for me or for us or for them; ~bermas, RECONCIUATION: 117-18. In Habennas's view, Rawls attempts to accommodate the plurality of interpretive perspectives held by individuals by using infonnational constraints to impose a unifonn perspective on the participants in the "original position." Habennas contrasts this strategy of'~neutralisation" ofperspectival difference with bis own strategy of"enlargement." and defends the greater adequacy of bis own strategy as a resplnse to pluralism. This seems to me to misconstrue the purpose ofRawIs's original position, at least as it fonctions in bis recent worlc 00 political Iiberalism. The original position is presented by RawIs as a device of representation, which modeIs wbat we regard as fair conditions under which the representatives of citizens who are free and equal could specify the tenns of social cooperaùon. Reflection upon the adequacy of how the original position is modeUed allows us to focus our considered convictions through a process of public discussion and self-clarification. Ideological pluralism hence poses a challenge which must be met at the level of the construction of the original position, rather than ~thin" the original position itself. See Rawls (1993): 22-28. 15 ~ we must ask what is equa/ly goodfor aIl. This "moral point of view!7 throws a sharp, but narrow, spotlight that picles out from the mass of evaluative questions praetical cont1iets that can be resolved by appeal ta a generalizable interest; in other words, questions ofjustice.26 In articulating the nature of this set of questions Habennas expands innovatively upon the narrow account of practical reason given by Kant. Discourse ethics attempts ta compensate for the focus upon deontological obligation taken by Kantian moral philosophy, and to provide a place within the theory for sorne of the insights of neo-Aristotelian theorists conceming the importance for our moral lives of cbaracter, community, and questions of the good life. In 50 doing he hopes 10 increase the attractiveness ofcommunicative ethics by showing its sensitivity 10 the range of phenomena encountered in our experience of agenc)', without sacrificing the priority ofthe claims ofjustice. The general function ofpraetical reason is to justify choices among alternative courses of action. Habennas views it as amenable to employment in three eategorially distinct ways, each of which bas an impact upon our experience of moral agency.27 Practical reason cao he employed in a pragmatic, ethical or moral sense depending upon the problem at band. Pragmatic employments of practical reason airn to identify appropriate technical strategies for satisfying our contingent desires, where the set of value preferences and goals serving as problem-oenstraints are assumed to he fixed. The resulting imperative is a conditional or relative ought, specifying what one ought to do, when faced with a particular problem, ifone wants to realise certain goals. The distinction of interest for us is that between moral and ethical employments of practical reason. Because it permits us to circumscribe a narrow class of questions on which 10 focus the theory, this distinction fonns the crucial axis around which Habermas's atternpt to ~bermas,04MSE." inJ&A: 151. 27Habennas, "On the Pragmatic, the EthicaI and the Moral Employments of PracticaI Reason," in J&A: 1-17. 16 develop a minimalist ethic revolves. Practical reason in its ethical employment focusses on the development of plans of life in light of culturally conditioned self*interpretations and conceptions of the good. In Habennas's view, ethical questions admit of rational resolution only within the horizon of a conerete historical fonn of life which recognises the ~1hick" notions of the good under discussion, or within the context of an individual life history. Because they cannot be entirely abst:raeted from culturaUy specifie notions of identity and the good life, these issues cannot be answered in universally valid tenns. In contrast, moral employments of practical reason focus on which moral mies goveming our living together are equally good for aIl. Habermas maintains that this type of reasoning, because it embodies what is meant by the "impartial standpoint," breaks entirely with the subjectivity of an individual agent's perspective. The impartial regulation of social interaction requires that the moral subjeet encounter ether agents on the same footing as herself. The resulting imperative is unconditional, dependent neither on subjective goals and preferences, nor upon views of the good life. Moral questions, he argues, are 50 construeted as ta admit of rationally binding solutions across differing life histories and traditions. The contrast between moral and ethical employments of practical reason is sometimes made by Habennas in light of a distinction between "norms," which inform decisions h as to ''what one ought to do;" and "values," which infonn decisions "as to what conduet is most desirable." As this distinction is crucial to Habermas's defence of the priority of elaims of justice, it is worth exp10ring in sorne detail. According to Habermas, DOrms differ from values in at least four interlinked respects. The first concems their respective ties ta role--govemed and purposive fonns of action. Nonns reflect a deontological orientation; they refer ta obligatory or prohibited actions binding on all persans absolutely. In Habennas's expression, nonns "impose equal and exceptionless obligations on their addressees." In contrast, values seem to have a teleological or purposive orientation. They "express the preferability of goods 17 that are striven for by particular groups." This is reflected in the nature of the irnperatives or validity claims raised by each, which fonns the second important difference between them. Norms express obligations which raise a ~4binary validity daim"; they either do, or do not, obtain. Values raise validity daims wbich signify that certain goods are more attractive than others, and this claim admits of degrees of assent. The contrast conceming the absolute bindingness of norms as opposed to relative bindingness of values constitutes their third point of distinction. Habennas regards the obligatory force of norms as binding absolutely. Such nonns have "the absolute meaning of an unconditional and universal duty." ln contrast, the attractiveness of values "reflects an evaluation and a transitive ordering of goods that bas become established in particular cultures or bas been adopted by particular groups." Their binding quality depends upon an individual's in faet sharing the preferences or striving for the goals in question, and this cannot be mad~ mandatory unless we deny the legitimacy of there being a plurality of forms of life. Finally, norms must consitute a coherent system in a way which values need note Nonns must not contradict each other when they claim validity for the same domain of addressees, whereas different values linked to complex fonns of life compete for priori~*. Rather than fomùng a system, they constitute "shifting configurations fraught \\ith tension. ,,28 The general features of Habennas's programme of communicative ethics can be seen as foUowing logically on the heels of the distinction between ethical and moral emplo}ments of practical reason. Discourse ethics is explicitly Kantian in spirit: it is deontological, cognitivist, fonnalist and universalist.29 A brief overview of these features will provide a convenient way ofsummarising the essential points of the model. 28Habermas, RECONCIUA TION: 117-18. 290yms malerial is drawn from "Morality and Ethical Lite," in MCCA: 196-98. See also William Reh& lnsight and Solidarity (University of California Press. 1994): 31. 18 Discourse ethics is deontological in that it regards the basic phenomenon which moral philosophy must explain as the nonnative validity of irnperatives and nonns of action. Il tries to justify nonns of social interaction in terms of intersubjectively binding rational principles, rather than through the identification of desirable ends. It is formaiist in that it does not issue in substantive moral judgments, but rather fumishes a rule or procedure in tenns of which the validity of moral nonns can he decided. Because Habermas recognizes the legitimacy of the plurality of life fonns held by various people he argues, in distinction to Kañ that substantive moral judgments may issue only from dialogues among the aetual persans affected. The procedure developed by Habermas should be understood as a warrant for any conceivable moral agreement that is rcached by a process of rcal dialogue meeting the specified conditions. Because it aspires to be a cognitiVist ethic, discourse ethics must answer the question of how rationally to justify normative statements. Habermas explieates the force of the moral ought through a theory of argumentation. This theory of argumentatiõ as we shaH see, ties Habennas's communicative ethics in crucial ways to bis broader project of developing a thecry of communicative action. It shouId be notOO that the version of cognitivism which Habermas upholds is a qualified one, in that it does not view the truth ofethical statements as on the same footing as that of faetual statements.30 ln bis view, the validity claims raised by factual statements express claims to truth, and concem existing states of affairs. Nonnative statements, by contras!, express claims to rightness related to legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. This form of validity is ana1ogous to, but not identical \\ith that of a truth claim. Finally, the theory is universalist in that it is meant to he valid for ail human agents who are competent speakers of a language. The moral principle proposed takes the fonn of the procedural rule of universalisation "U." Habennas argues that a principle is legitimately universalizable if and ooly if ~~All afIectOO cm accept the consequences and side effects its »nus issue is taken up in greater detail in Chapter 2. 19 / \ general observance can he anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone *s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those ofknown alternative possibilities for regulation).,,31 1.4 Habermas's Assessment or the Relative Merits of Discourse Ethics Habermas's strategy for the demonstration of the superiority of discourse ethics over neo-Aristotelianism is twofold. First, he claims that the reinterpretation in intersubjective tenns of Kant's conception of practical reason results in a recoofiguration of the main features of a Kantian ethic; it thereby def1ects the force of the damaging criticisms of abstraet reason and agency levelled against such an approach ta moral theory. Second, Habermas argues that a revival of an Aristotelian-style ethic on a postmetaphysical footing must be beset with "insuperable difficulties." His incisive criticisms draw attention to the difficulties of developing a coherent Aristotelianism in the absence of an appeal ta Aristotle's now superceded metaphysics. These points will he discussed sequentially. While maintaining the features of a moral theory in the Kantian tradition, Habennas"s communicative ethics is devised so as largely ta neutralise the force of the neo-Aristotelian criticisms discussed above. RecaIl that these criticisms drew attention ta the narrow range of value phenomena treated by Kant, the problems of formalism and rigorism which seemed to attend the procedure of the categorical imperative, and, more generally, the radically unencumhered notion of agency which Kant's approach presupposes. Communicative ethics, by contrast, postulates a number of points oftangency between the universality of its principles and the particular situational features of relevance ta embodied and socialised agents. As regards the tirst criticism, discourse ethics departs from traditional deontological theories in acknowledging the importance of questions of individual and communal self31Habennas, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Programme ofPhilosophical Justificatiõ" in MCCA: 65. 20 realisation. Although it maintains a strict priority ofobligations ofjustice over other forms of obligation, it recognises the value of ethical discourses in which snch questions are raised. However this prioritisation of the right over theg~ as Habennas acknowledges, still leaves open the important question of the motivation wbich individuals bave for pursuing morality. Habermas argues !bat the issue of moral motivation falls outside the realm ofmoral theory. In its limited role, moral theory can only articulate and justify a procedure which provides a means for generating a rational agreement on valid norms. Whether the nonns developed through this procedure are in fact implemented by individuals depends, in Habennas's view, on whether they have undergone an appropriate psychological development, and this in tum depends upon an agent's being socialised into forms of lire in which the requisite sort of moral development is fostered. In Habennas's phrase, u any universalistic morality is dependent on a fonn of life that meets it halfway. ,,32 An aim of this thesis is to lend a greater clarit)' to what this condition entails. Second, because Habermas's procedure for universalisation involves discourse among real aetors rather than a hypothetical thought experiment, it avoids many of the problems for which the categorical imperative was rightly faultOO. The categorical imperative generates universal norms by detaching fonnal features of a moral situation from their particular circurnstances. A judgement abstraeted in this somewhat awkward manner might risk insensitivity to the needs of particular individuals, and to the circwnstances of the problem at band. This problem would seem to he greatly mitigated by Habennas's proposai that norms be agreed upon discursively with ail others affected. A principal advantage of a dialogical as against a monological procedure for the adoption of nonns is that dialogue provides the moraI subject an opportunity to compensate for the limitations in knowledge and understanding of the 32Habennas. uMorality and Ethical Lire: Does Hegel'5 Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse EthicsT in MCCA: 207. See aise uDiscourse Ethics: Remarks on a Programme ofPhilosophical 21 other agents involved therein, by drawing attention te relevant but previously neglected features of any given situation. Moreovery in contrast to the potential deficiencies in choice of maxim accompanying Kant's decision te view the morality of an action as residing uniquely in the quality of intentions of a given agent, HabennasYs fonnulation of the principle of universalisation explicitly asks that the consequences and sicle effec~~ which cao be expected ta foUow from the adoption of a norm he considered. Habermas also stresses the need for sensitivity in the application ofnorms, although discourse ethics does not address itself directly to this problem.]] Finally, Habennas draws attention to the complex interdependence which exist5 between the individual and the collective to which she belongs. According to Habennas, competent subjects become individuals ooly through growing up in a linguistically articulated lifeworld shared by a group or collective. An individual identity is formed primarily through positioning itself within a field of broader social attaehments. Moreover, he holds that the cultural identity of a language community develops and maintains itself through the communicative interaction of its members. This interdependence confers upon ail human beings an inherent vulnerability, for which morality is designed to compensate. A morality tailored to the fragility of human beings individuated through socialisation must in Habermas's Justification," in MCCA: 108-9. 33Habermas recognises that nonns do not contain within themselves rules for their own application. He argues that sensitive application of nonns caUs for a new procedure, separate from that of justification, and governed by a principle of appropriateness (Angemessenheit). This principle airns, through a sensitive reading of situational features. to determine whether a norm should be observed in any particular situation. For details on how snch a principle might funetion Habennas refers the reader to Klaus Günther's Der Sinnfùr Angemessenheit. Anwendungsdiskurse in Moral und Recht (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988). An English-language summary ofthis work, entitled "impartial application of moral and legal nonns: a contnbution to discourse ethics'" can be found in Phi/osophy and Social Criticism 14. Sec aIso Georgia Wamke's response to Habennas on this issue in "Communicative RationaIity and Cultural Values," in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White (Cambridge, 1995): 120-42. Wamke argues that the influence of cultural values may extend through the way we understand principles of application and judgements of appropriateness themselves, 50 that the issue ofwhat constitutes "impartial application" cannat be 50 neatly divoroed from the cultural context. 22 view have a dual aim; it must defend the integrity of each individual agent through according her equaI rights and respect, while simultaneously proteeting the ties of mutual recognition which bind an agent ta a communication community. Habennas tenns these two features '~ustice" and "solidarity" respectively. The exercise of morality in Habermas~s sense fasters and reinforces bath aspects: the dialogical procedure ofdiscourse ethics allows each individual to participate in defining the general interest, and thereby proteets the interests of each, while strengthening the web of intersubjective relations through reinforcing the ties of solidarity whieh emerge ftom relations ofreciproca1 recognition and respect.34 Yet Habermas recognises that the persuasiveness of this portrayal does not in itself constitute a sufficient response to the challenges of bis erities. As one of bis commentators perceptively remarks, "the issue betweeen discourse ethies and neo--Aristotelianism cornes down to the internai coherence of their respective accounts of practical reason.,135 Habermas combines this account of the persuasiveness of bis own conception of practical reason with a series of fundamental challenges to the coherence of a neo--Aristotelian one. He argues that reembraeing an Aristotelian approach could he unproblematic ooly were its proponents prepared to embrace the metaphysicaJ picture of the cosmos which grounded Aristotle's own ethics. However, contemporary neo-Aristotelians are unprepared ta do 50. The difficulties ~See Habermas, "MEL," in MCC4: 199-203. One of the aims of Habermas's concept ofsolidarity is to counter claims by communitarian theorist5 who argue that political philosophies which focus on the prirnacy of"justice" have been partly responsible for the '1i'agmentation" ofcommunity in modem society, in that this model of social self-understanding erodes the ties of solidarity wlùch bind together panicu1ar ethical communities. Alasdair MacIntyre is probably the philosopher most frequently associated with this view. Habermas's response relies upon an implicit distinction between two forms of solidarity. The first is the sort of solidarity which exists between members of a particular ethical community. It may be based in certain instances on exclusionary or oppressive practioes. The second fonn of solidarity is the one upon which Habermas focusses. This is the solidaristic relation which exists between agents who regard cach other morally; that is. through relations of reciprocal recognition and respect. Habennas believes this to be a real bond in modemity. and moreover, one which bis opponents have overlooked. Funhennore, this notion of moral solidarity should pl'O\ide a standpoint from which oppressive forms ofcommunity solidarity may be criticised. 3SCronin, 04Introduction." in J&A: x.xi. 23 attending an attempt to develop a practical philosophy in an Aristotelian spirit without such metaphysical underpinnings are, in bis view, insunnountable. He describes two such difficulties, bath ofwhich make reference ta features of modem pluralism. Habermas draws attention ta wbat Rawls bas called ~e fact of reasonable pluralism;" that is, the existence of a plurality of equally legitimate views of the good life which coexist in modem Western societies. For Habennas, il is a fact of contemporary social life that we live in a world populated by an irreducible varlety of conceptions of the good Iife whose intersubjective binding force cao no longer be grounded in a religious or metaphysical worldview acceptable ta ail. The Aristotelian approach is viewed by Habennas as requiring a retum to a substantivist conception of the good tied ta a particular fonn of life. Sueh agreement over the good is, in bis view, impracticable. In the present context only issues of the right are capable of commanding sueh agreement. Under modem conditions, philosophy cao no longer stand in judgement over the multiplicity of individual life projects and collective fonns of life, and ho\\" one lives one's life becomes the sole responsibility of socialized individuals themselves and must he judged from the participant perspective. Hence, what is capable of commanding universal assent becomes restrieted to the procedure of rational will formation. 36 If we want ta resolve arguments non-coercively, he argues, there is no other way to resolve conflicts across varying conceptions of the good than by adopting a procedural approach. In light of this understanding Habennas questions the feasibility of a neo-Aristotelian approach to practical reason. As we have seen, Aristotle distinguishes the form of knowledge in ethics from that embodied in science or rheoria in the strict sense. The intellectuai skiU involved in ethical judgement is that of practical deliberation or phronesis. However, modem Aristotelians, Habermas argues, cao no longer uncritically appeal ta sueh a faculty. The emergence of the modem naturai sciences bas compelled us to abandon the claims to ~bennas. "MSE," inJ&A: 150. 24 knowledge of Aristotelian metaphysics, and this bas altered the status of the claim to tnlth in Aristotelian ethïcs. In Habermas'5 view, ph:-onesis could ooly provide the individual agent with guidance conceming the nature and conditions of the good life because it drew upon a background picture which understood the end of human life in a certain way, as identified with the virtues ofthe polis.37 The current untenability of this background picture gives Tise ta two difficulties, bath of which make reference ta the features of modem pluralism. First, modem societies are characterised by a pluralism of individual life styles and communal ways of life. Habennas argues that individuals are in the present context required to choose between alternatives. We must either abandon the claim of an Aristotelian philosophy ta establish one way of life, such as that embodied in the polis, as capturing the proper good for human beings, and hence as capable of serving as a paradigm; or we must abandon the modem attitude of tolerance towards fonns of life, according to which a vari~' ofways of life are equallyg~ or at least, have an equal right to exist and be recognised.38 The abandonment of tolerance towards the multiple forms of life present in Rlodem pluralism is clearly indefensible. Second, if no one fonn of life is identified as exemplary, that is to say, as that fonn of Iife in which aIl persons (or perhaps, on AristotIe's view, ail eligible persons) could realise the goal of a good life, Habermas questions the ability of praetical reason interpreted as phronesis ta provide the agent with rational ethical guidance. He argues in essence that there is no viable substitute in modernity for Aristotle's ethical teleology. Habennas views the modem neoAristotelian as faced with a dilemma: "Once its metaphysical underpinning bas been removed," he claims, phronesis or practical reason "must either he assimilated to everyday 37Habennas, "neo-Aristotelianis~" inJ&4: 117. 38Habennas. uneo-Aristotelianism," in J&4: 122-23. 2S knowledge or elevated to the status of reflective knowledge. ,139 Habennas argues that a postmetaphysical concept of practical reason must either falI into common sense and hence serve as a conservative defense of the traditional assumptions of the form of life 10 which it is tied, or become ~~emancipated from provincial limitations" by moving in the direction of a procedural philosophy which orients itselfta the question ofwhat is equally good for ail human beings.<40 ln other words, because we cannet retum 10 a substantivist conception of the good tied ta a particular fonn of life, we must adopt an approach which can satisfy our intuitions conceming pluralism, 10leranee and faimess in modemity; that is, an approach that gives priority 10 issues ofjustice. Not to do so, ~io remain faithful 10 the Aristotelian conviction that moral judgment is bound to the ethos of a particular time and place" is 10 "renounee the emancipatory potential of moral universalism" and to "'deny 50 much as the possibility of subjecting the structural violence inherent in social conditions characterized by latent exploitation and repression ta an unstinting moral critique.,141 Habennas's discussion ofphronesis fixes on sorne very real difficulties coneeming the viability of this notion when detached from Aristotle's cosmology. However, bis appeal to the faet of modem pluralism in the debate against the neo-Aristotelian seems to me to blur the MOst interesting points at issue therein. 1 hope to substantiate this claim by approaehing the issue in an indirect fashion via Habermas's debate \\ith bis principal neo-Kantian opponent, John Rawls, whose political liberalism takes a universalist and procedural approaeh explicitly situated within a specifie historical and cultural context. 1.5 Excursus: The Rawls*Habermas Debate 3~bennas, "nee.Aristotelianism," inJ&A: 123. ~bennas, "nee.Aristotelianism." in J&A: 124-25. See also Habennas~ "Remaries on Discourse Ethics," inJ&4: 20*25. 41Habennas, "neo*Aristotelianism," inJ&A: 125. 26 Acknowledging the common inspiration of both discourse ethics and Rawls's political liberalism in the work of Immanuel Kant, Habermas regards bis debate with Rawls as in the nature of a familial dispute. My exclusive goal in examining this debate is to identify what Habermas views as the weak points in Rawls's argument, that is, to ascertain where he locates the principal points of difference between them. Habennas views Rawls's primary interlocutors at the present juncmre as contextualists who lt'question the presuppositions of a reason common to ail humans." His main reservation conceming Rawls's work is that Rawls bas in fact given too much over ta these opponents; tbat he "makes concessions ta opposed philosopbical positions wbich impair the cogency of bis project.,,42 One such set of concessions interests me particularly; namely, those linked to the notion that Rawls bas failed fully to divest the procedural conception of practical reason expounded in bis work of 'ltsubstantive connotations," and thereby ta develop it in a strictly procedural manner.43 This is tantarnount ta saying that Rawls's theory fails to he minimalist in the appropriate sense.44 RecaII that Habermas views discourse ethics as minimal bath because it restriets moral theory ta the articulation of a procedure, and because of the narrow range of phenomena it addresses. From this perspective, Habermas argues that there are at least two ways in whieh Rawls's theory fails to restriet itself ta a procedural approaeh. First, unlike discourse ethïes, Rawls's politicalliheralism does far more than articulate a procedure. It uses this procedure to generate specifie proposais for norms ofjustice, narnely the two prineiples of justice. The first prineiple, which takes precedence over the second, guarantees the equality in 42Habermas. RECONClUATION: 110. ~bermas~ RECONClUATION: 116. ~wls, ofcourse, makes a similar reproacb againsl Habermas, regarding Habennas's tbeory as a "comprehensive doctrine" and therefore insufficiently minimal when compared with political bDeralis~ which aims to develop a politica1 conception ofjustice independent ofany comprehensive doctrine. 1view this thesis, which iDVestigates the philosophical commitments underlying Habermas's positiõ as providing support for Rawls's position on this point. See. e.g. Rawls "Reply to Habennas," in The Journal ofPhi/osophy Volume XCII, Number 3. March 1995: 135-38. 27 terms of basic rights and political liberties of each member of society. The second places restrictions on the sorts of social and economic inequaliities which may exist in a just society.45 Rawls ~s commitment to defending SPeCific proposais is appropriate in Habermas ~s view to his raIe as a citizen taking part in a particular, bistorically situated debate; however, it oversteps the bounds of bis role as a philosopher. <46 This failure 10 distinguish philosophical from political tasks is related to what Habennas perceives as a second, and deeper, problem: the situatedness of Rawls'5 approach within a particular fonn of life. Rawls's political liberalism takes its point of departure from a question explicitly addressed to a specific context. He asks: ''What is the appropriate conception of justice for spccif)ing fair tenns of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal~ and as fully cooperating members of a society over a complete life, from one generation to the next?,747 Rawls 's question is addressed 10 a society with particular historica1 and social conditions, and bis aim is to develop an appropriate theory of justice.48 Its salient charaeteristic is social and ideologica1 pluralism. Rawls views this pluralism as reasonable; that is, as '1he nonnal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime.,.49 In bis view, only the oppressive use of state power could curtail the proliferation of comprehensive religious, political and moral doctrines. The aim of politicalliberalism is to develop a theory ofjustice politically acceptable "Sorbe two principles as expressed by Rawls in Polilica/ Libera!ism are as follows: "(a) Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme ofequal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal politicallibenies, and only thase liberti~ are to be guaranteed their fair value. (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to al1 under conditions of fair equality of opponunit}'; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least aclvantaged members of society." See John bwls, PoliticaJ Libera!ism (Columbia University Press, 1993): S~. ~bermas, RECONCIU4 TION: 131. See also bis "M5E,'" in J&A: 175-76. •7Rawls (1993): 13. *rhis is not, of course, to say that it is powerless to address itself to problems ofjust relations between peoples. Rawls indicates the sorts of response politicalliberalism might offer to problems of international justice in bis "Law ofPeoples," (An Oxford Amnesty Lecture in Basic Books 1993. 28 to these various comprehensive positions. 5uch a theory should aim "to work out a conception of justice for a constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines...might endorse."5O The endorsement of this political conception ofjustice should not presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine7 nor should the conception of justice be formulated in terms of any such comprehensive view. It should rather he articulated "in terms of certain fundamental ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a democratic society.1251 This conception ofjustice is moreover construeted for a specific kind of subject: it applies to the ubasic strueture77 of a modem constitutional democracy, where by ~1>asic structuren Rawls denotes the system of social cooperation manifested in a socidy~s political~ social and economic institutions.52 This reconstruction of the problem of just social cooperation is hence limited ta the politicalr~ and framed and answered within a specifie set ofhistorical traditions and social conditions. Habennas views this as a marked shift in strategy from Rawls's position in bis earlier work, A Theory ofJustice. He regards Rawls's intention in that work as that of representing the theory ofjustice as part of the general theory of ehoice. The aim of such a strategy would he to provide universal mIes of justice valid for ail rational agents through limiting the situation of choice in an appropriate fashion, and subsequently letting agents choose from enlightened self*interest.s3 The "serious concession" ofpoliticalliberalism in Habermas's view is the revision ofthis initial goal. Rawls, bowever7 disagrees with this reading ofhis intentions in A Theory of Justice. He views the transition to the more recent doctrine of political liberalism as motivated by problems in the earlier narrative conceming how a just society might maintain itself over time. Rawls regards bis initial account of the stability of a just *~wls (1993): xvi. S<>aawls (1993): xviii. 51Rawls (1993): 174*75. 52Rawls (1993): Il. 29 society as unrealistic. Whereas the account of a well~rdered society in A Theory ofJustice seemed ta assume a relative homogeneity in its basic moral beliefs, the central insight underlying the doctrine ofpoliticalliberalism is that the very fteedom ofthe institutions of such a society tends to foster a plurality of comprehensive positions regarding issues religious, political and moral. The well~rdered society of Political Libera!ism is hence no longer a society united in its basic moral beliefs, but in its political conception ofjustice. This concept of justice is regarded by Rawls as affinnable by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls remains unmoved by Habermas's objection that the conception of justice as faimess articulated in Political Liberalism is substantive and not procedural. He regards Habennas's daim as emanating from a ucomprehensive account of the fonn and structural presuppositions of thought and action;" and identification with a comprehensive doctrine is precisely what political liberalism eschews.S4 Rawls's analysis of the salient point at issue between himself and Habermas is perceptive, and worth quoting in full. 1 conjecture, looking back at Part 1 where 1 cited two passages from Between Facts and Norms, that by the terrns "substantive" and "substantiaI" he [Habennas] means either elements of religious and metaphysical doctrines, or those incorporated in the thought and culture of particular communities and traditions, or possibly both. His main idea, 1 sunnise, is that once the fonn and structure of the presuppositions of thought, reason and action, both theoretical and practical, are properly laid out and anaIyzed by his theory of communicative action, then all the alleged substantial elements of those religious and metaphysical doctrines and the traditions of communities have been absorbed (or sublimated) into the form and structure of those presuppositions. This means that te the extent those elements have validity and force in moral justification in matters of right and justice, their force is fully captured and can he defended by reasoning of that fonn and structure; for those presuppositions are formaI and universal, the conditions of the kinds of reason in all thought and action. Jusn*ce as faimess is substantive. not in the sense 1 described (though it is that), but in the sense lhat il springs from and belongs ta the tradition ofliberal thought and the larger community of polincal culture ofdemocratic societies. It fails then to be properly formai S'iiabennas, RECONCIliATION: 111-12. ~wls (1995): 179. 30 and truly universal. and thus to be part of the quasi-transcendental presuppositions (as Habermas sometimes says) established by the theory of communicative action.55 Rawls and Habennas hence concur in thinking that the appropriate form of justice for the pluraIist societies of Western modernity should he a procedural one. The crucial point of dispute pertains 10 the scope ofthe claims made by the theory; that is, ta whether deontological moral theory should concem itself with articulating a procedure for fàir social cooperation in tenns which are valid universally. The differing responses ta this issue given by Rawls and Habermas reflect different conceptions of the nature ofprocedural moral theory~ which in tum reflect difIerences in how each understands its justificatory basis.56 1 would like to illustrate this daim by looking briefly at Rawls's discussion of how political liberalism conceives the right as prior to the good. Rawls advocates a priority of the right in that he conceives ofjustice as circumscribing the limits of the ways of life which can legitimately he pursued in society. The challenge for political liberalism is, as it were, to draw the limit in the right place; to pravide '"sufficient spacen within the society it envisians for worthy ways of life. 57 Prioritisation of the right bas been conjoined in liberal thought with the notion that the state, in setting the limits of justice, must remain somehow neutraI between pennissible ways of life. In arder ta clarif)' the manner in which political Iiberalism aspires to this goal Rawls differentiates several senses in which a theory may aim at neutrality. The contrast between "procedural neutrality" and uneutrality of aim" is particularly useful in distinguishing the manner in which Rawls and Habennas conceptualise their respective prajects. 5~wls. "Reply to Habermas," in The Journal ofPhilosophy, 178*79. Italics my addition. ~ am grateful to Tony Laden for bringing several differences in the levels of theoretical justification 50Ugbt by Rawls and Habennas respectively to my attention. s7Rawls, following lsaiah Berlin, explicitly recognïses that although ajust liberal society may have more "social space" than other social worlds, il ma)' not be capable of accommodating many worthy fonns oflife. See Rawls (1993): 197-98, fn 32 and 33. 31 In Rawls's tenninology a theory is procedurally neutral if it can he defined "by reference to a procedure that can be legitimated, or justified, without appealing to any moral values al all." Recognising that the notion of justification may in its nature appear 10 involve an appeal 10 sorne values, Rawls amends the above de6nition ta read, "a neutral procedure may he said to he one justified by an appeal to neutral values, that is, ta values such as impartiality, consistency in application of general principles ta aIl reasonably related cases (compare to: cases similar in relevant respects are to he treated similarly), and equal opportunity for the contending parties ta present their Claims."S8 He regards Hahennas's moral theory as aiming at neutrality in this sense.S9 Habennas intends bis theory to be valid universaIly for all linguistic agents, on the basis of bis reflections upon the mode of language use which he caUs "communicative action." As Rawls points out, the ooly way this could he accomplished neutrally is if the reconstructions of the fonn and structure of the features of reason and action gjven by the theory of communicative action succeed in capturing exhaustively the morally relevant features of "substantive doctrines," of concrete historical fonns of life.60 Rawls does not intend bis own theory to he neutraI in this sense. He recognises that the principles of justice espoused by political liberalism are substantive and express far more than procedural values, as do the political conceptions of society and persan utilised in the ori8inal position.61 He argues for the priorit}* of the right in political liberalism in that the notion of justice it affirms should not he supported by conceptions of the good tied to particu/ar comprehensive doctrines. The view of justice affirmed through an overlapping S8Rawls (1993): 191. s~wls (1993): 191-92. see esp. Fn. 24. Rawls adds. referring indirectly to Habennas, "[t]he specification ofa neutral procedure MaY also draw on values that underlie the principles of free rational discussion between reasonable persons fully capable of thought andjudgmeñ and concerned to find the truth or to reach reasonable agreement based on the best available infonnation." ~wls, "Reply," 178-9. 32 consensus finds its basis of support in ideas of the good which are political and can hence he shared by citizens as free and equal. These ideas are viewed by Rawls as widely held in the public culture ofa constitutional democratic society.62 1.6 The Qum to Universality The scope of the claim to validity raised by Habennas ~s communicative ethics is, as we have seen, the distinguishing feature of the theory with regard to its main neo-Kantian competitor. 1 want next to argue that this claim also plays a pivotai and as yet unexamined role in the debate between Habennas and bis contextualist critics. In order to ilIustrate its relevance 1would like further to specify the sense in which the contextualist position concems me. The term "neo-Aristotelianism" as used by Habennas describes a number of diverse but interrelated positions sharing a common inspiration in the works of Aristotle.63 My principal interest is in the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-George Gadamer~ and in particular, in the stress laid by Gadamer upon the historically conditioned character of human understanding.64 61Rawls (1993): 192. 62Rawls (1993): 176. Rawls emphasises that "'neutrality ofaim" does not translate mto "neutrality of effect" since "it is surely impossible for the basic structure ofa just constirutional regime not to have important effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents over time; and it is futile to try to counteraet these effects and influences, or even to ascenain for political pmposes how deep and pervasive they are. We must accept the faet of commonsense political sociology." See Rawls (1993): 193. 63Seyla Benhabib provides a useful clarification ofHabermas's relation to neo-Aristotelianism. Benhabib distinguishes three strands of social anaIysis and philosophical argumentation to which the tenn "neo--Aristotelian" is commonly applied: F~ and particularly in the German context. neoAristotelianism bas been identified with a neoconservative social diagnosis of the problems of lalecapitalist societies. Second, this tenn bas been used to emphasise the imponance or"the decline of community in such societies. However. unlike the neoconservatives~ this second group also takes a criticaI stance toward society. The "communitarian" neo-Aristotelians look to communities in part to recover control over. and to build a basis for the critique of. modem capitalism and technology. In so doing. they aim to develop new solutions to the current crises ofwelfare-state democracies. Finally, neo-Aristotelianism is a position identified with a henneneutical approach to philosophical ethics. especially as developed by Hans George Gadamer. This last varlety is ofparticular interest to me. See Benhabib. "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel," in Situating the Self: Gender. Community and Postmodemism in Contemporary Ethics (Routledge. 1992): 24-26. ~e key text wrinen on this theme 1».' Gadamer is Truth and Method (Crossroad, (988). See especially the discussion of henneneutics and the human sciences in Secondp~ Section Il. My 33 i, Gadamer undertakes an exploration of the conditions of understanding which underscores the importance of the embeddedness of understanding in history. In 50 doing, bis aim is neither simply to emphasise the variety of conceptions of truth which have existed, nor ta attend to the limitations which our historicaI situatedness places upon our knowledge. The cu1turally and bistorically situated charaeler of agency does not, in Gadamer's view, function uniquely as a constraint. His intent is ta draw forth a sense of the productive insight which snch situatedness makes possible, as well as of the limitations which it potentially places upon our clairns to knowledge. In emphasising that there is no neutral vantage point ftom which to understand, Gadamer challenges a series of oppositions between the critical power of reason and the irrationality of established custom advocated by ManY figures of the EnIightenrnent. Enlightenment thinkers frequently regarded reason and method as sources of liberation in the battle against human misery caused by ignorance, oppressiõ irrationality, and injustice. These phenomena were often seen as finding their source in accepted dogma and custom, in prejudice and the authority of tradition. In the viewpoint of the Enlightenment, prejudices originate in two ways. One may rely upon received opinion tirst through laxness in the use of one's reasolt, and second, from a careless, unrnethodical use of that reason where it is employed.6S Yet although sorne established customs have clearly been pemicious, Gadamer views the thinkers of the Enlightenment as drawing a false opposition between tradition and reason; as being blind in their ardour for liberation to the virtues of what they attack. On a deep level, he argues, prejudice and tradition are essential to understanding. sununaty ofthese aspects of Gadamer's position is indebted to Georgia Wamke's lucid and elegant account in Gadamer: Herrneneutics. Tradition and Reason (Stanford, 1987): 73-100. Many of the points 1develop in this thesis were also issues of contention in the debate between Gadamer and Habennas. Wamke's discussion of the main lines ofthis debate bas a1so been very useful in writing this chapter. See Wamke (1987): 107-138. 34 On Gadamer's account there is no such thing as a neutral vantage point from which we can come ta an understanding of an object or subject matter. One must initially approach an obj~ text or situation by projecting meanings upon it. These "prejudices" or projected m~niñ form the point of departure for our processes of understanding. The literai meaning of the term "prejudice" is pre-judgement; that is, a judgement made in advance of an adequate assessment of the evidence. Such pre-judgements MaY he confinned or clisconfirmed, and are not, in contrast to the portrayal given them by thinkers of the Enlightenment, to he thought of as uniformly misleading. Moreover, pre-judgements or interpretive projections of meaning are rooted in the situation of the interpreting agent. In Gadamer's view, they refer to concems or assumptions which are part of the historical experience of the community to which the agent belongs. An agent's historical and linguistic situation is hence not a barrier to understanding, but rather the horizon or perspective from which understanding first becomes possible. There is in Gadamer's vie\\' no understanding which is not situated in sorne historical context, and no moral standpoint which is not dependent on a shared ethical understanding ofa community. From the idea that understanding is contextually situated in this sense, the immediate question pertaining to Habennas's discourse ethics is whether the procedure it advocates may not reflect ways ofthinking about issues of value tied in important respects to our own culture, and hence he potentially biased in its ability to serve as a device of cross-eultural arbitration. To ask this question is to ask, in a somewhat deeper sense than Habermas bas heretofore addressed the issue, the question whether the right is prior to the good.66 As we saw in .r 1.4, 65See Warnke (1987): 75. See also lmmanuel Kañ ~What is EnlightenmentT' in Kant 's Po/itical W,.itings, 00., Hans Reiss (Cambridge, 1970): 54~. ~ take the question of whether the right is prior to the good in the sense commonly attributed to it by liberals. which fonns the point of departure for this thesis, from discussions with Charles Taylor. Because my interest in this question is motivated somewhat differently from Taylor's 1 have not drawn directly upon bis work in the present chapter. It nonetheless foons the backdrop for rny thinking on this issue. See, e.g.• "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate." in Taylor, Phi/osophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995): 181-203; "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice," 35 Habennas understands the question whieh forms the axis around whieh bis debate with the neo-Aristotelian revolves as tbat concerning the fonn of ethic Most appropriate to a modem pluralist society. He portrays the neo-Aristotelian as aiming ta replace a procedural-style ethic with discussions oriented towards questions of the good Iife, and offers a number of persuasive reasons not ta adopt a substantiaIist ethic tied te a paradigmatic life history or an exemplary life-fonn. In the context of modem pluralism, Habennas maintaïns, discussions bound to the ideals and values of a particular way of life may Dot he able to gamer support. Consensus is far more likely to develop around a narrow set of issues important to ail parties. Moreover, in bis view, the prioritisation of the right provides a critical standpoint from which to adjudicate the daims of individuals, which makes possible the revision of existing practices. The utility ofa procedural approach lies essentially in its distantiation from specifie ways of life. From my perspective, the crucial question concerns whether the distantiation offered by a procedural approach is viewed as relative, or absolute. The fonn of contextualism in which 1am interested prompts us to question whether obligations connected to justice or the right form a category entirely separable from ways of thinking about the good tied to concrete historical life forms, which Habermas caUs *'ethïcs." A procedural approach may nonetheless he viewed as advantageous from this perspective. However, the understanding it espouses of the role and authority of the procedure in question would differ substantially from that upheld by Habennas. As we have seen, the recent work of John Rawls combines support of a necKantian position \\ith a recognition of the close ties between this way of thinking about the daims ofjustice and a particular, historical fOIm of life. Habennas, in contrast, seems to lay great stress on the ability of a procedural or fonnal ethic, properly conceived, to fully distance and uThe Diversity of Goods," both in Taylor, Phi/osophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophica/ Papers Va/ume 2 (Cambridge. 1985): 289-317 & 230-247, respectively. 36 itself from all specific cuhuraI fonDS of life.67 In Rawls~s tenninology bis theory aims to he ~1Jrocedurally neutral." Habennas's response 10 neo-Aristotelianism wouId seem effectively ta require two, interrelated levels of strategy. One line of argument would aim at defending a procedural rather tban a substantive approach within a contemporary, pluralist democracy. This bas been the almost exclusive focus thus far both of Habermas'5 discussiõ and of that of bis commentators.68 However, as 1 have argued, the uniqueness of Habermas'5 theory lies in its claim te he universally applicable to all societies. My guiding interest in this thesis is in reconstructing and critically analysing the various arguments offered by Habennas in defence ofthis daim. 1 regard this issue as the fundamental one for Habermas, and titis for two reasons. First, as discussed in Il.2 Habermas, like the contextuali~ affinns the situatedness of the knowing subject within a social and historicallanguage group. A principal challenge facing bis theory hence concems its ability to differentiate itself from what Habennas regards as the relativistic dangers of contextualism. He aims 10 do 50 by dernonstrating that language, which the contextualists see as the source of socialisation into particular ethical communities, is aIso the means through which we assume membership in a universal moral community. This intuition finds its basis in reflections upon the nature of linguistic communicatioñ and in particular, upen that mode of language use which Habermas calls ~~communicative action." Habennas argues that both the need for morality or justice and its essential elements are found 67This point is made by Charles Taylor in "Language and Society," in Communicative Action. 00. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas (polity Press. 1991): 30. 68Ciaran Cronin, for example, assesses the burdens of proofbome by Habermas and the neaAristotelian respectively as foHows: "...he [Habermas] can counter that under conditions of irreduClble plura1is~ consensus conceming basic values and notions of the good life bas pennanently receded beyond the horizon ofpossibility. and hence that neo-Aristotelian appeals to tradition and community as a basis for coordinating social action simply fly in the face of historical reality. Under such circumstances we are left with no alternative except to locale the nonnative basis for social 37 species-wide. Morality serves an essential role in ensuring the flourishing of creatures like us who become individuated ooly through socialisation into specifie language groups~ and are hence inherently wlnerable in our dependence for identity formation upon networks of reciprocal recognition. He claims moreover that moral intuitions are preseñ at lea.st in nascent fõ in ail societies struetured linguistically. As Habermas sees ~ the structure of reciprocal recognition involved in ail communicative action already contains within itself the intuitions extended and rendered explicit in discourse etmcs. To put it another way~ the nonnative content ofthe pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation is borrowed ftom that of communicative action, ooto which discourses are superimposed. This is why all moralities coincide in one respect: the same medi~ linguistically mediated interaction, is bath the reason for the vulnerability of socialized individuals and the key resource the)" possess ta compensate for that wlnerability. Every morality revolves around equality ofr~ solidarity~ and the commoo good. Fondamental ideas like these <:an he reduced ta the relations of symmetry and reciprocity presupposed in communicative action.69 Secoñ and more praetically, the procedure advocated by Habennas addresses ooly a narrow range of issues. As, on this account, vaIid norms cm ooly emerge from a process of reaI diaIogue~ it is illegitimate to demand from Habennas a detailed theoretical specification of them. However, bis writings provide an indication of the sons of principles he envisions as fonning just norms. Habennas's examples to date of what might constitute a generalisable interest refer exclusively to universal human rights. The adequacy of bis procedure must hence he measured in terms of its appropriateness as a mechanism for dealing oot ooly with issues of interpersonal confliet resolutioo arising within our own culture, broadly spea.king, but aIso \\ith those pertaining to aIl human societies.70 The invaluable role such a tool would play in the arena of international justice is apparent, and this, 1 want to argue, renders the issue of its interaction in the rational structure ofcommunication itself." See Cronin, "Translator's Introduction," in I&A: xx-xxi. ~bennas. "MEL," in MCC4: 201-202. 38 potential biases correspondingly pressing. In my view, the most compelling question which emerges from a recognition of tht: socially and culturally situated character of understanding is not wbether we shou/d think &om within a tradition, but whether it is not in sorne sense inevitable that we do 50. If 50, the best defence against ethnocentricism migbt he thought to he a self-conscious awareness of the presuppositions of our thought. A clear understanding of Habennas's position is hence essential. Secondary literature on communicative ethics bas focussed to date almost exclusively on the appropriateness of the theory to a modem pluralist society.7l Commentators have followed Habermas's lead in portraying the debates between Habermas and contextualists,n and between Habermas and Rawls73 as focussed essentially within the context of Western modemity. This bas, in my view, resulted in a somewhat distorted understanding of the issues at stake in each.74 A variet)' of reasons, in addition to a natural preoccupation \\iith our own 7Grhe adequacy of the procedure specified in Habennas's discourse ethics must hence be demonstrated in a manner significantly dissimilar to that of the Rawlsian original position. 71 A notable exception is Alessandro Ferrara's "Universalisms: ProceduraJ, Contextualist and Prudential," in Phi/osophy and Social Criticism 14, 1988; which briefly but accurately addresses the programme ofjustification pursued by Habermas and its burden of proof vis-a-vis other positions prevalent in contemporary English-language moral and political philosophy. Ferrara's article first sparked my curiosity in this issue. 72Ciaran Cronin's article, for example, compares these two positions exclusively within the contex1 of Western modemity. and this. as 1have pointed out in note #65, leads him to misrepresent the burdens of proofborne respectively by these approaches. 7:;Cenneth Baynes offers a detailed comparison between Rawls's position and that ofHabermas in The Normative Grounds o/Social Criticism.(SUNY, 1992) Ba}nes's discussion, which represents one of the first attempts to bring these positions into dialogue. is very useful. However, 1believe that il misrepresents sorne of the salient points at issue between these thinkers due to its exclusive focus on cornparing their adequacy for Western modemity. See aIso. "The Liberal! Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics," in Phi/osophy and Social Criticism 14, 1988: 293-313; where Baynes argues that discourse ethics offers a mid-point between the claims of liberalism and communitarianisrn. Baynes aims generally to show that Rawlsian constrUctivisrn could remedy its defects by faking the direction ofHabennas's communicative ethics. 7*William Rehg's recent book lnsight and Solidarity (University of California, 1994>. is the first fulllength study of Habennas's communicative ethics to appear in English. Il add.resses a number of questions pertinent to this thesis. and bas been helpful in guiding my thinking on severaJ points. Rehg's discussion ofwhether and in what sense the right is prior to the good in discourse ethics bas been particularly useful. However, Rehg's study restriets itselfto the context ofWestem modemi!)'. and this leads him at tirnes to misrepresent comparisons between Habermas and the other figures, such as Rawls and Taylor. whom he considers. Rehg defends the **modest}*" ofHabennas's position 39 concems, underlie this focus. Sorne enties have desired to delirnit and discuss a manageable segment of Habennas's project,75 while others have 50ugbt to distance themselves from bis species-wide claims to universality.76 However, perhaps the most significant impediment to a perspicuous discussion of Habennas's daim to universalism bas been the intricacy of its and the *'unavoidable good of social cooperation" presupposed by discourse ethics by appealing 10 features of modemity. He wriles: "In SUIn, discourse ethics makes a rather modest claim for its allegedll' unavoiclable good. Il allows one to acknowledge fully the value of self-ïnterest, or of goods and values besides that of rational cooperation, in their respective domains. In addition, it does not deny the possibility of choosing not to pursue the good ofcooperation in any given situation; neither does it assume that aIl social cooperation must be explicitly cooperative. Rather. il c/aims that in today's wor/d rational actors cannot in genera/ forego the good ofcooperation in conterts marked by conflict potentia/s. This is far from inflating such cooperation into a kind ofcategorical imperative for every particu1ar situation. n Rehg draws from bis discussion a rather suong claim for the priorit}* of the right in discourse ethics. He explains: .....denying the privileged status of the constitutive good of discourse etlùcs implicates one in a rather strong counterclaim to the effect that agents can aet rationally \\1thout ever basing their choice on the good of rational cooperation.... One of the aims of my thesis is to show how such claims misconstrue the strength of the arguments needed to justify Habennas's position. See Rehg (1994): 161, italics in first quotation myaddition. 'SUus is a principal reason given by William Rehg for bis exclusive focus upon discourse ethics as it applies to Western modemity. He nonetheless supports Habennas's claim to universalism species- \\ide, and invokes it as a theoretical strength of Habennas's position in bis comparative discussion of Rawls and Habermas. See Rehg's discussion of the priorit)* orthe righl in discourse ethics in (1994): 91-173. '6Seyla Benhabib modifies Habermas's claim to universalism bl' situating il explicitly within the contex1 ofWestem motiemity. She writes: ".. .1 would like to plead for a 'historically self-conscious universalism.' The principles of universaJ respect and egalitarian reciprocity are our philosophical clarification of the moral point ofview from within the nonnative hermeneutic horizon ofmodemity. These principles are oeither the only allowable interpretation of the formal constitutents of the competeocy of postconveotional moral aetors nor are they unequivoca1 transcendental presuppositions which every rational agent, upon deep ref1eetion. must concede to. These principles are arrived al by a process of'*ref1ective equilibrium," in Rawlsian lenns, whereby one, as a philosopher, analyzes. refines and judges culturally defined moral intuitions in light of aniculated philosophical principles. What one arrives at at the end of such a process of retlective equlibrium is a 'thick description' of the cultural horizons ofmodemity." The moral universalism defeoded by Benhabib is a style ofthinking, which fosters conceptuaI enlargement through its commitment to sensitively including all those affected by a given Donn. This is oot a claim to universal validity in the sense given it by Habermas. In moving closer to a contextualist position on this point Benhabib must also abandon the strict distinction made by Habennas between moralit)" and ethics, and the emphasis on the goal of consensus as an outcome ofdialogue. Her very ioteresting anempt to develop an approach to moral philosophy which takes the notion ofdialogue central to Habennas's wode in an original direction is elaborated in Situating the Self Gender. Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Routledge. 1992). The passage cited above is found in this work on page 30. 40 ( justifieatory strategy, which ties the recent work on discourse ethics ta bis longstanding project of developing a theory of communicative action.77 The systematic articulation of discourse ethics represents the coming 10 fruition of a project spanning thirty years of intellectual work. Habennas's commitment 10 this proj~ whose aim ta provide a legitimate normative basis for social criticism bas remained unchanged throughou~ bas impelled him ta foray inta a number ofareas ofphilosophy and social science. The conclusions of bis recent work on discourse ethïcs, which first appeared in German in 1983 (the earliest English-Ianguage translation dates from 1990), are based upon rnaterial presented at other points in bis career. The historico-materialist arguments, for example, date from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s, while the concept of communicative rationality and its relevance to the study of society came to fruition in the 19805. Moreover, developmental psychology bas taken on an increased importance for Habermas since the decade of the 19805. These various components of the theory of communicative action rernain the basis of Habennas'5 thought, and hold a key to the understanding of bis current project of discourse ethics. Much of the work of this thesis bas involved constructing a coherent and systematic argument from premises found throughout Habermas's writings. This thesis takes up the daim to universality made by communicative ethics by studying ho\\' this claim is justified. My reconstruction of Habermas's position is relatively linear. Chapter 2 examines Habennas's attempt to justify the procedure of discourse ethics by appea1ing to facets of linguistic agency. It looks specifica.lly at the argument that a speaker of "1 have been fortunate in having t\\'o excellent points ofreferenoe in connecting these branches of Habennas's work. Thomas McCanhy. in "Rationality and Relativism: Habennas's 'Overcoming' of Hermeneutics," in Habermas: Crilica/ Debates. ed., lB. Thompson and D.Held (Macmil~ 1982>, examines the success ofHabermas's attempt to use rational reconstructions to develop a critical theory ofsociety not susceptible to the relativism ofhermeneutics. Stephen White's monograph The Recent Work ofJürgen Habermas: Reason. Justice &Modemity (Cambridge, 1988) traces Habennas's anempt to develop a minimal fonn of moral unÏ'\'ersaIism from the theory of 41 a language must, on pain of "perfonnative contradiction" recognise the validity of the procedure specified by discourse ethics. The chapter demonstrates that L'le success of this argument is ried ta viewing as paradigmatic a specifie form of language use; one which presupposes the capacity of speakers ta differentiate and defend validity cIaims in a way not common to ail cultures or historical epochs. In fact, Habennas acknowledges that bis account of the rational structure of communication reflects the influence of Westem modemity. However, as he correctly points out, the fact that our knowledge is historically conditioned does not mean that its scope of validity is necessarily limited. His hypothesis is that the development of a species-wide communicative competence takes place over time, and that this can he shawn through rational reconstructions of their logic of development. These reconstructions aim 10 show that the fonn of rationality implicit in the modem worldview is not simply the out8r0wth of a specifie tradition, by rather reflects a bigher stage in a species-wide path ofdevelopment. Chapters 3 and 4 investigate Habermas's defence of this claim. Chapter 3 examines the rational reconstructions of the processes of individual and societal maturation offered by Habennas as empirical evidence corroborating bis theory. It argues that, nornithstanding their persuasiveness in many respects, these reconstructions in effect assume what is to be proven. They trace ordered sequences of development by specif)ing an endpoint which itself draws upen the concept of rationality whieh Habennas aims to support, and then .interprets the data in tenns of stages leading to this endpoint. These reconstructions therefore effectively assume the greater cognitive adequaey of Western modemity in order to support this daim.78 Chapter 4 then takes up Habennas's attempt to justify this methodological communicative action. Although these works do not focus directIy upon discourse etlùes they have fumished me an invaluable point ofdeparture. 781am hence less sanguine about the efIectiveness ofHabennas's appea1 to theoretical defeasibilit)' in mitigating the strength of bis claims than many cornrnentators. Croni~ for example, writes: U An important feature ofHabermas'5 account ofvalidity claims often overlooked by aities is ho\\' il combines a nonrelati'istic defense of the objectivity of truth and normative rightness with a 42 approach by showing that the fonn of rationality associated with the Westem worldview represents a higher level of cognitive adequacy than ail others. 1examine Habennas 7 S defence of this claim in the debate over cross-cultural judgements of rationality discussed in The Theory ofCommunicative Action. My aim is ta demonstrate the specificity of Habennas's position in this debate, and to suggest the viability of other ways of approacbing the issue. Chapter S offers a brief conclusion, which addresses the difficult question of whether the procedure spccified by discourse ethics is itself biasecL in light of retlections upon its programme ofjustification. The dialogical procedure for conflict resolution specified by Habennas gives powerful expression to sorne of our most important moral intuitions. The aim ofmy thesis is not to deny the importance of these moral claims7 but to recast our understanding of the provenance of their force. In my view7 Habennas's appeal 10 linguistic agency as the source of our obligation to recognise the legitimacy and priori~' of this procedure seems dangerously to obscure the complexity of the plùlosophical position one actually need adopt in order to support it, and the problematic aspects of what this position takes to he the relationship of modem Westemers vis-a-vis ather cultures. thoroughgoing fallibilism conceming particular faetua1 and normative claims, hOWC\'er weil supported by real argumentation. This applies to bis own theoretical claims as well: he explicitly ties the fate ofdiscourse etbics to reconstructions of implicit knowledge and competences that he acknowledges are fallible. and hence contestable, in principle." Cronin, "Translator's Introduction,"inJ&A: xxix, note 13. 43 Chapter Two 1 defend a cognitivist position. In facto 1 am dejënding an outrageously strong claim in the present contert ofphi/osophical discussion: namely. that there is a un/versai core ofmora/ intuition in aU times and in ail societies. 1 don 't say that this intuition is spelt out in the same way in ail societies at aU times. Whol 1do say ;s that these intuitions have the same oTigin. In the last analysis. they stem from the conditions ofsymmetry and reciproca/ recognition which are unavoidable presuppositions ofcommunicative action. Jürgen Habennas, uLife-Fonns, Morality and the Task of the Philosopher" An ethic:s is termed universalist when if alleges that this (or a similar) moral princip/e, far from reflecting the intuitions ofa particular culture or epoch. is valid universally. As long as the moral princip/e is not justified-ondjustifying if involves more than simp/y painting 10 Kant 's ''foet ofpure reoson "-the ethnocentric fo/lacy /ooms large. This is the most difficu/t part ofethies. Jürgen Habermas, ~~Morality and Ethical Life" 2.1 Introduction For Habennas as for Kant, the goal of moral theory is te develop a prineiple in teons of which the rightness of norms can he adjudieated. However, Kantian ethies is perceived by Habermas to fall short of this aim in at least three broad respects, two of whieh were touched upen in the previous clIapter. 1 F~ discourse ethics eritieises the monologie charaeter of Kant's moral principle.! As we have~ in Habermas's vie\\' the attempt 10 develop a moral principle adjudicable by an individual agent must necessarily fail. It does not follow from the IThese criticisms ofKanfs position are drawn from Albrecht Wellmer's very interesting discussion of discourse ethics in "Ethics and Dialogue," in Wellmer. The Persistence ofModemity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodemism (MIT, 1991): 115-6. 44 decision of a single agent to adopt a maxim universally that the maxim in question is truly universalisable, and that it aetually represents an impartial consideration of the interests of all concemed. Second, discourse ethics criticises the potential insensitivity of the categorical imperative ta the needs and wlnerabilities of particular individuals due 10 problems of formalism or rlgorlsm which may accompany such an approach 10ward ethical universalism.3 Thini, communicative ethics remains dissatisfied with Kant's attempts at a philosophical justification ofhis moral principle.4 These criticisms reflect in various ways what Habermas sees as difficulties in the conceptions of reason, truth and agency upheld by Kant, whose theoretical approach he refers to as "the philosophy of consciousness." Habennas proposes to remedy these problems by reconfigurïng or 'sublating' Kant's fonnally mono/agie universalism within a fonnally dia/agie universalism.s This thesis focusses upon Haberrnas's attempt to demonstrate that the basic moral intuitions we possess have their source in a universal feature of hurnan life, namely, in the linguistic structure of the communicative interactions present in all societies. Understanding how the dialogic nature of Habennas's theory opens up novel possibilities of philosophical justification is therefore essential. In 12.2 1 take up the daim to cognitivism of communicative ethics, with a view toward showing how Habermas recasts in intersubjective tenns the notions of linguistic meaning, ratianality and validity operative in bis theory. This discussion provides a point of departure for my examination in 12.3 of Habennas' s attempt to elucidate the justificatory basis ofbis moral principle through recourse to features of linguistic agency. Habennas, like Kant, defends bis moral principle through transcendental arguments. Yet as we shall see, Habennas's appeal ta ''the universal and necessary presuppositions of 2See J1.2 above. 3See JI1.2 and 1.3. "See, for example. Habennas's "PhiIosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter," inAfCC4: 1-20. 45 argumentationn is distinguished from the Q priori style of deduction taken up by Kant in its explicit fallibilism.6 In 12.4 1assess the role played by the transcendental-pragmatic argument in establishing Habennas's claim to universalism. 2.2 The Principle of Universalisation and the Defence of Ethical Copitivism The characteristics of Habennas's moral principle are dietated largely by bis commitment to articulating a defensible cognitivist ethical theory. As we have seen, Habermas*s theory takes as its airn the reconstruction of the moral point ofview, where this is understood as the perspective from which competing nonnative claims can he fairly and impartiaIly adjudieated. It replaces Kant's categorical irnperative with a procedure of moral argumentation which links the justification of norms to reasoned agreement among those subject to the nonn in question. Habermas presents bis defence of the moral principle through the device of a debate \\ith an imaginary interlocutor representing value scepticism, or pure ethica1 noncognitivism. An examination of this argument will complement the discussion of the principle ofuniversalisation begun in Chapter One by enabling us to see its strategic raie in Habennas's theoretical programme. Habermas portrays the non-eognitivist as challenging the notion that one cao properly speak of validity claims in ethical discourse. The value sceptic draws attention to sorne perceived irregularities concerning the rationality of our processes of belief fixation in ethical as opposed to assertoric discourse, from which basis she argues that ethical theories do not admit of truth and that ethical inquiry in the sense of normative theory is meaningless. This SWellmer, uEthics and Dialogue," in Wellmer (1991): 115. ~e most systematic explanation ofthese aspects of Habermas's position to date is found in Habennas. "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Programme ofPhilosophical Justification," in MCC4: This article is the principal source of reference for the present chapter. 46 position relies principally upon two arguments.7 (l) The first argument issues from puzzlement over the sense in which nonns may he said te be true. The sccptic argues thã because moral discourse lacks sorne essential features associated with rational discourse in the CODStative rea1rn, it cannot he viewed as making a validity claim anaIogous te a truth claim. Specifically, it is a fundamental feature of constative claims to truth that they are evaluable. This permits our coming to agreement upon them with adequately infonned individuals. Severa! features are associated with this notion of evaluability in the oonstative reaIm. When making claims to truth we assume that a claim wbich asserts that something is the case is valid if and only if it is in faet the case. There is sorne feature independent of that cl~ some state of affairs, in virtue of which the claim is justified or unjustified. It is in virtue of titis feature that we should he able to bring about agreement under appropriate circumstances as to whether a particular proposition is troe.8 It seems that if validity claims in ethics are rationally redeemable, we should he able to identify a similar characteristic in this case. The problem arises when we ask what justifies a nonnative claim te validity. As Habennas sees i~ previous attempts to explain the truth of ethical nonns on the model of faetual truths have not been convincing. The traditional objectivist view, which is modelled on the pieture of a constative truth claim, posits a hnon-natural property of rightness" to play a Tole analogous to that played in constative discourse by the concept of a state of affairs. Were there such a property, however, considerable agreement should exist on ethical nonDS. This is not the case. Habermas interprets this objection as a challenge to specify the nature of the validity claim raised in moral discourse. He \\ill argue that a normative claim to validity obtains if and only ifthere exists a "generalisable interest" among the parties affected. '1 am very grateful to David Davies for clarificatol)' discussions on the nature of the noncognitivist'5 arguments~ and for comments on carller drafts of this chapter. 8Habermas, "Discourse Ethics." in MCCA: 56. 47 (2) The second argument draws attention ta the fact that nonnative disputes, unlike disputes over matters of fã fail frequently 10 issue in agreement. Moral disagreements are often characterised by a pluralism ofultimate value orientations.9 However, we generally take it ta he a characteristic of rational beliefs that there he sorne method for verifying them. This can he interpreted as a cha1Jenge ta specify the procedure for the redemption of the validity claim in question. 1will take up Habennas's response 10 these charges in tum. As we will see, the principle of universalisation or "(U)" is designed precisely as a response to the philosophical worries underlying each. (1) A cognitivist ethic is one which holds the view that the validity or invalidity of a oonn cao he rationally ascertained. Habennas maintains that the sceptic's first query, which questions the cogency of applying notions of truth or falsity to nonnative propositions, loses its force once we give up the prenùse that ')tonnative sentences, to the extent that they are connected with validity daims at ail, cao he vaIid or invaIid ooly in the sense of propositional truth."IO In Habennas's view, the notion of propositional vaIidity modelled upon the satisfaction of truth-conditions is appropriate for faet stating rather than nonnative modes of discourse. Habennas aims to develop an alternative account of the rational redemption of validity daims, which does oot assimilate the rationality of claims to normative validity to that of constative truth. On Habermas's account, an action or practice is rational only to the extent that it is based upon reasons which are open to intersubjective criticism through argumentation, and which thereby pennit of correction and improvement. The tenn "argumentation" is reserved by Habennas to refer to that type of speech in which participants render contested validity claims explicit, and attempt to vindicate or criticise them through arguments. An argument '1Iabennas, "Discourse Etlùcs," in MCCA: 56. 48 contains reasons or grounds which are systematically connected with the validity daim raised in a problematic expression. The ustrength" ofan argument is measured in a given context by the soundness of the reasons proferred, and this c:an he estimated in part by whether an argument is able to convince the participants in discourse to accept the validity claim in question.11 Argumentation in Habermas's sense takes place in wbat he calls "communicative" as opposed ta "strategic" interactions. Strategic actions occur when one acter seeks 10 influence the behaviour of another by means of the tbreat of sanctions or the prospect of obtaining a rewar~ in order 10 cause the occurrence of a desired outcome. Communicative actions, by contrast, take place when an actor attempts rationally to motivate another towards a course of actiõ by raising criticisable validity claims which she guarantees to redeem. 12 The concept of a validity cIaim as articulated by Habermas is a general one, which can he used to illuminate a number of different domains of discourse in a coherent way. Validity claims may he rationally raised or redeemed in many domains of action, including tbose regulated by norms, cultural values, and aesthetic crite~ in addition to those regulated by constative speech aets. A validity claim says only that the conditions of validity of an utterance-be it a factual proposition or a moral comrnand-are satisfied. This cannot be done by direct appeal to decisive evidence; validity daims must he discursively redeemed. The appropriate form of redemption, as we shaH see, varies according to the nature of the claim. What is important to note at present is the way in which this understanding of validity claims allows Habennas to dissociate the notion of rational redemption from what he sees as a mistaken concept of truth, which models troth as correspondence between propositions and reaIity. It is byand large this association which Habermas holds responsible for the success of l~bermas."Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 56. llHabennas~ TC4 J: 18. 12Habennas~ "Discourse Ethics." in MCCA: 58. 49 sceptical arguments conceming the truth-status ofnonnative elaims. In bis view., the idea that propositional truth cao be explieated in tenns of the existence of states ofaffairs represents the specifie way in wbich the validity claim made in the domain of factual discourse is redeemed, rather than the exclusive model for rational redemption ofclaims in ail spheres. The epistemological understanding of validity elaims proposed by Habermas gives an intersubjective account of our practices of reason-giving. This account bas the advantage of generality in that it applies equally 10 all rational domains of hW1W1 life, and thus does not represent an ad hoc adaptation to the normative domain. As Habermas explains: ~~From physics to morality, from mathematics to art criticism., our cognitive accomplishments fonn a continuum within the common, though shifting, terrain of argumentation in which validity elaims are thematized.,,13 The account of validity claims developed thus far provides a general explanation of how various domains of action can he seen as rational. Habennas next undertakes to explain how the nature of validity claims and the grounds for their redemption vary across different domains. This enables him to meet the sceptie 's challenge and to articulate the nature of the claim to validity raised in nonnative discourse. On Habermas's account, validity claims funetion primarily as mechanisms for the coordination of social action: in allo\\ing for the rational offer and acceptance of speech aets, such claims make possible the continued interaction between speaker and hearer. However, the two discursively redeemable validity claims upon which Habermas focusses, that is, claims ta propositional truth and to nonnative rightness, play their roles as coordinators of social action differently, and are to be redeemed in analogous rather than identical waYS.14 Validity claims raised by faetual statements express l~bennas,"Remarks on Discourse Ethics," inJ&A: 30. 14Habermas, "Discourse Ethics." in AfCCA: S9~2. 50 claims to truth, and concem existing states of aftàirs. Normative claims, by contrast, express nothing more than a cIaim to rightness in intersubjective relatiollS. As Habermas explains: Tbat a norm is just or in the general interest means nothing more than that it is worthy of recognition or is valid. Justice is not something material, not a detenninate '~ue," but a dimension of validity. Just as descriptive statements can he troe, and thus express wbat is the case, 50 too nonnative statements can he right and express wbat bas ta he done. 1S This claim 10 nonnative rightness in Habermas's view expresses the idea that the action enjoined is equally in the interest ofall affected by it.16 As we have seen, Hahennas's theory, rather than aiming to develop substantive moral principles, limits itselfto a reconstruction of the moral point ofview. We can now see why bis account of the moral point of view takes the shape of a theory of argumentation: titis point of view is defined precisely as the procedure under wbich the validity claim 10 normative rightness can he redeemed. Ta say that something is moraUy right is 10 say that it expresses what is equally in the interests of all, and this, in Habennas's view, is simply to say that it would satisfy the conditions stipulated in the procedure established by the principle of universalisation. (2) The second argument given by ethical noncognitivists drew attention ta the faet that disputes over moral judgements often fail to issue in agreement. Habermas daims that this argument loses its force "if we can name a principle that makes agreement in moral argumentation possible in principle.,,17 The procedure outlined in the prineiple of universalisation counters this charge by specifying a method thraugh which a claim to moral validity may he redeemed, and the requisite agreement reached. l~bennas, "Morality. Society and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen," in J&4: 152. l~bennas. "Remarks," inJ&A: 29. l'Habermas. "Discourse Etlùes," in MCCA: 56. 51 The principle 50ugbt by Habennas must specify a procedure for legitimate generalisations or extrapolations in the moral domain. It serves a function similar to that fulfilled by the principle of induction in theoretical discourse, which bridges the gap between particular observations and general hyPOtheses. The principle of universalisation functions as a bridging principle in that it aims to provide a means of arriving at or coordinating legitimate moral consensus across various value positions. The legitimacy of moral consensus lies in the ability of the principle to do justice ta the notion of moral impartiality. As discussed previously, Kant's categorical imperative, which is designed 50 as to express the irnpersonal or general charaeter of valid universal com.mands, fumishes the starting point for Habermas's search for a bridging principle adequate to the moral domain. IB However, the categorical irnperative suffers in bis view from several weaknesses which impair its ability to represent a troly impartial perspective. 19 The principle of universalisation attempts to compensate for the informational gaps productive of bias inherent in Kant's procedure primarily by shifting the frame of reference for determining moral validity. Whereas Kant's categorical irnperative can be applied by a moral agent reflecting in isolation, the process proposed by the principle of universalisation is necessarily intersubjective: it stipulates that norms can onty be justified through a process of real dialogue among ail affected. This shift aims to compensate for the tendency towards bias produced by the categorical imperative in two ways. The first concerns the monological nature ofthe categorical irnperative. As Habennas emphasises, only if a moral subject could assume as uniquely legitimate her own form of life would she he justified in thinking that actions universalisable from her own perspective are 18Habennas, "Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 63. 19See for exarnple Il 1.2. 1.3. 52 truly 50 universalisable. 2O ln fact, combatting pemicious foons of injustice often requires the questioning ofone's anteeedent value orientations. However, because each individuallacks the necessary knowledge of the others' standpoint, moral impartiality requires that we adopt a procedure which will ensure that the interests of ail are taken into account. As we have seen, moral discourse compels us to think about a given situation from the perspective of the other discussants, an ability which Habermas sometimes refers 10 as the skill of "reversibility." At the same time, our involvement as participants io the process of moral argumentation ensures that we can check for ourselves whether the solutions proposed meet our interests as we best understand them.Zl Second, the principle of universalisation also ensures that the often criticised blindness of the categorical irnperative to consequences ofaction is not imported ioto discourse ethics. It aims ta proteet the ioterests of participants by requiring that the consequences and side-effects of the general observance of a nonn have been taken iota consideration by and for ail of the agents affected.n ~bermas explains tlùs point by reference to the formulation of the categoricaI imperati\'e concerning the Kingdom ofEnds. He writes: ~It is not a foregone conclusion that maxims generalizable from my point ofview must aIse be acknowledged to be moral obligations from the perspective ofothers, let alone aIl others. Kant could disregard this Caet because, as 1not~ he assumed that aIl subjects in the Kingdom of Ends share the same conception of themselves and of the world." See Habennas, "Remarks on Discourse Ethïcs," inJ&4: 64. 21 See, for example Habermas, "Remaries," in J&A: 52. nHabennas, "Lawrence Kohlberg and neo-Aristotelianism," inJ&A: 129. 53 2.3 The Transcendentai-PralJDatic Justification of the Principle of Universalisation Recall that the principle of universalisation set out by Habermas requires that every valid nonn fulfil the following condition: All aftècted can accept the consequences and the side effec:ts its general observance can he anticipated 10 have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation. 23 This definition of a principle to serve as a mie of argumentation constitutes the tirst step in Habennas 7 S attempt to justify discourse ethics.24 The remaining sections of this chapter examine bis attempt to demonstrate the universal validity of the procedure, by adopting a transcendental mode of argument. This argument identifies necessary features of linguistic agency. It then aims to show that, in virtue of their taeit acoeptance of these presuppositions, speakers of a language must also accept the principle of universalisation. This section introduces the transcendental-pragmatic argument and explicates its structure. The present discussion will enable me in 12.4 to address the question ofwhat this argument establishes. Habennas acknowledges that anthropological and historical data show clearly that the moral code which bis principle of universalisation represents is not charaeteristic of ail cultures and historical epochs. Many other societies, and our own societies in other historical periods, have operated v.ith normative concepts and codes which differ in important ways from those reflected therein. 2S ln faet, the intuitions underlying this principle seem 10 he espoused with significant frequency only in certain strata of modem, Western societies. It hence is evident that the universality of the structures which Habennas singles out cannot be established inductively. ~bermas. WDiscourse Ethics," in MCCA: 65. 24Haberrnas. "Discourse Ethics." in MCCA: 97. ~bennas, uDiscourse Ethics." in MCCA: 78. 54 Yet the problems attendant upon a deduetive approach to justification for this claim are not less striking. It bas been argued, notably by Hans Albert, that it is impossible deductively to justify a moral principle as having universal validity. According to Albert, a cognitivist atten1pting ta provide sucb a justification must inevitably tind herself pinned on the borns of a "Münchhausen trilemma." He claims tbat once we understand the nature of deductive justification and precisely how conclusions are logically entailed by premises, we must rec:ognise the following problem. The attempt to provide ultimate justification forces the cognitivist to search for further justification for any premise, and this process must in its nature he intenninable. The cognitivist must necessarily choose between three equally unacceptable alternatives: the attempt 10 provide ultimate justification tenninates either in infinite regress, or, if infinite regress is to he avoided, in a circular argument, or in arbitrarily breaking off the chain of deduction. 26 . The effectiveness of this trilemrna lies in the cognitivist'5 acceptance of the notion of deductive justification it employs, and this is precisely where Habermas takes issue with Albert~s strategy. Habennas argues that the notion of deduetive justification is too narrowly conceived to be appropriate to the context at band. The principle of universalisation in ethics, just like the principle of induction in the empirical sciences, is introduced solely as a bridging principle to permit inferences to he made among elements which are no! deductively related. Such principles are hence not amenable ta deductive justification.27 Habennas thereby evades the Münchhausen trilemma. However, difficulties in inductive and deductive approaches make necessary the development of a new strategy of justification for the moral principle. This strategy draws upon features of intersubjective communication. 2~bermas, "Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 79. 2'Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 79. ss Habermas's general goal is ta provide a theoretical aecount which does justice to the observed diversity of existing moral codes, while simultaneously demonstrating the universal applicability of its moral principle. Bath of these goals are accomplished by recourse to the theory of communicative action. Recall that on Habermas's view, members ofour species can only acquire an individual identity through being socialised iota particular social groups, which are characterised by relations of reciprocity. The values which fonn the context within which we are socialised do vary for a varlety of reasons across different forms of life, and this is ref1ected in the diversity of observed moral and social practices. However, Habennas also argues that the process of socialisation must always take place through the medium of communicative action, and that this imposes certain common structures upen it. Specifically, he argues that the relations of reciprocity and mutual recognitiõ which charaeterise communicative actiõ form a necessary part of the successful socialisation of any individual, and hence provide an "abstraet core" of moral intuitions which transcend the specific value fonnulations of any particular group.28 This concept of an abstract core of moral intuitions plays a pivotai raie io the justification of the moral principle. Habennas's programme ofjustification follows an approach taken by Karl-Otto Apel, who bas revived the transcendental mode of justification through building upon the resources of a pragmatics of language. Apel ' s innovative style of transcendental argument bases its defence ofmoral universalism upon identifying the conditions of the possibility of participation in practices of argumentation as such. In order to show how Habermas makes use of this strategy, it will he helpful to stan with a simple description of what transcendental arguments :zBnùs tenn is borrowed from Thomas McCanhy. See bis "Introduction," to Habermas. AfCC4: x. 56 are, and how they function ta establish their conclusions. 29 1 would like to use a description drawn from Charles Taylor's ~The Validity ofTranscendental Arguments" as a starting point. According to Taylor, arguments of the transcendental vanety consist of a chain or series of what he caUs "indispensability claims.'ùO The argument moves from starting point to conclusion by showing that the condition stated in the conclusion is indispensable to the feature identified at the start. However, it is clear that any c1aim ofthe sort that C is indispensable for B, which is in tom indispensable for A, does not in itself provide us with any information conceming the status of C. What a transcendental argument must show is that feature A provides us with an unchaIlengeable starting point, one which cannat coherently he disputed. As Taylor explains: The arguments 1 want to cali .transcendental' start from some fcamre of our experience which they claim 10 he indubitable and beyond cavil. They then move to a stronger conclusion, one conceming the nature of the subject or bis position in the world. They make this move by a regressive argument, to the effect that this stronger conclusion must be 50 if the indubitable faet about experience is to be possible {and being 50, it must he POssible).31 There are hence two broad stages in any transcendental argument. The first involves the identification of an indubitable feature of our experience, which \\i11 serve as the argumenfs point of departure. The second involves the drawing of inferences based upon this insight, which pennit the author to rcach a stronger or more interesting conclusion than that reached in the first stage. Habermas's argument is an ambitious one: He aims to offer a transcendentalpragmatic demonstration that every actor communicatively competent in a specific sense already presupposes the validity of the principle of universalisation. An actor cao reject this 29See Charles Taylor, "The Validity ofTranscendental Arguments,'" in Taylor, Phi/osophica/ Arguments (Harv~ 1995) for a more detailed account. »r"aylor, KValidity," in Taylor (1995): 27. 31Taylor, **Validity." in Taylor (1995): 20. 57 principle only on pain of ~~perfonnative contradiction.n 1 would like te present Habennas ~s argument in two stages confonning to this broad scheme.32 Stage One: Argumentation as an Essential Feature ofExperience Habermas's argument builds in crucial ways upen Apers work on the pragmatics of language. 1 begin by sketching sorne key clements whicb Habennas draws from Apel' 5 argument against the non--cognitivist or skeptic, who argues by means of the Münchhausen trilemma that moral principles cannot he given an ultimate justification. This should provide a vantage point from which to view the broad outlines ofHabermas's strategy. Apel argues that the sceptic or fallibili~ who denies the possibility of providing an ultimate justification for moral principles by invoking the Münchhausen trilemma, involves himself in what Apel caUs a "performative contJadictiõn and hence that bis position is not consistently tenable. This tenn is defined by Habermas in the following way: "A perfonnative contradiction occurs when a constative speech aet k(P) rests on noncontingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradiets the asserted proposition p. ..33 Apel aims in essence to show that the fallibilist mu~ in advancing her argument, make assumptions inevitable in an}l process of reasoning or argumentation. In taking part in the process of argumentation, the sceptic bas already accepted as valid a minimum number of unavoidable mies of criticism, namely the set of cules necessary to understand the sceptic's defence of the principle of fallibilism. These preconditions could then he shown to contradiet the principle of fallibilism. This strategy should reach even the sceptic who refuses to enter into the language game of moral argumentation in virtue of ber belief that moral phenomena require alternative explanations from the metaethical level, hecause as saon as the sceptic makes any claim in 32My presentaùon of this argument is indebted to Stephen White*s extremely helpful account in Stephen K. White. The Recent Work ofJargen Habermas (Cambridge. 1988): 50-58. 58 ! " favour of ber position, 50ch as the claim that moral phenomena cannat he ~b'ue~" for instance~ she must argue for this assertion. The style of transcendental argument offered by Apel and Habermas hence differs somewhat from the traditional approach. Rather than seeking ta establish conditions of the possibility of experience as su~ this argument examines the conditions of the possibility of the practice ofargumentation. The goal is ta show that engaging in any form of argumentation wbatsoever will invoke presuppositions which entangle the sceptic in a "perfonnative contradiction." ln order to have the practice of argumentation as such serve as an effective anchor for a transcendental argument, it must he shown to meet two conditions: (1) It must he demonstrated that argumentation is a fcamre ofhuman life 50 general that it cannot be replaced by a functional equivalent. Let us call this the irreplaceability condition. (2) This feature must also he shown to be an unavoidable aspect ofhuman life. ( 1) Hahennas claims that an argument is transcendental ooly if it identifies what 15 implicit in a capacity for speech and action, and is "general~' in the following sense: "Strietly speaking, arguments cannot he called transcendental unless they deal with discourses, or the corresponding competences, so general that it is impossible to replace them by functional equivalents; they must he constituted in such a way that they cart he replaced ooly \\ith discourses or competences of the same kind.,,34 The idea which underlies this condition is that if the practice selected to serve as the basis for a transcendental argument were replaceable by another functionally equivalent practice, the argument would not he compelling. The sceptic would be able to resist it simply by avoiding the practice identified and replacing it with its equivalent. 3~bennas, "Discourse Ethics." in A-fCCA: 80. 34Habermas, "Discourse Ethics." in MCCA: 83. 59 (2) The transcendental argument that Habermas develops can ooly work effectively against the opponent who enters into argumentation with the cognitivist. What of the opponent who eschews practices ofargumentation altogether? Ifthis is a viable option, the sceptic can simply evade the basis for the transcendentaI-pragmatic argument trom the start. Such a sceptic may, for example, regard practices of argumentation and justification trom the perspective of an extemal observer, rather than that of an engaged participant. This would be for the sceptic to ''take the attitude of an ethnologist vis-a-vis bis own culture, shaking bis head over philosophical argumentation as though he were witnessing the unintelligible rites of a strange tribe. ,,3S Habennas argues that this posture is not consistently tenable for a human being. In bis view, every agent is socialised into a shared sociocultural form of life through a criss-erossing network of conununicative actions, and produces her life in that context. As we have seen, communicative action involves the raising and redemption of validity daims, and this in tum depends upon a reciprocal imputation of accountability on the part of the participants. To esche\\' argument entirely, to give up on communicative action in favour of strategic action a10ne for exarnple, is to separate oneself from the communicative practice of everyday life. Although there is no logical impossibility in such a posture, it does seem to take us to the lintit ofour understanding ofhuman agenc)". The life of such an agent would seem to lack features wbich we consider constitutive of such agenc)'.36 On these grounds Habermas 3~bermas, "Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 99. ~ point was originally and persuasively made by Stephen White, who suggests that we should tbink of the concept of practical rationality as incorporating sorne minimal motivational assumptions. He maintains that there are two generâI types of motivation which are constitutive of what we understand as human action. The absence of one or the other in ongoing behaviour is grounds for throwing an agent's claim to reason radically into doubt. These are: (1) Motivation of self-interest or orientation to self which, a1though rooted in the motive of physical self-preservaùon, is not limited to this. The charaeteristic fonn of rationality here is means~nd reasoning. (2) Intersubjectivecontextual orientation: An agent motivated in tlùs way orients her actions not ooly towards self but also toward creating and maintaining institutions and traditions in which are expressed sorne conception of right behaviour and a good life with others. This motivational dimension expresses our charaeter as creatures who seek meaningfulness for our indi\iduallives by creating and maintaining intersubjectively binding nonnative structures. See White (1988): 7-24. 60 argues that the end of argumentation is sufficiently interwoven with the intersubjective forro of life 10 which human agents belong that it can serve as a noñarbitrary starting point for a transcendental argument. Stage Two: Justification ofthe Princip/e ofUniversalisation The practice of argumentation provides Habermas with a plausible feature of human experience on the basis ofwhich to begin a transcendentaJ argument. He now attempts to draw implications from this practicc which will allow him to refute the relativist. Ethical relativism is defined by Habermas as that position " ...which holds that the validity of moral judgments is measured solely by the standards of ratiooality or value proper to a specific culture or form of life.,,37 Habennas attempts to refute this position by pointing out that the sceptic mu~ in making any such daim, rely upon a specific notion of argumentation. He atternpts to show that this practice of argumentation requires us to make use of certain mIes or presuppositions, and that the principle of wùversalisation is logically implied by these. Habennas sometimes expresses bis position by saying that any linguistically competent agent who fails to recognise the validity of the principle of universalisation finds herself in a situation of '''perfonnative contradiction.,,38 As 1 hope ta show in this section and the next, this daim overstates what can aetually he demonstrated thraugh this fonn of argument. Before tuming to Habermas's discussion of the presuppositions of argumentation, it may he useful to look more closely at bis notion of "perfonnative contradiction." We can get a 37Habennas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in MCCA : 121. Habennas defines relativism as a position which holds that moral judgements are vaIid solely relative to a specifie culture. By showing that this position is not tenable, Habennas hopes to defend bis universalist approach. 1 will argue in Chapter 4 that Habermas argues for bis own position in pan by presenting the reader with a false disjunction. 3Iln "Discourse Ethics," he describes bis justificatory strategy in the foUowing terms: "Every persan who accepts the universal and necessary communicative presuppositions ofargumentative speech and who knows what il means to justify a nonn ofaction implicitly presupposes as valid the principle of 61 better idea of what Habennas sees as taking place in sueh a situation by rephrasing bis argument in tenns of the concept of communicative action. In ongoing communicative actiõ subjects coordinate their behaviour through a mutual recognition of validity claims. This mutuaI recognition rem on the hearer's supposition that the speaker can be held accountable for redeeming or justifying her claims should the need arise. This applies equally 10 the clairns wbich are continually raised in action oriented towards reaching understanding. Aecording to Habennas, tbis obligation to justify one's daims is one which every actor bas '''implicitly recognized" simply by virtue of having engaged in communicative action. Moreover, imputations of equality and mutual recognition between aetors must a1so be part of this process, as such assomptions are required for the non-coereive justification of nonns.39 Any communicatively competent actor hence tacitly makes use of certain notions which have a moral dimension. To deny the legitirnacy ofthe principle of universalisation is, in Habermas's view, to deny what is logically entailed by the presuppositions of one's own practices. These presuppositions fonn the "abstract core" of our moral intuitions. Habermas follows Aristotle in distinguishing three levels of presuppositions of argumentation. The first arise at the logical level of products, the second at the dialectical level of procedures, and the third at the rhetorical leveI of processes. He examines each in order to ascertain whether it can furnish suitable premises for a transcendental-pragmatic argument. 1discuss each in sequence. Reasoning or argumentation is designed to produce logically cagent arguments which allow us to justify or vitiate daims to validity. The presuppositions of argumentation at this UIÙVersalization, whether in the fonn 1gave it above, or in an equivaIent forro. ft See Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 86. 3~ am indebted here to Stephen White's account of Habermas's argument. See White (1988): 50-55 for a very enlightening analysis ofHabermas'5 argument against the rationality ofa radically strategie aetof. 62 level are logical and semantic rules. These mIes have no ethical impõ and hence do not constitute suitable bases from which ta construet the transcendental-pragmatic argument. In proceduraI tenns, arguments are processes of reaching understanding in which validity claims offered by speakers and hearers are made explicit, and in which the participants involved attempt ta vindieate or criticize sueb claims. Habermas argues that participants in discourse at this level must assume a reciprocal obligation ta justify the claims which they make, and to be truthful in their defence of these claims. These asSumptiODS, which Habennas believes ta be ~~implicidy recogni.zed" by every actor who engages in action oriented towards reaching understanding, do bave ethical importe Habennas maintains that the obligation ta provide justification in the search for better arguments is "irreconciliable with traditional ethical philosophies that have to proteet a dogmatic core of fundamental convictions from aIl criticisms.,1040 1 shall argue that the success of this claim tums upon a particular use of the notion of argumentation. In essence, Habennas daims that one can only defend a traditional ethics by removing it from the sphere of argumentation as practiced by US41 • For Habermas, a '~tional ethics" is one which keeps a core of basic convictions away from the demand for justification which argumentation imposes upon us. The precise meaning of bis "demand for justification" must he cIarified, as it cao be interpreted in both a broad and a narrow sense. If the demand for justification associated with communicative action is truly to he universal, and found in the widely varying cultural and social circumstances in which communicative actions are present, the notion ofjustification involved must be interpreted in a broad sense. The requirement that the demand for justification he met at this Ievel does seem te establish that participants in argumentation are obliged to provide ~nnas, "Discourse Ethics," in MCCA: 88. 41The distinction between argumentation Was practiced by us," and argumentation in the broad sense is central in Chapter 3. 63 reasons for the daims they make7 and that the inability or unwillingness ta do sa may he interpreted as a fonn of inationality. However7 a proponent of a traditional ethics is fully capable of providing reasons at this level. What such a persan may not he willing ta do (on Habennas 7S definition of traditional ethics) is ta satisfy the demand for justification in a more narrow and specifically modem sense; she may he unwilling ta provide justification for claims which calI into question the most basic tenets of her ethical framework. This does not seem ta he irrational7 per se. 42 However7 the sceptie who makes use of a narrow or modem notion of argumentation in advaneing ber own claims and yet refuses ta apply this notion 10 traditional ethies wouId he inconsistent in ber practice. The specifie nature of this inconsistency receives clarification at the next level ofargumentation. Habennas aIso regards argumentation as a process of communication aimed at reaching rationally motivated agreement. The success of this process tums upon its ability ta present itselfas a fonn ofcommunication which approximates7 to a satisfactory degree7 certain ideal conditions. As Habermas explains7 "[p]artieipants in argumentation cannat avoid the presupposition that7 owing to certain eharaeteristies that require fonnal descriptiõ the structure of their communication mies out ail external or internai coereion ether than the force of the better argument and thereby also neutralizes ail motives other than that of the cooperative seareh for truth. 7743 Using the method of perfonnative contradictions to test the intuitions of subjects competent in speecb and action44 as ta what constitutes a valid argumeñ "2As Steven White notes, provided that the agent in question is consistent in the judgments she makes (i.e. willing to apply a norm of action equally to herself and others) the proponent of ttaditional ethics does not seem to be "irrationai" in the strong sense needed ta establish perfonnative contradiction, in that the agent is not involved in behavior which is unintelligible to us. or which takes us to the limits of our understanding ofhuman agency. See White (1988): 54. However, 1believe that White misses the force ofHabennas's point here. The "perfonnative contradiction" is imputed to the sceptic, who aUegedly makes use ofa narrew, more demanding forro ofargumentation in making bis o\\n point, while failing ta apply this to traditional ethies. °Habermas, "Moral Consciousness," in MCCA: 89. <14As we shall see. "competent" for Habermas means competent modem. Western speakers. 64 Habennas attempts to specify certain ndes ofargumentation essential ta discourse. He accepts the rules set do\\n by R. Alex)' as a tentative reconstruction ofthese intuitions. These mies are as follows: (3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and aet is alIowed to take part in a discourse. (3.2) a. Everyone is alIowed to question any assertion wbatever. b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. c. Everyone is aIlowed to express bis attitudes, desires and needs. (3.3) No speaker may he prevented, by internaI or extemal coercion, from exercising bis rights as laid do\\n in (3.1) and (3.2).4S Habennas maintains that any agent who engages in argumentation must presuppose the validity of the discourse mies. These ruIes, which represent the explicit statement of the normative content of the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, fonn the first premise for the derivation of the principle of universalisation. The second premise captures our general intuitions conceming what it means '10 discuss hypothetically whether norms of action ought to he adopted." Disputes over nonns can he understood as those where alternative orderings for the satisfaction of interests are at issue. In Habermas~s view, participants in discoursf.: must recognise that the ooly way in which a particular scheme for the ordering of interests would be considered legitimate by ail is by recourse to a Olle of universalisation. Habennas argues that the principle of universalisation follows by '~material implication" from the conjunction ofthese two prenùses.46 "~bennas, "Moral Conscïousness," in MCCA: 89. 460yne specifics ofthis "derivation" are complex., and lie outside my concems in this chapter. J refer the interested reader to two sources: William Rehg, Insight and So/idarity (University of Califomia, 1994): 57-83; and Seyla Benhabib, "Liberal Dialogue versus a Critical Theo!)' ofDiscursi\'e Legitimation," in Liberalism and the A-/ora/ Lift, Nancy Rosenblum 00., (Harvard, 1989): 143-156. 65 2.4 Assessment of the Success of the Transcendental-Pragmatic Argument Traditional transcendental arguments are constituted by a series of indispensability claims anchored in sorne universally shared experience or activity. Such arguments aim to establish a conclusion which is strong relative to the argument's starting point, by arguing that the conclusion must obtain in virtue of its serving as a condition of the possibility of the (indubitable) first premise. Transcendental arguments have usually aimed 10 provide an '\1ltimate justification" of their conclusions. This fonn of justification aims to create an absolutely secure epistemological basis for theory, and one immune to the fallibilism of ail knowledge deriving from experience. Habermas's style of uanscendental-pragmatic argument differs from the traditional model in several respects. In the first place, it provides an analysis of the conditions of the possibility of there being a particular practice, that of argumentation, rather than of experience itself However, the most salient difference between Habermas's approach and the traditional one is the rejeetion of the ambition to provide ~'ultimate foundations." TItis largel)' refleets Habermas•s dissatisfaction with the approach to philosophy underlying such arguments in their classical fonn. As we shaH see in Chapter 3, Habermas's abandonrnent of the search for ')Jltirnate foundations" is intimately tied up with his attempt to develop a nC\\* paradigm for philosophy, and one which would bring it into a more fruitful relationship with research programmes in the social and natura! sciences. Habennas' s strategy is in essence to uncouple the aspiration for theoretical universality ftom that for neoessity or oertainty. As he himself describes it: '~I have tried to take up the universalistic line of questioning of transcendental philosophy, while at the same 66 time detranscendentalising the mode ofprocedure and the conception ofwhat is to he shown. ,.47 The fonn of philosophy Habermas proposes would he self-conscïously fallibilist, and yet would offer a universalist account of rationality and rationalisation. It would aecomplish this by entering into a working relationship with promising empirical research programmes, and Most especia11y with the ureconstnJctive sciences." Habermas believes there te he crosscultural universals of cognition, speech and action, which can be captured in fallible, but nevertheless general reconstructions of species-wide competences,. such as those pertaining to the presuppositions ofargumentation. With these concepts in mind, 1 would now like 10 evaluate the success of Habermas's argument against the relativist, and in particular, te identify which components ofhis argument bear the burden of proof. These brief concluding remarks set the stage for the discussion undertaken in Chapter Three, and \\ill he explored more exten5ively at that point. It \\i11 be useful to consider the two stages of the transcendental-pragmatic argument individually. The fust stage, which uses the technique of '''performative contradiction" 10 demonstrate the indispensibility of argumentation to ongoing social action, appears relatively successful. ln showing that argumentation is a central feature of human agency, Habermas aIso draws out certain implications for the tenability of the value sceptic's position: he persuasively shows that it is not possible to eschew argumentation entirely without calling into question one's o\\n rationality. When we consider what would he involved in such an attempt,. we are brought to a limit of our conception of what it means to he human. The second stage of the argument aims to clraw implications from the indispensability claim established in the first. As we have seen, its critical significance is lirnited. The ubiquity of the practice of argumentation does provide grounds for thinking it a feature of agency that 47Habennas, REPL}": 238. 67 the validity claims raised in argumentation should he redeemed by providing good reasons. Nonetheless, the c1aim that our participation in a practice of argumentation requîres us ta recognize the validity of a moral principle resembling the principle of universalisation is directed towards (and can hence he successful ooly against) a moral sceptic, who relies implicitly upon this modem or narrow notion of argumentation in advancing bis view. RecaIl that the sceptic regards moral claims as failing ta advance cIaims to validity in a sense analogous ta assertoric c1aims. Habennas interprets the sceptic as sayin& in essence, that we could give up a particuJar view of moral argumentation without giving up anything central to our practices of rationality. The force of Habennas 's response is to say that our moral claims are equally weil or badly grounded as anything established through arsumentation. Our conception of ethics is not optional for us, 50 long as we have the conception of discourse which we do have. However, the intuitions which Habermas uses as a basis for developing the reconstruction of the presuppositions of argumentation ("discourse rules") are not empirically to he met with universally. For example, not every speaker of every language need have the same understandings ofhow to justify a nonD, or ofwhat are the underlying rules ofdiscourse. The method of probing for linguistic intuitions through performative contradiction may not elicit the same response in each case. In filet, it seems that these intuitions correspond most c10sely ta those of modem language speakers. Hence to the extent that these relatively thick intuitions conceming argumentation are required by Hahennas's transcendental argument, they cannot he assurned ta he inescapable features of human agency. Even if Habermas's reconstruction of the linguistic intuitions of modem language speakers is accurate in its entiret)', we must ask what force bis argument bas against agents who do not share this specifically modem conception of argumentation. Someone who argues from what Habennas 68 caUs a "traditional" ethical position would still satisf}' the demand for rational accountability inherent in the practice of argumentation in its most general sense, the sense established by Stage 1 of the transcendental argument. The transcendental-pragmatic argument appears at most ta show that speakers with certain (modern, Western) intuitions about the nature of argumentation may find themselves in a species of ~~perfonnativecontradiction" if they do not recognize the validity of the principle of universalisation.4I However, it offers no grounds in itself for persuading those who do not intiallly share these intuitions of their general validity. Justification of the principle of universalisation in the strong sense needed to defeat the relativist hence cannot unequivocally he established on the basis of a transcendental-pragmatic argument. This reflects the modesty of what Habermas, in contrast to Kant, regards philosophy as capable of establishing. Habennas caUs the style oftranscendental justification which he offers Hweak", rather than '''ultimate.'' Let us investigate titis claim. What the transcendental argument so far bas sho\\n is no! that the mies necessary for argumentation (the presuppositions of argument) are true, or justified. Rather, it allows one to infer that if the praetice of argumentation is to procee<L there are no alternatives to these mies of argumentation, as these rules fonn the conditions for the possibility of the practice itself.49 However, if we interpret the tenn "argumentation" in its specifically modem sense, the transcendental argument by itself cannot establish that modem notions of what it means to argue and to justify a nonn are of universal "significance" and hence fonn a suitable point of reference for all linguistic agents. The universal import ofthese experiences must be established by other means if the argument is to ~s conclusion fo11o,,"s ifone grants Habennas the truth of bis prenùses. 1abstain from taking a position on the accuracy ofHabennas'scharaeterisation of the presuppositions of argumentation neoessaJ')* to Western modemity, as this issue faIls outside the immediate scope ofmy thesis. "~bermas. "Discourse Ethics," in AfCCA: 95. 69 persuade those who do not initiall)' share modem conceptions of argumentation or of the justification of nonns. Sorne of the reasons which Habennas offers for the validity of bis transcendentalpragmatic argument are drawn from lines of empirical researclt, and especially from rational reconstructions of our competences in various fields. He hopes that these various theoretical perspectives may overlap in ways which corroborate bis findings. Thomas McCarthy describes the burden of procf assumed by Habermas in arguing against the relativist as follows: Ta put it succinetly, Habermas bas ta show that the ability to act communicatively (in bis strong sense) and to reason argumentatively and reflectively about disputed validity claims is a developmental-Iogically advanced stage of species-\\ide competences, the realisation and completion of potentialities that are universal to humankind.sa The plausibility ofHabermas's defence of the claim that there are universal-pragmatic fea.tures of communication as such therefore tums on the success of bis attempt ta view these features in a developmental perspective. This will he the subject ofChapters 3 and 4. Habermas must show by means of such accounts that the emergence of the rationaIity he associates \\ith language use in Western modemity represents a demonstrable advance upon other structures. The weight of the argument against the relativist is contained in these developmental reconstructions, rather than in the transcendental-pragmatic argument itself. »rhomas McCanhy, "Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's "Overcoming" ofHenneneutics,'" in Habermas: Critica/ Debales, 00. 1. B. Thompson and David Held (Macmillan, 1982): 66. McCarthy's article bas been invaluable in clarifying Habennas's approach to estabüsbing bis theoretical claim to universalism. My understanding in this cbapter is very much indebted to bis account. 70 _________C_'h.....apter Three What raises us out ofnature;s the only thing whose nature we con know: language. Through ifs structure autonomy and responsibility aTe positedjOT us. Ourfirst sentence expresses unequivocally the intention ofuniveTsal and unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together comprise the only idea that we possess a priori in the sense ofthe philosophical tradition. Jürgen Habermas, 19651 ... the presuppositions ofcommunicative action already carry within themselves the germ of morality. Jürgen Habermas, 19912 3.1. Introduction The intuition underlying Habermas's progranune of discourse ethics is that ail human beings, in virtue of their being speakers of a language, should recognise the validity of severaI moral concepts, and that these concepts find their fuilest articulation in the procedure outlined by the principle of universalisation. His attempted justification of this idea is complex and proceeds on severallevels. In the last chapter we examined the structure of the ttanscendentalpragmatic argument, which airns ta show that every communicatively competent actor who engages in the practice of argumentation presupposes the validity of the principle of universalisation. During the first stage of the argument Habennas introduced the notion of 1Jürgen Habermas, Inaugural Lecture, June 1965 al Frankfun University. Reprinted as an appendix in Habennas. KHI. 71 conununicative action in order to demonstrate its inescapability as a practice for all human agents. Recall that communicative action is defined by Habermas as a form of interaction in which the participants coordinate their plans ofaction consensually. Such action is initiated by a speaker's making a speech act, which implicitly raises a validity daim. The hearer can then respond to this claim with either a "yes" or a "no". In making a speech~ a speaker offers a hearer an implicit guarantee that she will redeem ber c1aim by providing reasons should she then he challenged to do 50. In Haberrnas's account, the raising of such a validity c1aim involves bath speaker and hearer in a relationship of mutual obligation. The hearer assumes the corresponding obligation to accept the claim in question unIess she can cite reasons against this course of action. The coordinating power of the interaction hence lies in this assumption of mutual responsibility to provide reasons for the claims in question. This obligation to evaluate the vaIidity clairns raised in speech aets through recourse to ~~good reasons" establishes an internal link between the concepts of communicative action and argumentation, a link which is essential to the sucoess of the transcendental-pragmatic argument. However, as we saw in the last chapter, the two stages of this argument rely upon quite different forms of argumentation. In a different context, Maeve Ccoke bas distinguished two senses in which the tenn "argumentation" is employed by Habennas. 1 would like to adapt her tenninology to c1arify the present issue. 1 thus distinguish a general or "conventional" form of communicative action from a "postconventional" mode of communicative action associated with Western modemity, which 1think essential for the derivation of the principle of universalisation. The tirst stage of the transcendental-pragmatic argument relies upon a conventional form of communicative action to establish its claim to generality: it draws attention to the need of human agents te engage in practices of argumentation in a very weak 2Jürgen Habennas. "Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism" in Habennas, J&A: 132. 72 sense, which requires ooly that agents engaged in communicative action he accountable for providing "good reasons" for their plans of action. These reasons may take a variety of fonns: practiccs of reason-giving based upon the ~ons of any particular society can fully satisfy the demand for justification at this level. As Cooke explains: ...this way of characterizing communicative action points ta an internai connection between such action and prooesses of argumentation, [however] these processes may be very rudimentary ones. What counts as a good reason may he fixed and given by the traditions of a particular society, for instance, and the validity of these reasons MaY he regarded as beyond dispute. This suggests that it is useful to distinguish between conventional and postconventional modes of communicative action. Only the latter are connected with forros ofargumentation that are opeñdedand critical.3 The distinction between the two fonns of argumentation hence tums upon the nature of the demand for justification associated with cach. The demand for justification associated with conventional forms of argumentation cao he fully satisfied by appealing to established practices of reason.giving in a particular tradition. The very basic tenets undergirding a tradition may weil he conceived to lie beyond dispute. In contrast, postconventional forms of argumentation are charaeterised by a more radical demand for justification, which stipulates that no validity daim may he exempt in principle from the critical e\ aluation of participants. In this chapter 1 will argue that the form of argumentation associated \\ith communicative action in the conventional sense (I ",ill henceforth use this term interchangeably with "Argumentation. ") does possess charaeteristics which have ethical import; however, it is the postconventional sense of argumentation ("Argumentation:;! ") which embodies the preunderstandings required for the derivation of (U). The reciprocal obligations involved in conventional practices of argumentation are of sorne relevance for ethics. Since communicative interactions are by definition non-eoercive, the success of the interaction is contingent upon relations of mutual recognition and respect upheld 73 by bath speaker and hearer. Each must regard the other both as an autonomous source of claims, and as an equal participant in the process ofjustification. This means that, in addition to using words consistently, participants in Argumentation) must ensure that no relevant argument is suppressed or excluded, that the situation is sufficiently ftee of force so that ooly the force of the better argument prevails, and that ail participants are motivated onIy by concem for the better argument.4 However, these relations of mutual recognition and respect may he seen ta apply ooly to a certain segment of society, with the result that the set of individuals who MaY he encountered by a given agent as potential partners in communicative action may he less than universal. The nonnative judgments developed from this fonn of argumentation must consequently he general only in the limited sense of being applied consistently by an agent to herseIf and to others. The norms themselves may be radically inegalitarian. For example, an agent who beIieves that there exists a class of persons who naturally possess the charaeter traits of slaves couId consistently support a norm endorsing the existence of slavery. It couId plausibIy he argued on these grounds that this practice is of general benefit in that it meets the needs of bath master and slave.S In Argumentation! the preconditions for the practice of argumentation are similar; yet, due to the characteristics of such modes of argumentatiõthey take a more universaI form. The postconventional mcxie of argumentation opens all validity claims ta critical evaluation by all. It thereby makes it incumbent upon participants reciprocally ta recognise one another as autonomous sources of claims having equal initial plausibility, and of demands which must he addressed.6 These forms ofargumentation C&J1 thus he seen ta rely upon the concepts of what Seyla Benhabib bas ~eveCooke, Language and Reason (MIT Press, 1994): 12-13; cf. p.30. 4Habermas, MCC4: 86-9. See also Cooke (1994): 30-31. sef Aristotle, Polilics. traIlS. Ernest Barker (Oxford University Press, 1958): 9-18, especially 18. Habennas's insistence on the need for nonns to bejustified through a process ofreal dialogue reflects a desire to preempt precisely these sons ofarguments, in which one agent pretends an ability to represent the needs and interests of another who bas not herself been consulted. 74 termed ''universal moral respect," which specifies that every person capable of speech and action bas an equal right to take part in the process of argumentation, and uegalitarian reciprocity," which stipuIates that within the moral conversation each individual bas symmetrical rigb15. 7 These include the rights of the each participant to question any assertion, to introduce new tapies into the discourse, and 10 express ber attinldes, desires and needs.' The first stage of the transeendentaI-pragmatic argument demonstrated with plausibility that the practice of argumentation associated with communicative action in the conventional sense is an inescapable feature of human life. It is bath central to our understanding of human agency, and irreplaceable by another, equivalent practice. It follows that insofar as this practice ofargumentation bas moral import, it will he of universal relevance for ail human beings. However, as Habennas recognises, the moral presuppositions associated with Argumentationt can he accomodated within a wide varlety of normative practices, and thus do not themselves establish any interesting fonn of moral universalism. Sïnce the overall aim of the transcendental-pragmatic argument is to support Habermas's claim that discourse ethics is of validity for all hurnan agents, the second stage of the argument endeavours to show the close links between postconventional forms of argumentation and the derivation of the principle of universalisation, or "(U)". However, the sucoess of this argument remains to he established, in that the necessity of making the transition from the communicative praetices associated with the tirst stage of the argument to those associated with the second stage bas not yet been demonstrated. It simply does Dot seem ta he a requirement of human agency as such that one practise argumentation in the specifically modem sense. The demand for justification 6Stephen K. White. The Recent Work ofJürgen Habermas (Cambridge University Press~ 1988): 56. 'Seyla Benhabib. Situating the Self(Routledge. 1992): 29-52. Sec atso Cooke (1994): 30-31. 'Jürgen Habermas. "Remarks on Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophica1 Justification" in Habermas. MCCA : 89. 75 or for the provision of good reasons embodied in the universa/ practice of communicative action is satisfied by cooventional forms ofargumentation.9 The next cha1lenge facing Habermas is thus ta provide a link between conventional and postconvcntional forms of argumentation whieh will enable him ta argue that all speakers of Argumentationl should recognise the validity of Argumentationz. IO The implieit target of the argument is the relativist: what must he shown is that these practices are oot simply different modes of argumentation. Habennas maintains that these forros of argumentation stand in a hierarehical relationship to one another, in that the postconventional praetice of argumentation constitutes a demonstrable cognitive gain over cooventional fonns of argumentation. This daim in tum serves as a basis for the argument that the moral intuitions associated with Argumentationz represent a more advanced fonn of intuitions available to all speakers of a language, and hence that the conception of ethics associated with modem modes of argumentation represents the ultimate flowering of a seed universally present for all linguistic agents. Habermas attempts to traverse this gap between the two stages of the transcendental argument by appealing to rational reconstructions of the development, along specifie axes, of bath individuals and societies. These reconstructions associate the apex of development with the eharacteristies of postconventional fonns of argumentatiõ in the hopes of demonstrating that mastery of these eharaeteristies represents the developmentally most advanced stage of species-wide competeneies. 1 wouId like to deseribe the formai features of the postconventional mode of argumentation in somewhat greater detail before tuming to study Habennas 's developmental accounts. ~te (1988): 56. IOcr. Thomas McCarthy, "Rationality and Relati\ism: Habennas's "Overcoming" of Hermeneutics," in Habermas: Critical Debates. ed. J.B. Thompson and David Held (Macmillan, 1982): 68. 76 3.2 The Concept of Communicative Rationality .3.21 Characteristics o/Communicative Ratio1U1/ity In this section 1 would like to give a brief account of the concepts of validity and rationality, which play a central role in Habermas's defence of the idea that the ethical practices associated with postconventional fonns of argumentation are of universal significance for all human agents. 11 Habermas develops these ideas through an analysis of the structural charaeteristics of postconventional fonns of communicative action. Through conceptual investigations into the pragmatic structure of everyday language use in modem Western societies Habennas aims ta show that an agent's ability to communicate depends upon her mastering a set of structural properties and implicit rules, and that this mastery is intimately tied to what we mean by "rationality." The fundamental features of this approach are introduced in the essay, "What IS Universal PragmaticsT' Habermas describes bis aim in this paper as follows: The task of universal pragrnatics is to identify and reconstruet universal conditions of possible understanding. In other contexts one also speaks of "general presuppositions of communication," but 1 prefer to speak of general presuppositions of communicative action because 1 take the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental. 12 This work extends to the features of language in use the guiding idea of the Chomskian research programme to develop a general science of language through the rational reconstruction of linguistic competence, or the competence to produce grammatically well11My understanding of these notions is indebted to Maeve Cooke's excellent account in Cooke (1994>, which offers a detailed anaJysis and evaluation of the concept ofcommunicative rationality. 12Jürgen Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Habermas, CES:l. 77 formed sentences. Habennas ~s intuition is that not ooly linguistic competence~ but also he eted " ersal 13communicative competence can reconstru ln UDlV tenns. Moreover~ this reconstruction must proceed by analysing the fonn of language use in which communicative competence is most fully demonsttated. Habermas argues that speech oriented towards the non-coercive resolution of confliet fonns the primary mode of language use~ in that the condition of the possibility of there being other modes of language use, such as the strategic~ rests upon the prior existence ofthis practice ofcommunicative action. 14 Hence the anaIysis of communicative competence must take place by examining (postconventional) forms of communicative action. The process of action oriented to reaching understanding requires aetors to develop and compare plans of action through a communicative exchange. When we focus on the pragmatic dimensions of speech, we see that in speaking we relate to one of three categories: the world around us, the social world we share with other persons~ and our own inner world of needs, feelings and wishes. We make claims in each of these dimensions conceming the validity of what we are saying. In order to function successfully in coordinating plans of actiõ linguistic utterances must make explicit reference to the items of extraIinguistîc experience such as faets, nonns and intentions. Successful consensual coordination of interaction relies upon the ability of agents to relate their speech aets to a shared reality in such a way that reasoned assessment of them becomes possible. In Habermas ~s view~ the precondition of our ability te carry out successful communicative interactions is the existence of a fonnal-pragmatic infrastructure of speech, which coosists of general mIes for arranging 13oyn0mas McCarthy, "Translator's Introduction" in Jürgen Habermas. CES: XV111. 1~nnas also eharaeterises the relationship between strategie and communicative fonns of action as one of asymmetry of complexit)-. In strategie action an aetor approaehes a situation through assuming an "objectivating attitude" to all elements of the social world. Communicative actions, as Habermas shall argue, offer agents a more complex and adequate array ofattitudes with whieh to approaeh social interaction. 78 the elements of speech situations within a c:oordinate system or matrix of three relations to reality. To put the point in Habermas's tenninology, the utterance of a speech aet situates a given sentence simultaneously in relation to three extra1inguistic '~orlds." As he explains, "for every successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) 'the extemal world' as the totality of existing states ofaffairs, (h) 'our social world' as the totality of ail nonnatively reguIated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) 'a particular inner world' (of the speaker) as the totality ofbis intentional experiences."lS The link between grammatical sentences and the three worlds of extralinguistic reality is enaeted through the raising and redeeming of Uvalidity claims." ln making an utterance every speaker asserts, even if ooly implicitly, that what she says is true, tbat her intentions are sincere, and that the utterance is right in relation to a recognised normative context. "That aetors seek the reasoned recognition of others for the validity claims they raise is a feature common ta ail fonns of communicative action. However, postconventional communicative action is charaeterised by the feature that no validity claim raised in such a context can in principle he immune to challenge or dispute. The raising of validity daims in this context must hence he, Habermas helieves, self-conscious or ref1cctive to a high degree: In raising a validity claim, the speaker relativizes her utterance against the possibility That it will be contested by other agents. The possibility of rejecting, on the basis of reasons, the validity of a gjven claim is the defining characteristic of this mode of communication. The very notion of a validity claim thus seems ta imply a ret1ective relation to the world, for in arder to recognize a given utterance as a validity cla;m a participant in communication must recognize that other participants MaY have reasons for challenging the utterance's validity. 16 lSJürgen Habennas, "What is Universal Pragmaticsr* in Habennas, CES: 67. 16Cooke (1994): 11-12. 79 Actors who raise validity cl2ims in speech acts must be aware that their validity claims are in principle contestable, and this is precisely to be aware of the status ofthese claims as claims, rather than as evident truths. To put the point differently, the ability ta carry out postconventional fonns of communicative action requires tbat agents bave acquired what Habermas, following Piag~ refers ta as a "decentered view ofthe world." Cultural modemity is characterised by Habennas as a period marked by a decentering of consciousness at the societal level. Following Weber, he argues that cosmological worldviews, which have traditionally conferred meaning and unity upon human endeavours, progressively lose their power to serve as ultimate foundations for the traditions and practices of modem societies. TIlis process can be described as a decentering of worldviews in the sense that aIl worldviews are now seen as standing in need ofjustification. For both Habermas and Weber, the modem era witnesses the disintegration of the substantive forms of reason expressed in religious and metaphysical worldviews, into the autonomous cultural value spheres of science, morality and art. Modemity is charaeterized by a rejection of the substantive rationality typical of religious and metaphysicaI worldvîews and by a belief in procedural rationality and its ability to give credence to our views in the three areas of objective knowledge, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic judgment. 17 The decentering of consciousness in the modem age makes it incumbent upon participants in postconventional forms of communicative action to recognise that the validation of troth* claims in each of the three "worlds" or specialised value spheres requires diffirent methods and procedures; methods and procedures which cosmological worldvîews had previously assimilated. Whereas Aristotle could reason from (purported) faets about the nature of the cosmos or universe to the vîrtues or excellences of humans,18 modems recognise that the l'Jürgen Habennas, "Philosophyas Stand-In and Interpreter." in Habermas, MCCA: 4. 18See e.g. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 80 validation ofan empirical truth claim such as "ail swans are white" should proceed differently from that for a normative claims such as "the production and distribution of pomography is wrong."19 As we saw, the principle ofuniversalisation is precisely an attempt ta define what is meant when such a nonnative validity claim is raised. The ability ta distinguish these three "worlds" tan hence he viewed as equivalent 10 an ability 10 distinguish between tyPes of validity claim.20 The fonnal features of the modem, decentered understanding of the world account for its superior rationality. Aceording to Habermas, a belief is rational to the extent to which it cao he justified through the provision of good reasoOS.21 A decentered understanding of the world facilitates this task in two ways: First, Habennas believes that the understanding of validity claims demonstrated in postconventional modes of communicative action reflects a more accurate understanding of reality, and is thereby superior to other modes of construing validity claims. Because the validity claims in these modes of argumentation have been separated out into three domains of validity, there is more possibility of providing appropriate justifications for the claims raised in argumentation. As Cooke explains: What Habennas seems to he saying is that the modem~eoentered-- understanding of the world bas opened up different dimensions of validity~ to the extent that each dimension of validity bas its o\\n standards of tnlth and falsity and its o\\n modes of justification for determining these, one may say that what bas been opened up are dimensions of rationality.22 Second, in postconventional communicative action no validity claim cao he in principle immune to criticism: every actor recognises the obligation to provide justification for any l~n the next chapter we will give detailed consideration to Habermas's claim that this separation of validity spheres represents an advance over other conceptions. 20panicipants in communicative action a1so leam to take up di1Jerent altitudes (objectivating, norm* confonnative and expressive) towards these worlds. In the first instance. when we adopt e.g. an expressive attitude. we relate to our "own" world of inner experience. However. it is possible in a secondary sense to take up different attitudes towards worlds. For example. one might, for poetic reasõ take up an expressive attitude towards the world ofexternal experience. Cooke (1994): 10. 21 Jürgen Habennas. TC4 1: 22. 81 { validity claim raised. As we shall see in Chapter 4, Habermas argues that this openness ta critique renders the modem, decentered understanding of the world "logically superior in leaming potential.,,23 3.22 The Role Played by the Concept ofCommunicative Rationo/ity The concept of communicative rationality plays a pivotai role in Habennas's general philosophical proj~ which aims ultimately 10 develop a critical theory of modem Westem late-capitalist society based uPOn the study of communicative interactions. In the Preface to the Theory ofCommunicative Action, Habermas offers a succinct description of the purpose of bis inquiry: "[T]he theory of communicative action," he writes, 4;4;is intended to make possible a conceptualization of the social life-eontext that is tailored 10 the paradoxes of modemity. ,,24 The critica1 theory of society which Habermas aims 10 develop must be sufficiently general that it pennit us to understand the development of society as a whole in its full complexity. It must enable us to analyse and account for the pathologies of modernity, such as loss of meaning and anomie, in a way which opens up the possibility for their constructive transfonnation. The programme of discourse ethics fonns one important axis of such a theory. The concept of communicative rationality plays a large role in the attempt to articulate a critical theory of society, precisely because it is through this construal of rationality that Habermas hopes to develop the requisite critical standpoint. As Cooke explains: 4;'Habennas attempts to develop a nonrepressive conception of reason which will 22Cooke (1994): Il. nne phrase is David Ingram's. See Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic ofReason (Yale University Press. 1987): 26. 24Habennas. TC4 J: xlii. 82 provide a standard from which ta critique irrational or unjust forms of individual and sociallife wbile avoiding possibly repressive metaphysical conceptions.n25 Habennas's notion of communicative rationality must hence negotiate two dangers. FUst, it must avoid making strong claims cbaracteristic ofphilosophy in the Kantian mode, for severa! related reasons. Substantive conceptions of truth or rationality, particularly in the moral domain, have repeatedly shown themselves ta he hypostatisatiODS of the value concepts ofa particuIar society, or more typically, a particular segment ofa given society, which tend ta pornay those not belonging ta the group as deficient in these qualities or values. Such a concept is potentially repressive, as Habermas recognises. Habennas can he seen here as giving partial recognition ta Nietzsche's point in the Genealogy of Morais that the value concepts of a particular group represent an attempt at self-affirmation on the part of that group, and concomitantly, a domination over others. He acknowledges that the voice of the other bas frequently been repressed in the name of moral universalism., resulting in a circumstance in which human dignity is violated, through a refusai either ta recognise the interests of the agents in question or to resPeCt their differences.26 Feminist literature provides numerous examples of precisely such domination: it bas extensively documented the tendency of philosophers to portray women as possessing qualities which are the inferior complement of the virtues associated with men, particularly the virtue of reason. 27 11ùs is another manner of reiterating the criticisms of the epistemological paradigm raised in Chapter l, namely by drawing attention to the intirnate links between specific conceptions of tru~ reason and agency, and the network of social interactions, including the power hierarchies which structure 2SCooke (1994): 1. 26Jûrgen Habennas. "On the Employments ofPractical Reason," in Habermas, J&A.: 14-15. 2'See e.g. Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Cornell University Press. 1991); Susan MoIler Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, 1979); and for an anthology documenting the concept of woman in the history of philosophy, see Mary Briody Mahowald , 00.. The Philosophy ofWoman (Hacken, 1978). 83 such interactions, charaeteristic of a particular fonn of life. Habennas hopes 10 avoid this error by substituting a procedural approach to rationality and the justification of moral nonns for a substantivist one. Second, although ~4postmetaphysical" and hence (hopefully) non-repressive, this conception must prove itself sufficiently strong 10 serve as a point of critical evaluation. As we have sem. Habennas holds that philosophy cao retain its claim to reason while accommodating the legitimate reoent criticisrns of the conceptions of reason, knowledge and agency embodied in traditional philosophy. These criticisms were previously presented in connedion with the themes of the Kantian epistemological paradigm in philosophy. For Kant, the question of ho\\' to assess the validity of knowledge claims lies al the heart of the philosophical enterprise. Through offering a series of ttanscendental arguments, he attempts to define once and for all both the possibility and limits of knowledge. Habennas caUs the philosophical paradigm which Kantian epistemology exemplifies 4lhe philosophy of consciousness." Il takes as its point of departure the question of how an autonomous rational subject can acquire reliable knowledge of a world of objects existing independently of it. However, critiques from a number of sources have called into question the presuppositions of titis model, pointing out both the impossibility of conceiving reason as standing abstract1y above history and the complexities of social life, and the deep sense in which agency cao develop ooly in the context ofclose ties 10 particular communities. The concept of communicative rationality hence reflects an attempt to reassess and get beyond the impasses of the "philosophy of consciousness." In contrast to the focus on individual structures of consciousness found in the subject~bject model of cognition and action, Habennas defines rationality through reflection on the intersubjedive praetices of 84 linguistic communication and interpersonal interactions.28 Although defined through reference to modem practiccs of argumentation, this fonn of rationality, Habermas believes, represents the fulfilment of a potential for rationality present in the communicative practices of ail societies. Finally, unlike Kantian transcendental anaIysis of the conditions of rationality, Habennas divorces bis proposais for universalist reconstructions of basic hurnan competences trom c1aims to necessity and certainty. Habermas argues that philosophy should not seek to establish ultimate foundations for knowledge, as Kant did, but should rather enter into a cooperative relationship \\ith various branches of the sciences, in particular, thase tied closely 10 programs of rational reconstruction. Rational reconstructions aim to make theoretically explicit the pretheoretical implicit knowledge and competencies of subjects who speak and aet. The universalistic hypotheses tested in such theories may originate in philosophical arguments, particularly arguments of the weak transcendental kind appeaIed to by Habennas. However, a1though such sciences aim to establish universaJ claims, the status of these claims is relatively weak: reconstructive sciences do not claim to establish their conclusions with ultimate validity. Instead they regard these claims as inherently fallible in that such claims must be construed as infinitely open to revision in the light of new evidence and insight.29 The universalistic claims embodied in the reconstruetîve sciences must, as other claims in empirical science, he open to empirical testing, and hence differ from the universalistic approacbes typical of traditional philosophy in heing bypothetical rather than necessary, and fallible rather than certain. JO The relationship between philosophy and the empirical sciences should he seen as one of mutual 2Jlln TCA Habermas writes: "One could even say that philosophical thought originates in reflection on the reason embodied in cognition, speech and action; and n:ason remains its basic theme." See Habennas. TCA J: 1. 29Jürgen Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in Habermas, MCCA: 116. 30Jürgen Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter." in Habennas, MCCA: 15-16. 85 support rather than as one of direct confirmation. Habennas recognises that theories in moral philosophy are not open to direct confinnation through empirical studies; however, they can gain greater plausibility by demonstrating their coherence and co-ordination with theories which enjoy substantial empirical SUpport.31 Our present interest in the notion of communicative rationality is limited to its importance for the programme of discourse ethics. The concept of communicative rationality plays a key role in Habermas's proposed resolution of the problem set out at the beginning of the chapter, that is, the problem of how to justify the clairn to universal validity of the understanding of reality implicit in modem practices of argumentation. Habennas presents reconstructive accounts of bath individual development and of social evolution 10 demonstrate the plausibility ofthe claim that postmodem forros of argumentation represent an advance over conventional ones. Bath theories aim to show that the structures of rationality identified by Habermas as being charaeteristic of modem thought represent advances in problem solving ability over other fonns of reasoning, and hence that these structures lie at the apex of a sequential path of development. If suecessful, this should in turn provide a reference point for the social critique of modemity whieh the theory of communicative action was developed to handle precisely by showing that 'lhe moral point of view" and its associated procedure is of relevance to ail. 3.3 The Development of Moral Consciousness 31Jürgen Habennas. "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas, MCC4: 117. 86 Habennas views the work issuing from the cognitive~evelopmental tradition in psychology as complementary te his cwn attempts to defend a universalist position in ethïcs. This tradition shares with him an interest in developing theoretical reconstructions of the acquisition of universal human competences in the areas of cognition.. speech and social interaction. Piaget's studies in the development of the capacity for formaI reasoning and Lawrence Kohlberg's work in the development of moral consciousness can be seen as attempts 10 support reconstructive hypotheses of a universalist or species-wide nature througb empirical research. Kohlberg's theory describes the acquisition of moral consciousness in tenns of a sequence of stages of moral judgement which are claimed 10 he bath culturally universal and sequentially invariant. Moreover, the highest stage ofmoraljudgment is charaeterized in tenns of formai properties, such as generality and reversibility, sirnilar ta those embodied in the procedure for the resolution of moral confliets endorsed by discourse ethics. Thus the results of Kohlberg's research cohere with the basic tenets of Habennas 's philosophical programme, and thereby provide an empiricaJ basis for its defence.32 The relationship which Habennas envisions between these two theories is nuanced and complex. Rather than viewing Kohlberg's theory as a potential '''proof' of bis philosophical claims, Habennas sees the potential coherence between these two theories as lending sorne measure of indirect confinnation to each: while drawing upon the results of Kohlberg's empirical research to support bis own claims in dîscourse ethics, Habermas aims to show that the theoretical resourees of discursive ethics can contribute to improving the conceptual clarity, and hence the plausibility, of Kohlberg's research. This mutual interweaving of support exemplifies Habennas's vision of how philosophy should cooperate with the empirical sciences. 1 would like 10 begin by presenting a brief summary of the results of Kohlberg's research into the genesis of the 32Tlùs coherence is, as Habennas recognises, Dot independent of the faet that bath theories have commOD roots in Kantian moral philosophy. We \\i11 retum to this issue below. 87 capacity for moral juclgement in individuals, before tuming to Habennas's analysis and reinterpretation ofthis theory in terms ofthe concepts ofa discursive ethïcs. 3.31 Lawrence Kohlberg & the Acquisition of the Individual's Capacity for Moral Judgement Kohlberg"s theory begins with a commitment ta wbat he tenns "methodological nonrelativism. n While recognizing the fact tbat, historically, clifferent societies have conceived of bath nonns and their appropriate modes of justification in a variety of ways, Kohlberg shares with Habermas the beliefthat it is possible to isolate certain fonnal criteria which are universally relevant. He explains: "Methodological nonrelativism is the doctrine that certain criteria (importantly, reversibility or universalizability) of moral reasoning or principles are universally relevant. It means that, even if there are observed cultural divergences of moral standards, there are rational principles and methods that cao reconcile these divergences or lead to agreement.,,J3 Kohlbcrg tums to Western moral philosophy, and in particular, the fonnalist tradition sternming from Kant, for the key descriptions of the abstract criteria in question.34 The question of whether these criteria can perfonn the role assigned them will be a matter of ongoing concem. 31...awrence Kohlberg. "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get away with It in the Study of Moral Development.," in bis Essays an Moral Develapment. vol. 1., The Philosophy a/Moral Development (San Francisco, 1981): 97. 304Kohlberg is quick to acknowledge that bis theory does oot begin from a "neutral" starting point, either culturally or philosophically. However, he does not believe that this compromises the validity of bis theory. He argues that all theories must start from sorne assumptions and that the goal of adopting a purely neutral stance is hence chimerical. Like Habermas, he believes that moral philosophyand moral psychology cao work together cooperatively, in what he descnbes as a "spiral or bootstrapping process." Il may nol seem surprising, Kohlberg acknowledges, that a tbeory which begins from the insights of Kantian moral philosophy issues in results which are consonant which such plùlosophy. However, it would be wroog to view the results ofKohlberg's theory as simply ubitrary: empirical data on the one band and the challenge ofcompeting theoretical paradigms on the other should serve as a corrective for the biases adopled in the process of theory construction. See Kohlberg. "From Is to Ought,'" in Kohlberg (1981): 97-114. 88 t' 1 The central attraction for Habermas of Kohlberg ~s theory is its defence of the notion that there is a unique path of moral development recognisable species-wide. Kohlberg claims that empirical data demonstrate that those who attain the highest levels of moral development in any culture attempt 10 fonnulate universaJisable principles~ and that these basic principles are recognisably similar even across very different cultures. Any adequate social science theory must therefore take account of this similarity in sorne fashion.3S Kohlberg attempts to do justice ta this phenomenon by adopting an explanatory framework comprising a cognitivedevelopmental theory of moral stages. He writes: We claim that there is a universally valid fonn of rational moral thought process which aU persons could articulate, asswning social and cultural conditions suitable to cognitive-moral stage development. We daim that the ontogenesis toward this fonn of rational moral thinking occurs in the same stepwise~ invariant stage sequence.36 According 10 Kohlberg, this series of stages cao be represented as interlinked points of equilibrium. Each successive stage represents a greater degree of adequacy in the maturation of moral consciousness than the preceding one, in that the individual acquires a more sophisticated problem-solving ability. The cognitive~evelopmentalapproach to studying individual maturation in the sphere of moral consciousness is of panicular interest to Habennas in its manner of dealing with the phenomenon of nonnative diversity. Opponents of universalist theories of ethical development generally point ta the large variety of norms which bave~ or are currently, regarded as valid across different social groups or societies in arder to cast doubt on the plausibility of advancing a universalist c1aim. Kohlberg ~s theory of moral development attempts to render the fact of ethical diversity consonant with a universalist approach to moral maturation by severa! 3.;cohlberg. "From Is to Ought,~ in Kohlberg (1981): 97. 89 means. F~ and in a manner generally agreeable with all Kantian moral philosophies, Kohlberg isolates a narrow range of questions whieh he associates with ')norality" from the broad range of normative concems. A "moral conflict" is defined by Kohlberg as "a confliet between the competing elaims of people.,,37 So moral judgements are those concemed with solving confliets of interest. Kohlberg believes that judgements involving conflicts of interest are rational in that they represent strategies for conflict resolution which may he objectively judged as being more or less adequate. This makes their acquisition difTerent in eharacter from that of other "cultural values" whieh Kohlberg along with Habennas views as inculcated nonrationally or arbitrarily. 38 The innovation of the cognitive-developmentaI approach and its specifie interest for Habennas as an anti-relativist strategy lies in its adoption of a twofold methodology pioneered in Piaget's studies of cognitive development: (1) First, Kohlberg focuses on the "formn rather than the "content" of concrete moral judgements. The apparent diversity of moral judgements may be substantially reduced by drãing attention to commonalities in the structures of these judgements, rather than the specifie content of what they recommend as good. (2) Second, Kohlberg places these moral judgments ioto a sequence of stages developing through an internai logic from lowest to highest forms of moral judgment. An internai logic, as we shaH see below, daims to represent a cumulative advance in moral consciousness from less adequate to more adequate forms. The remaining differences between fonns of moral judgement cross-eulturally may then be explained as differences in the level of development of ~wrenceKohlberg. "The Current Fonnulation of the Tbeory." in Kohlber& Psych%gy afMora/ Development (San Francisco, 1984): 286. As quoted in Jürgen Habermas's "Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianis~"in Habermas, J&.A: 114. 37Kohlberg, "From 15 to Ought," in Kohlberg (1981): 143. :J8Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," in Kohlberg (1981): lOS. 90 the capacity of moral judgement.39 1 would Iike to discuss in greater detail how these two features play out in Kohlberg's account. The range of variation in moral concepts held by individuals and cultures is significantIy less, Kohlberg believes, than is often thought. He claims bis empirical studies show that the same basic fonnulations of moral principles are found in every culture. As we shall see, it is Kohlberg's focus on the distinctive fonns rather than the particular contents of moral judgements which allows him ta persuasively defend the idea tbat there exist universal moral concepts, values and principles.40 Kohlberg's method of studYing moral development relies upon asking test subjects how they would resolve a series of hypothetica1 dilemmas involving interpersonal conflicts of interest. Examination of the strategies employed for dilemma-resolution suggests not only that such strategies are finite in number, but that they follow one another in an invariant order. Kohlberg's studies were condueted initially on a group of 75 boys in the United States over a 15 year period from early adolescence through young manhood. His hypotheses conceming bath the basic principles and their order of development were fonnulated in this context.41 However, the initial studies have now been supplemented by a series of studies concerning the development of moral judgement in other cultures. 1 would like to examine in greater detail how Kohlberg employs the form/content distinction in bis cross-cultural studies te support the notion that the nurnber of basic moral principles is finite. 3~bermas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas, MCCA: 117. ~ohlberg, "From Is 10 Ought," in Kohlberg (1981): 116. 41 A1though Kohlberg claims universality for bis stage sequence, groups not included in bis original sample rarely reach bis bigher stages. Initial results of Kohlberg's empirical studies place women'5 average level of moral development behind that of men, al Stage 3. The question whether the original formulation of the theory is non-neutraI in that il depiets the path of moral development predominantly in terms dra\W from men'5 experience of moral conflict and choice, in snch a way as to occlude the understanding of women '5 moral experience and of their place within that development, is taken up by Carol Gilligan in her insightful and pathbreaking study, ln a Different Voice: Psych%gica/ Theory and Women 's Deve/opment. (Harvard University Press, 1982). 91 The famous Heinz dilemma is used by Kohlberg to present test subjects "vith a situation of interpersonal contliet in which the value of property ownership is pitted against that of preservation of life. In the Heinz dilemma a husbañ baving ascertained that there are no legitimate means OPen to him te acquire a certain drug essential to bis wife's survivaI, steals Ît. Test subjects are asked te evaluate whether this action was right. The first difficulty in generating comparable data cross~1turally coneems the translation of this dilemma into similar concepts in the language ofthe culture in question. Here is the dilenuna as presented in concepts deemed suitable for inhabitants of two villages ïnvestigated, one AtãaI (Malaysian aboriginal), and one Taiwanese: A man and bis wife had just migrated from the high MOuntains. They started to faon, but there was no raiD, and no crops grew. No one had enough food. The wife got sicle, and tinally she was close 10 dying from baving no food. There was ooly one grocery store in the village, and the storekeeper charged a very high priee for the food. The husband asked the storekeeper for sorne food for bis wife, and said he would pay fOT it later. The storekeeper said, 'No, 1 won't give you any food unIess you pay first.' The husband went to ail the people in the village to ask for food, but no one had any food to spare. So he got desperate, and broke ioto the store te steal food for bis wife. Should the husband have done that? Whyr2 The studies Kohlberg bas condueted cross-eulturally support the idea that one cao identify a number of common forms or methods of resolving a given dilemma, even though the specifie reasoning might differ according to cultural nonns. Kohlberg defends this daim by showing the similarities between the varieties of response obtained in the two villages studied. In the Taiwanese village, a boy whom Kohlberg evaluated at being moraUy at Stage 2 would respond te the dilemma by saying "He should steal the food for bis wife, because if she dies he'lI have to pay for her funeral and that costs a lot." ln the Atayal village the importance of funerals was not the predominant concern. Stage 2 boys in this village would say, "He should steal the food because he needs bis wife to cook for him." Although the boys agree that the act of 92 stealing was right on the part of the husband, they justify this claim by reference to the instrumental use of the wife ta ber husbañ either as a domestic servant or as a means of avoiding incurring expense. In both cultures, the fonn of the reasoning used to resolve the dilemma operates by thinking through the concepts of wbat is right in terms of the notion of instrumental excbange, which Kohlberg identifies with Stage 2 moral thinking. Such a consistent method ofevaluating moral dilemmas is what Kohlberg calIs a ')noral principle." Kohlberg claims not only that the basic principles used ta resolve moral dilemmas are finite in number and present across different societies and cultural groups, but aIso that these principles cao he organized sequentially into a set of stages. A "stage" concept implies that individual development should manifest a universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. As Kohlberg explains: "AlI individuals in ail cultures go through the same order or sequences of gross stages of development, though varying in rate and terminal point of development. ,~3 The results of Kohlberg's empirical research show that an individual"s moral stage cannot he derived directly from the MOst frequent or "modal" stage of the society in which she lives. Nonetheless, there are differences in the observed frequency with which the highest moral stages appear across various cultural groups, and these differences in stage are, according to Kohlberg, related to the cognitive and social complexity of the group. Empirical results confinned that stages 5 and 6 were entirely absent in the isolated villages studied; that the rate of development was slower in Mexico and Taiwan than in the United States; and that Stage 5 is more salient in the United States than in other countries studied.44 We will return ta this theme in 3.4 below. At present, we cao summarise by saying that, for Kohlberg, moral judgements are those concerned with resolving confliets of interest. The ways in which such 42Kohlberg. "From 15 lo Ought," in Kohlberg (1981): 115. 41<.ohlberg~ "From 15 lo Oughl," in Kohlberg (1981): 126. 44Kohlberg, "From Is lo Oughl," in Kohlberg (1981): 123. 93 conflicts are resolved admit of fonnal anaIysis, and such analysis reveals that the strategies for conflict resolution are finite in number, universal, and move in stages. Cognitive-developmental models comprise a series of stages which are regarded as fonning a conceptual hierarchy, eac:h of which represents a higher or more adequate level of problem-solving in the moral domaine Kohlberg shares with Piaget a constructivist concept of leaming according 10 which knowledge is seen as a continuous construction which emerges through the individual'5 interaction with ber environment. The transition 10 higher levels of cognitive structures is viewed as a creative reorganisation on the part of the individual who, in the face of persistent difficulties, reorganises the existing cognitive inventery in a more adequate rnanner. TItis transition should he a seen as a fonn of leaming. It must he possible for the individual herself to explain why the transition from one stage 10 another enables her to solve the problern in question more adequately, thereby revealing the deficiencies of her original mode ofthinking. The stages of moral development outlined by Kohlberg represent a process of leaming, where each stage is defined '"as a relative equilibrium of operations that become increasingly complex, abstract, general, and reversible. ,~s They hence constitute a hierarchy of cognitive difficulty, where the lower stages are available to, but not used by, those at higher stages. Kohlberg conceives the relationship between the development of formaI cognitive operations such as those studied by Piaget and the development of the stages of moral judgment as one of paraIlelism, in that the acquisition of new moral structures is made possible by the acquisition ofnew abilities in logica1 reasoning. However, mastery offonnaJ logjcal structures constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the acquisition of a new moral stage, since the acquisition of higher moral equilibria involves two processes absent in the logical domain or in 94 the cognition of physical objects.46 In the first place, moral judgements involve the ability ta take the viewpoint or role of another persan conceived as a subj~ and to coordinate interactions through reference to these viewpoints. As Kohlberg explains: The primary meaning of the word social is the distinctively buman strueturing ofaction and tbought by role taking, by the tendency to react ta others as like self and ta react ta the selfs bebavior &om the otber's point of view. The centrality of role taking for moral judgment is recognized in the notion that moral judgment is based on sympathy for otbers, as weU as in the notion !hat the moral judge must adopt the perspective of the "impartial spectator" or the ugeneralized other," a notion central ta moral philosopby front Adam Smith to Roderick Firth.47 The precondition for having a moral conflict is precisely this role-taking ability. Moral confliets, or conflicts between the competing claims of people, arise when there are discrepancies between the role-taking expectations ofone persan and another. SeconcL moral situations in disequilibrium are resolved by appealing to principles of justice or faimess. As we have~ moral stages represent the interaction of the child's strueturing tendencies and the features of the environment, which, in the face of cenain unresolved difficulties, lead to successive forms of equilibria. The movement from stage to stage is brought about by situations of moral disequilibrium, where such a situation is defined as one "in which there are unresolved conflicting claims.''''' A situation of disequilibrium is resolved when each party involved is ~~given ms due." The interpretation of what faimess means in this case is specified in Kohlberg's scheme by the particular principle of justice embodied in each stage. Examples of such interpretations of faimess are the ideas that what is just is that which instrumentally satisfies one's 0\\11 needs while accommodating the needs of .4~bermas,"Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences," in Habermas, A1CC4: 34. ~ohlberg. "Justice as Reversibility," in Kohlberg (1981): 194. .47Kohlberg, "From 15 to Ought," in Kohlberg (1981): 141. 4SKohlberg, "Justice as Reversibility: The Claim to Moral Adequacy ofa Highest Stage of Moral Judgment." in Kohlberg (1981): 194. 95 others (Stage 2); or that what is just is tbat which upholds the laws and regulations of an intrinsically valuable social order (Stage 4). Kohlberg outlines the development of moral consciousness on a three-level mode1, wbere each level is subdivided iota two stages. The salient distinctions for our purposes are those between the three levels, denoting preconventional, conventional and postconventional stages of moral CODSciousness. At the preconventiona/ stage of moral coosciousness the developiog child understands and resPODds to the cultural use of the terms "goodn and "bad", "right" and ''wrong.n However, bath what is right and the reasons it is viewed to be right are defined principally in a vocabulary which depicts human relations as relations of exchange. The rightness of actions is assessed either in terms of the hedonistic consequences of action (reward, exchange of favours), or in terms of the directives and sanctions issuing from authority figures. At this phase the concept of a specifically moral obligation bas not yet been differentiated from other reasons for action; moreover, the strategies available for the resolution of confliet are relatively limited. At the corrventiona/ level, confonnity to social roles and meeting one's obligations as a member of the social order come to be seen as valuable in their own right. Conventionai moralities do have notions of general norrns~ however, such norms tend te sPeCify the nature of right action for people in a particular social role, and are hence tied to the structures of a particular forro of life. At the postconventional level there is an attempt to define moral values and principles whose validity is not contingent on the authority of the groups or persans holding these principles, nor on the individual's identification with these groups. KohIberg identifies two stages at this level. The fifth stage is entitIed the stage of "social contraet or legalistic orientation," and is c10sely connected with the philosophical theory of utilitarianism. Agents at this stage tum towards procedural rules for designing laws and standards for the good of aIl members of society as a whole. These laws 96 and duties are often based on the rational calculation of consequences, or, "the greatest good for the greatest number. n The highest stage ofmoraljudgement, Stage 6, is identified with the philosophical theory of deontology, where the understanding of wbat is right is seen as based upon the validity of abstract principles which hold for ail of humanity. KobIberg's schema is presented in Appendix 1. Kohlberg must next address the question of the sense in which the stages outlined constitute a hierarchy. This requires the specification of formai, universally relevant criteria which demonstrate that the equilibria reached in the higher stages of moral judgement constitute ''more adequaten solutions to moral confliets.49 Although Kohlberg does hold that more mature stages of moral consciousness embody more complex cognitive structures, he argues that the higher stages of moral judgement should he regarded as Uobjectively" preferable to earlier stages of moral consciousness on the basis of certain moral criteria. Higher stages are more moral than lower ones in the sense that they more cJosely approach the formal criteria separating moral from non*moral judgements. 5O Kohlberg adopts general standards of adequac}" from the writings of moral philosophers in the Kantian school, which see the adequac)' of moral judgements as a funetion of formaI characteristics such as universalisability, impersonality and ideality, rather than of content. The Jogic inherent in the sequence of stages of moral consciousness is explicated by Kohlberg in terrns of the increases in "difIerentiation" and "integration" present at each successive stage, where these criteria are said 10 he isomorphic with the formaI criteria that philosophers in the Kantian school have established 10 characterise genuine moral judgements. 4~e successful specification of snch criteria is central to Kohlberg'5 04methodological non* relativism... ~ohlberg, "Justice as Reversibility." in Kohlberg (1981): 190*1. 97 According 10 Kohlberg, the process of ~4differentiation"describes the degree to which individuaIs at a given stage are able to separate out the sphere ofmoral issues from the general field of practical reason. At the first stage, moral and non-moral motives are fully conjoined: a child does not differentiate between performing an action because of fear of punishmeñand perfonning an action because it is righl. At the middle levels of moral judgemeñ the notion of a binding nonn is recognised. However, the motives for perfonning right actions and the conception of what such actions consist in are, ta use Kantian tenninology, heteronomous, blending as they do motives of self*interest and inclination with adherence to principle. At the highest level ofmoral development principled morality as articulated in the categorical ~"ought" becomes clearly separated from the sphere of practical reason as an autonomous domain. Furthermore, moral obligations are viewed as taking precedence over all others. uIntegration" refers to the sophistication or comprehensiveness with which a structure of thought allows an individual ta accommodate the conflicting daims of individuals present in a moral dispute. This structure of thought is associated with the criteria of consistency and universality, which play an essential role in the daim of postconventional morality to establish in principle what is right for anyone in any situation. The more points of view which an individual can imaginatively assume, the more powerfully this fonn of moral consciousness can serve as a tool for bringing conflieting points of view into equilibrium. A chiId's ability to see herself as interchangeable with other parties in a moral conflict increases as she ascends the ladder of moral judgement. Kohlberg thus concludes: ~4These combined criteria, differentiation and integra.tion, are considered by developmental theory ta entail a better equilibrium of the structure in question. A more differentiated and integrated moral structure handles more moral problems, conflicts, or points ofview in a more stable or self-consistent way."Sl SlKohlberg. "From Is to Ought." in Kohlberg (1981): 134. My understanding ofthese points bas 98 It is worthwhile considering the properties of Stage 6 moral judgements in somewhat greater detail. Kohlberg argues that judgements made at the highest stage are not only more just or "morally right," but also that people using Stage 6 thinking will reach agreement about the resolution of specific dilemmas. ''Not ooly are Stage 6 principles designed te he acceptable te ail rational people, but ail those who were using Stage 6 methods and principles will eventually agree on the uright" solution in concrete situations, our empirical data suggest. ,,52 The general daim advanced in this passage is that the stability of moral solutions increases with the stage of moral consciousness, hecause the content of the judgement made at each successive phase is determined less by situational or cultural particuIarities and more by the structure of the moral principles. At the highest level, Kohlberg envisions test subjects analysing moral dilemmas by means of a universal principle similar 10 Kant's Categorical Imperative. The second formulation of this imperative, which reads, "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means,,53 brings out the features of universality and respect for persons as "ends in themselves" MOst relevant for "appropriate" dilernrnaresolutioD.54 Consistent use of such a general moral principle results in a higher degree of agreement among people on the proper resolutions to dilemmas posed. This idea is of crucial significance for Habermas's discourse ethics: if Kohlberg's intuition is correct, the procedure of discourse ethics, which is explicitly designed to capture the structure of Stage 6 moral judgements, should end in consensus, just as Habennas asserts. been facilitated by Stephen White's very clear analysis in White (1988): 59. s2Kohlher~ "Justice as Reversibility," in Kohlberg (1981): 193. s3Inunanuei Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMorais. trans. James Ellington (Hackett. 1981): 36 ~e question is, ofcourse. whether the definition of what an "appropriate" solution might he is specifiable in a neutral manner. or whether it reflects to sorne significant degree Kohlberg's o\\n philosophical commiunents. 99 However, bath the description and the existence of this sixth stage are hody conoested matters. Kohlberg, as we have~ draws explieitly UPOD the concepts of Kantian moral philosophy to define the features of Stage 6, as there is at present insuffieient empirical evidence to do sa. As Kohlberg admits, although longitudinal studies carried out in the United States, Turkey and Israel support the existence ofa fifth stage, none of the subjects studied bas yet reached the highest stage of moral development. uOur examples of Stage 6," he writes, ucome either from historical figures or from interviews with people who bave had extensive philosophie training....Stage 6 is perbaps less a statement of an attained psyehologica1 reality than the SPeCification of a direction in whieh, our theory daims, ethical development is moving.',ss 3.32 The Discourse-Ethical Reinterpretation ofKohlberg 's Theory 80th the definition of the moral sphere, and the features (sueh as impartiality, universalisability~ reversibility and preseriptivity) whieh Kohlberg uses to characterise the apex of moral reasoning, are compatible with the general contours of Habermas's discourse ethies. This, as Habermas aeknowledges, is less than surprising given the common inspiration of these two theories in Kantian deontology. While aeknowk:dging the difficulties occasioned by this philosophical proximity in assessing the degree to whieh the coherence between these theories is significant, Habermas believes that discourse ethics can complement the scheme whieh Kohlberg bas set out in two general respects, thereby enhancing the plausibility of eaeh. (1) Habermas is dissatisfied with the account KohIberg provides conccming why the stages should he seen to fonn a logical sequence of development. If discourse ethics can manage to give a more satisfactory account of the conceptual interrelation of these stages, the argument for the superiority of a postconventional forro of moral reasoning elosely a1lied to (U) and S~ohlberg, "From Is to Ought:' in Kohlberg (1981): 100. 100 affiliated with Kohlberg~s Stage 6 will have been strengthened. This should render Kohlberg~s argument more attraetive~ by improving its intemal coherence. (2) If successful~ this should provide sorne reason for thinking that discourse ethics offers the most philosophically adequate account of moral reasoning among the varieties of neo-Kantianism, which in tum should strengthen its claim ta provide the Most suitable description of Stage 6.S6 As Habermas notes: "The discursive procedure, in fact, ref1ects the very operations Kohlberg postuIates for moral judgments at the postconventionallevel: complete reversibility of the perspectives from which the participants produce their arguments; universality, understood as the inclusion of all concemed; and the reciprocity of equal recognition of the claims of each participant by all others."S7 Because our overall interest is in Habennas's claim ta advance a universalist ethic we will give particuIar attention to the first line of argument. It aims to justify the superiority of postconventional structures of moral judgement over the other fonns of moral judgement relegated to levels 1and II in Kohlberg's stage sequence. Although Habermas finds the general scheme of stages of moral consciousness set out by Kohlberg very plausible, he believes that Kohlberg bas failed ta fulfil bis obligation to demonstrate the interrelation of these stages in terms adequate for a cognitive-developmental model. In order to advance a stage model of the development of a specific competence~ in this case, the competence for moral judgerneñ Kohlberg must show that these hierarchically ordered stages form a path of development which bas an internai logic, and which fulfills the ~n an earlier essay Habennas attempted to show that the dialogical form ofconfliet resolution described by discourse ethics, in which the need interpretations advanced by individuals can themselves become an object ofpraetical discourse, aetually represents a sevcnth stage of moral development. At this juneture Habermas~ following Kohlberg, associated Stage 6 with approaches such as that ofJohn Rawls. Rawls' theory conceives ofjustice deontologically and procedurally; however. bec:ause it tests the generalisability of nonns monologically it does not require an individual to challenge bis or her need interpretations directly, as would a real discourse of the sort Habermas recommends. Habennas bas since abandoned this idea and now interprets the battle between the varions forms ofdeontology as disagreements over what constitutes the most adequate description of Stage 6. Sec Habennas. "Moral Development and Ego ldentity," in Habermas, CES: 90. 101 criteria of a leaming process. The stages must he capable of heing portrayed as successively more adequate equilibria which are constructed by the individual in the &ce of certain persistent moral problems.58 It will he useful 10 look more closely at the features ofa developmental model in arder to gain a sense of the precise nature of Habermas's criticism of Kohlberg, as well as ta understand the standards he himself must fulfill if he is to make good titis deficiency. My description of the features of a developmental logic is drawn principally from Michael Scbmid's incisive analysis of Habennas's use of developmentallogics in the theory of social evOlutiOD.59 According to Scbmi<L the term "developmenUd lagic" describes a sequence of stages or steps in which processes can he seen as bath cumulative and exhibiting a certain direction. A developmental model can he cbaraeterized in terms of the folloy';ng three hypotheses: (1) The stages of a developmentallogical account should he "discretely definable": each stage should be arnenable ta definitioD in a logically indePendent fashioD. (2) The stages or phases described must fonn a hierarchy which exhibits an intrinsic structure: "...The cognitive structures ofa higher stage dialectically sublate those of a lower one, that is, the lower stage is replaced and at the same tinte preserved in a reorganiud, more differenttated form.,160 (3) The stages outlined must be capable of being ordered iota an iovariañ irreversible and consecutive sequence. In other words, there is ooly one viable path towards the apex, and no higher stage cao he reached witbout traversing all preoed.ing stages. Once an equilibrium at a higher stage bas been reached, regression is impossible. S7Habermas, "Moral Conscïousness," in Habermas, MCA: 122. Sllt is imponant to note that cognitive-developmental models distinguish the /ogic ofa process of development from the dynamics of that development. No claim is being made about the aetual process of transition between the stages. as this depends upon situational particularities ",hich can vary without limit from case to case. S9See Michael Schmid, "Habennas's Theory of Social Evolutiõ " in Habermas: Critica/ Dehales, 00. lB. Thomson and D. Held (Macmil~ 1982): 164. My appreciation of the significance of developmental-logicaI accounts in supporting the universality thesis ofdiscourse ethics is due in large part to Schmid's penetrating discussion in tlùs article. ~bermas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas, MCCA: 127. 102 As Habennas recognises, the key component ofthis model is the second hypothesis. He claims that "the notion ofa path of development which tan be described in terms of a hierarchically ordered sequence of structures is absolutely crucial ta Kohlberg's model of developmental stages. ,161 It is the presentation of the forms of moral coosciousness as a hierarehical arder which aUows Kohlberg ta take a strong anti-relativist stance, as it pennits him ta organize the variety of "basic prineiples" identified in empirical investigation inta an ascending sequence. This in tum enables him ta portray these basic principles as successively more adequate approximations towards one uniVersal idea1 form of moral conseiousness, rather than as rival or competing versions of moral judgment. While supporting Kohlberg's vieYt'POint, Habermas does not believe that Kohlberg bas as yet met the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate it. He regards Kohlberg's six stage, three-Ievel anaIysis as intuitively plausible; however, he also views its theoretical defence of the internal logie of these stages in terms of the concepts of '4differentiation" and "integration" as ultimately question-begging. According to Habermas, this theoretical account is possessed of neither sufficient anaJytical rigour to describe the various components of the theory independently of one another, nOf sufficient clarity to demonstrate why they should form an unequivocal sequence.62 The demonstration that Kohlberg'5 descriptions of moral stages do indeed fonn alogie of development is viewed by Habennas partly as a problem of conceptual analysis. It is on this level that he believes that discourse ethics, by bringing a distinct theoretical viewpoint to bear on the problem, may he able ta contribute to the advancement of Kohlberg's theory. Habennas wants to use the framework ofthe theory ofcommunicative action, and in particular the concept of a 44decentered world viewn associated with PQStconventional forms of argumentation, ta define a developmental-logical ordering of types of interaction. The internai 61Habennas. "Moral Consciousness." in Habennas. MCCA: 128. 103 logic of this progression, it will he arguecL consists in the way in which the phases outlined progressively approximate features associated with this decentered view of the world. The ultimate aim is ta show that each stage of interaction makes available a particular 44form of reciprocity," and that this fonn of reciprocity is precisely what is captured in the notions of justice avaiJable at Koblberg's stages of moral consciousness. If Habermas is successful in advancing this series of arguments he will have provided a non--circular account of the logic of development of Koblberg's moral stages in terms of the appeal 10 interactive or role competence.63 Moreover, he will bave come a long way towards accomplishing the goal set out at the beginning of titis chapter. Because developmental logics descrihe processes which are cumulative and directed, a persuasive narr~tive demonstrating that individual maturation progresses species-\\ide in an invariant sequence towards fonns of interaction and moral consciousness associated with postconventional forms of argumentation (Argumentation;: ) will greatly increase the plausibility of arguing that such postconventional fonns of argumentation are of universal significance 10 practitioners of ail fonns of argumentation. 1 will next delineate the principal features of this argument. Habennas describes interactive competence or "role competence" as a rnastery of the implicit rules which govern our abilit)' to take part in increasingly complex fonns of social interaction.M Higher stages of interactive competence can he anaIogously seen as those which provide an agent with more sophisticated mechanisms for the coordination of interpersonal actions. Habennas 's goal is to develop a developmental-Iogical reconstruction of this fonn of universal competence which portrays the unfolding of the sequence of stages as a progressive acquisition of the features necessary to carry out communicative action at the highest or 62Habennas. "Moral Consciousness," in Habermas, MCCA: 129. ~y comprehension of Habermas's sttategy for strengthening Kohlberg's argument bas been greatly improved by Stephen White's elegant and accurate presentation in White (1988): 60~5. 104 4'postconventionaln level. Following Piaget, Habermas conceives of ego development as a prooess of cognitive and moral decentration, in which the child leams progressively to adapt to an extemal world of objects and to a social world constituted by norms and relationships ta others. This process ofdecentration results in an understaoding of the world which Habermas tenns Udeoentered." The decentered perspective demands in tum that agents have acquired a certain set ofabilities. As Habermas explains: The deoentered understanding of the world is thus characterised by a complex structure of perspectives. ft combines two things: first, perspectives that are grounded in the formai three-world reference system and linked with the different attitudes toward the world and secoñ perspectives that are built into the speech situation itself and linloed to the communicative raIes. 65 As wc saw in 3 above, the capacity for postconventional communicative action turns upon an agent's having mastered the use of a tripartite system of relations to the extemal, social and subjective worlds, along with their corresponding validity claims. In this passage Habennas also draws attention to the demands which the process of advancing and assessing such validity claims places upon the agent herseIf. A mature actor, Habennas argues, must bave available to her not only a system of '"world perspectives," but also a system of "speaker perspectives" or communication roles. These together comprise what it means to bave acquired a fully "decentered understanding of the world." It is through reconstnJeting the child~s acquisition of this complex perspective structure that Habennas hopes to provide us with the key to the justification of Kohlberg's moral stages in tenns of a logic of development. Habennas argues that the acquisition of the decentered understanding of the world bas its genesis in two basic processes: (1) The acquisition of the system of '~orld perspectivesn is closely bound to the cbild~s interactions with the physical environment. It is through such interactions that she acquires what Habennas tenns "the observer perspective," which 64White (1988): 29. 105 eventually becomes consolidated as the ~~objectivating" attitude tawards extemal nature and integrated into the tripartite system ofvalidity claims. (2) The more important process for our purposes is the development ofa system of "fully reversible" speaker perspectives. Habennas will argue that the sys'"..em of speaker perspectives embodies certain ufonns of reciprocity" among persons, which play a key role in making the connection ta Kohlberg's stages of moral judgement. As is recognised by both Kohlberg and Habermas, the development of mature structures of social thought and action is centrally related ta the aetor's capacity to take the raIe of ethers. Habermas hence toms ta R. Selman's studies of social perspective-taking to fumish the starting point for bis account of the development of a system of speaker perspectives.66 Selman identifies three basic levels of perspective taking, each of which describes a stable pattern of thought on the basis of which the self interprets her own circumstances and actions vis-a-vis thase of another individual. These levels denote frameworks which can he arranged hierarchically by virtue of their capacity to confer on actors a progressively increasing power to coordinate individual participants' plans of action 00 the basis of a shared definition of the situation. 1 will very briefly sketch Selman's stages with a particular ernphasis upon the reciprocity structures which each embodies. At the first level of perspective-taking (ages 5-9) the child is clearly able to distinguish the perspectives of self and other, and recognises that they may PQteotially ditTer from one another. Habermas describes this phenomenon by saying that the child bas developed a concept of speaker-hearer relations at the level of communication, in that the chiId understands what the other ("alter'') means when she makes a statement, demand or announcement, and is also aware of how her 6~bennas, "Moral Conscïousness,n in Habermas. MCCA: 139. ~bennas, "Moral Consciousness,n in Habermas, MCCA: 141-46. See also R. L. Selman The Growth oflnterpersonal Understanding (New York 1980). 106 j own ("ego's") statements will he comprehended by the other. However, the child bas not yet leamed to extend the reciprocity present in the basic speaker-hearer relation to the fonnation and coordination ofplans ofaction. In judging the actions of otbers, children at titis stage find themselves unable to simuJtaneously maintain their own points of view while imaginatively placing themselves in the position of the other. This resuIts in the child's inability ta effectively judge ber own actions from the standpoint of others, which fonns a barrier ta negotiating shared understandings of the situation. In other words, this stage is charaeterised by an incomplete forro of reciprocity at the level of interpersonal interactions. During the second phase ofperspective-taking (ages 7-12), which is identified by Selman with the secondpersan perspective, the child leams to make a reversible connedion between the perspectives of speaker and hearer. Ego and alter can take each other's attitudes towards their own plans of action and cao hence coordinate their plans of action on this basis. This stage is therefore charaeterised by a two-way forro of reciprocity. The third phase of persPeCtive-taking (ages 10-15) marks the introduction of the third-person perspective into the field of interpersonal interactions. It perrnits an actor to interpret her circurnstances by means which go beyond simply taking alter ~s persPeCtive on the self. Instead, this stage enables actors ta see the interrelation between self and other from the third persan or '~generalizedother" perspective. To express this in Habennas's terminology, the third level of perspective-taking couples the ''performative attitude" of the involved agents of the second level with the uneutraI attitude" of someone who witnesses the interaction while remaining uninvolved. The skills mastered at the second level are now restructured into a more complex set of speaker perspectives which are "fully reversible." As Habennas explains: The new structure consists of the ability to view the reciprocal interlocking of action orientations in the first and second persans from the perspective of the third person. Once interaction bas been restructured in this way, participants can not only take one another's action perspectives but also exchange the 107 participant perspective for the observer perspective and transfonn the one ioto the other.61 This makes it possible to take a detached stance towards the forms of reciprocity developed at Level n, and hence 10 become aware of them in a more ret1ective fashion. The insigbts generated by Selman's studies of perspective-taking fonn a key component in Habermas's ~~stages of interaction." Habermas outlines three stages of interaction which specify the resources available to agents at a given phase 10 coordinate individual plans of action. These stages ascend in the degree of complexity and power of the resources they offer agents to solve interpersonal problems, tenninating in the complex structure of perspectives essential te competence at the postconventional fonn of communicative action. In outlining these stages 1 will focus upon the description Habermas gives of the transition between conventional and postconventional fonns of action, as this will he crucial in understanding how he views the transition from the traditionalist mode of understa.'1ding norms to the modem one. These stages~ once~ he distinguished by the fonns of reciprocity they embody. Stage 1: Preconventiona/ Action: The preconventional stage of action incorporates the perspective-structure of Selman's Level n into roughly t\\'o types of interaction: Although bath ego and alter have leamed to coordinate actions by placing themselves in the position of the other, human relations tend to he viewed as relations of exchange. Moreover, in considering what is exchanged, participants in interaction focus primarily upon the consequences of action. When authority is unequal, as in the family, a non-symmetrical form of reciprocity obtains, where the child may expect for example security and guidance in excbange for obedience. When relationships are egalitari~ as in friendships, actions are coordinated on the basis of the satisfaction of mutual interests. The possibility of interacting 67Habermas• "Moral Consciousness," in Habermas, MCCA: 146. 108 competitively or cooperatively arises in both forms of relationship; however, the possibility of strategie or competitive behaviour arises with particular force when relationships are ega1i~ and the situation is defined as one ofconflict. Stage 2: Conventional Action: This stage embodies the form of reciprocity available in Selman's Level ID ofperspective-taking. Recall tbat this stage ofperspective-taking is seen by Habennas as joining the first and second person perspectives embodied in the relations of speaker and hearer, to the third persan or "observer" perspective. Mastery of this system of speaker perspectives allows agents to coordinate actions on the basis of a more radical form of reciprocity than that available at Level fi, in that the system of speaker perspectives at this level pennits agents "full reversibility" in the exchange of speaker, hearer, and observer roles. Acoording to Habermas, the conventional stage of interaction cornes into being when the observer perspective, which emerges from a child's manipulation of the physical environment,6I is joined to the participant perspective characteristic of preconventional forms of interaction.69 At this juneture the fonns of interaction nascent at the preconventionaI stage of development evolve and acquire definition along two important lines: the notion of nonnatively regulated social action emerges and defines itself through contrast with the notion of strategic action, whieh began to develop at the preconventional stage. 1 would like to look at Habennas's description ofthe emergence ofconventional norms of interaction in greater detaiL The focal point in the development of norrns of action is the growing child's transference of concepts of authority and legitimacy away from conerete authority figures to recognise a supra-personal authority. Drawing both upon empiricaI acoounts of the 68Habermas, "Moral Consciousness." in Habermas, .\fCCA: 139. 6~bermas. "Moral Consciousness," in Habermas. AfCCA: 158. 109 development of concepts 50ch as ftiendship~ group and authority during middle ehildhood,JOas weil as the theories of Sigmund Freud and G.H. MeacL Habennas outlines a general process wherein the prototypes of consensual problem-solving witnessed in the preconventional stage of interaction are transfonned into nonnative actions in the proper sense. Initially~ the child views interpersonal relationships primarily as relationships of exchange. She sees the legitimacy behind particular behavioural expedations as residing in the sanctiODÏDg power of an individuaI authority figure. The transition ta the conventional stage of interaction consists in the child~s leaming to detach the notion of legitimate authority from specifie persons and to recognise the authority ofa 5Oprapersonal will. As Habermas explains: At this point the child ~s view of social bonds, authority and loyalty become dissociated from specific reference persons and contexts. They are transformed into the normative concepts of moral obligation, the legitirnacy of roles, the nonnative vaIidity of authoritative commands, and 50 on.71 Following Freud and Mead~ Habermas views this process as one of internalisation of the sanctions associated with legitimate authority. These sanctions are originally viewed as attached to the authority of concrete reference persans; however, to the extent that they become incorporated into the personality structure of the growing chil~ their authority becomes divorced from attachment to specific individuals. The child rea1ises that what she at fust saw as an expectation applicable in relation to herself and her mother, for example, is in fact a behavioural norm goveming interrelations between mothers and children in general. lbis process requires the child to place herself in the position of other individuals, to take a third personal perspective with respect to the situation confronting herself and the other, and to leam to see the positions of the actors as interchangeable. She thereby leams ta detach concrete 7~bennas refers to stlldies condueted by R.L. Selman in The Growlh oflnterpersona/ Understanding (New Yõ 1980), and by W. Damon in The Social Wor/d ofthe Chi/d (San Francisco, 1977). 71Habermas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habermas, MCCA: 153. 110 behavioural expectations from specifie persons and te see these as applicable to all group members under specifie eircumstances. From this process arises the notion of a ~social role" around whieh conventional moralities develop. The perceived legitimacy of behavioural expectations underlying social roles is based upon the recognition by group members that the way of life ofa specifie group is legitimate, and upen a form of loyalty intimately linked to the group"s power to punish and reward those actions which confonn or fail to confonn ta its social norms. Socially recognised norms bence represent an admixture of rational consent and a capaeity for repression based upen the power of the group. lbis is what Habennas tenns a ~lraditionalist'" understanding of norms. Gaining acceptance on the part of a norm is encoded in a twofold fashion because our motives for recognizing nonnative c1airns ta validity are rooted bath in convictions and in sanctions, that is, they derive from a complex mixture of rational insight and force. Typically, rationally motivated assent will be combined with empirical acquiescence, effected by weapons or goods., ta form a belief in legitimacy whose companent parts are difficult to isolate. 72 So is clear that social roles and nonns at the conventional stage of interaction are still embedded in, and presuppose the validity of, the taken-for-granted background of traditions, practices and institutions which Habennas calls 'lhe lifeworld." At this stage., morality in the strict or narrow sense of justice bas not yel become autonomous from those aspects of practical reason faIIing under the classification of "ethics." Although the behavioural expectations attaehed to social roles may be extended beyond the boundaries of partieular social groups and transfonned into a generalised system of nomlS, they are still linked to the ethical outlook or worldview of a particular community. As Kohlberg says., "conventional morality defines good behavior for a Democrat but not for a Republican, for an American but 72Habennas, "Discourse Ethics," in Habennas, MCCA: 61-62. III not for a Vietnarnese, for a father but not for a SOD. n7J Nonns embody conceptions of what is right by attaehing expectations of behaviour to particular roles within a form of life seen to he good in itself. However, the recognition of social norms requires an individual ta make use of a syouoetrical fonn of reciprocity, whose radical extension makes transition te a third stage of interaction possible. When the persans concemed play their social roles knowing that as members of a social group they are entit/ed ta expect certain actions from athers in given situations and at the same time obliged ta fulfill the justified behavioral expecta.tions of others, they are basing themselves on a symmetrical fonn of reciprocity even though the contents of the roles are still distributed in a complementary fashion among the different group participants.74 Stage J: Discourse: The third stage of interaction focuses on the testing through argumentation of implicit validity daims embodied in social nonns. Habermas describes this stage as characterised by the "hypothetical attitude,n which allows agents ta suspend helief in the validity of existing nonns. The validity claims embodied in social nonns must now be redeemed through processes of postconventional argumentation or discourse. The successful practice of discourse toms upon the agent's having acquired a deoentered understanding of the world. It depends on her ability to coordinate the system of world perspectives or validity daims and the system of speaker-bearer perspectives, which provide the frarne\\'ork within which speakers aet as opponents and proponents who criticize and defend validity claims. This stage requires that agents practise an idealised fonn of reciprocity, in that it depends for its success upon aetors seeing their relations as fully reversible. In discourse aetors rely "on the complete reversibility of their relations with other participants in the argumentation and al the 7~0h1berg, "From 15 to Ought," in Kohlberg (1981): 135. 704Habermas, "Moral Conscïousness," in Habennas,MCC4: 155. 112 same rime attribute the position they take ta the persuasive force of the better argumeñ no matter how their consensus was reached in actual facto n7S The transition between conventional and postconventional stages of interaction is associated by Habermas with the transition from adolescence ta adulthood. It also marks the transition from a moral consciousness associated with "ethics" te one which distinguishes and prioritises "morality" in the narrow sense specified by discourse ethics. It will hence repay us te examine this transition in greater detaïl. As wc have seen, the practice of advancing and assessing validity claims in the natural, social and subjective spheres can ooly take place when claims are advanced in what Habennas caUs a "self-reflective" manner, which requires agents to recognise that ail such claims are in principle contestable. This recognition is what Habennas caUs the "hypothetical attitude." Introduction of the hypothetical attitude alters the subject's relation to the world ofexisting states of affairs, and problematises the relationship of an agent to her lifeworld. ln light of hypothetical claims to validity the world of existing affairs is theoreti~ that is, becomes a matter of theory, and the world of legitimately ordered relations is moralized, that is, becomes a matter of morality. This moralization of society...undennines the nonnative power of the factual: from the isolated viewpoint ofdeontological validity, institutions that have lost their quasi-natural charaeter can he tumed into 50 many instances of problematic justice.76 The hypothetical attitude is an unavoidable component of a fully decentered understanding of the world. Its adoption demands of an agent that she calI into question the validity of the social institutions and norms she currently acoepts. These DOnns become subject to radical questioning, thereby undermining the naive acceptance of lifeworld practices which previously underlay the perceived legitimacy ofnorms. The norms themselves DOW require a different and more far-reaching sort ofjustification. 7~bennas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas. MCC4: 159. 113 The autonomous justification of morality hence becomes an inesc.apable problem for anyone who bas acquired a decentered understanding of the world. Nonetheless, Habennas believes that this very same decentered understanding of the world provides the key to the problem~s dissolution, in that it specifies a procedure of argumentation wherein one can assess current socia! nonns in the light of higber levels nonns. As traditions and lifeworld practices are problematised and lose their unquestioned validity~ the need to arrive at a means of conflict resolution which proceeds consensua1ly dernands that aetors adopt the moral point of view in the strict sense. Only at the postconventional stage is the social world UDcoupled from a stream of cultural givens. This shift makes the autonomous justification of morality an unavoidable problem. The very perspectives that make consensus possible are now at issue. Independently of contingent conunonalities of social background, political affiliation, cultural heritage, traditional forms of life, and 50 õ competent actors cm DOW take a moral point of vie\\', a point of view distanced Jram the controversy. only if they cannot avoid accepting that point of view even when their value orientations diverge. Consequently, this moral reference point must he derived from the structure in which aIl participants in interaction always already find themselves insofar as they act communicatively.77 Habennas equates the moral point of view with a point of view that agents cannot help but accep~ regardless of whatever particular views of the good and just life they May happen to hold. He believes that such a point of view is found in the notion of reciprocity contained in the pragmatic presuppositions of ail fonns of argumentation. The structures of reciprocity play an essential role in meeting the objectives pertaining ta the reinterpretation of Kohlberg's model which Habermas bas set for himself. Recall thã in Habermas's view, the hierarchical interrelation of Kohlberg's stages bas Dot yet been satisfàctorily demonstrated. Habennas'5 goal bas been 10 remedy this difficulty from within the framework of a discursive ethics. The structures of reciprocity play a twofold raIe in 7~bermas. "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas. MCCA: 161. 114 Habennas's response. FUst, these structures are essential in linking up the stages of interaction, themselves developed from the theory of communicative action, with Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Secoñ Habermas will argue tbat the sttuetures of reciprocity embodied in the stages of interaction provide the key ta demonstrating that these stages fonn a lagie of development. Seing conversant with Habermas's reasoning on this point will place us in a favourable position 10 understand bis solution ta the problem posed at the beginning of the chapter. 1will begin by traeing the connection ta Kohlberg's work. Recall tha.t Kohlberg's principles of moral judgement are organized into a three-Ievel, six-stage structure. Habermas must show that the three stages of interaction outlined can he logically correlated with the three levels of Kohlberg's model. 1 will follow Stephen White in depicting this interconnection by distinguishing the general stages of interaction along two axes. First, these stages differ in regard to the structure of behavioural expectations employed by the aetors therein.78 The transition between these forms of behavioural expectation is portrayed by Habermas as a logical progression taking place through increasing selfapplication or "reflexivity." The preconventional stage is transformed into the conventional only when the simple expectations conceming particular actions and their consequences charaeteristic of the preconventional level can he mutua/ly expected. This operation creates the roles and norms charaeteristic of the conventional level. The conventional level is transformed into the posteonventional when the nonns of the conventional level are themselves assessed according to higher-Ievel DOnns.79 The stages of interaction may aise he differentiated along the axis of reciprocity structures embodied Ù1 a given fonn of action. As White explains: "When the two 77Habermas. "Moral Conscîousness." in Habennas, MCC4: 162~3. 78White (1988): 61. 115 { dimensions-struetures of behavioral expectations and reciprocity-are~ one can see how the forms in which reciprocity appears in interaction structure the difJërent conceptions ofrightness wbich infonn Kohlberg's stages ofmoraljudgements.'~Let us examine how this relationship unfolds. At the preconventional level of interaction, ooly concrete actions and consequences of action understood in tenns of gratification or punishment are assessed by the child as morally relevant. When the fonn of reciprocity employed is nonsynunetrical, as in the parent-clilld relationship, we obtain Kohlberg's Stage 1 ("punishment~bedience orientation") of moral judgement. The justice<Ollcept at this stage defines right action as that which maximises reward through obedience ta authority. If a symmetrical fonn of reciprocity is employed, as among peers, we obtain Kohlberg's Stage 2 ("instrumental-hedonism orientation"), in which justice is conceived as that which maximises reward through symmetrical exchange of equivaIents. At the conventional stages of interaction, agents employ notions of social roles and norms in assessing what is morally relevant. The fonn of reciprocity is symmetrical, in that a fully reversible set of speaker perspectives is employed at this stage. Focussing upon social roles yields Kohlberg's Stage 3, in which justice is seen as role-conformity; whereas focussing upon nonns yields Stage 4, in which justice is equated \\ith nonn-confonnity. At the postconventional stages of interaction, the introduction of the hYPOthetical attitude associated with a decentered understanding of the world makes it necessary that principles become the moral theme. A decentered understanding of the world requires that agents he able to participate in fully open--ended or postconventional fonns of argumentation. Such processes of argumentation provide a forum wherein DOnns related to particular forms of life can he evaluated in the light of higher~rder principles. Moreover, participants in argumentation must employ an idealised fonn of reciprocity, in which aIl 7~te (1988): 61-62; and Habennas. "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," in Habermas, CES: 156. 116 agents are conceived as equal participants in dialogue. Stages 5 and 681 on Kohlberg's scheme represent such universalist modes of thinking.12 1 have schematised this relationship in Table SOWhite (1988): 62. 81Following a suggestion by Thomas McCarth~', Habermas bas in recent work become wary of the notion of stages of postconventional fonns of moral consciousness in the strict sense. McCanhy argues that it is questionable whether the highest forms of moral consciousness can be investigated and established with the same methods as the lowest. precisely because higher fonIlS of moral consciOUSDess are rejlective. This feature puts the subject's moral thought on a par epistemicaIly \\ith that of the moral psychologist. See McCarthy, "Rationality and Relativis~" in Thompson and Held (1982): 72*75. 82My analysis of the interconnection between the stages of interaction and Kohlberg' s forms of moral consciousness deviates from White's in severa! respects. This is due ooly to the faet that White relies principally upon the account given by Habennas in "Moral Development and Ega.ldentity," in Habennas, CES: whereas 1focus upon the revised account in "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas, MCCA. 83My examination of the stages of interaction bas focussed on the acquisition of"speaker perspectives", as these embody the fOnDS ofreciprocity neoessary for the derivation ofKohlberg's stages. However, it is important ta note tbat the transitions between the stages of interaction are brought about through "world perspectives" which manifest a particular understanding ofreality. The transition from preconventional to conventional stages of interaction takes place when the observer perspective, which is acquired through the chiId's manipulation of the physical environment, is introduced into the speaker*hearer relationship. This is the precondition for the constitution of a world of socially recognised mIes and nonns essential to this stage. The transition from conventional ta postconventional forms of interaction is, once again, brought about by a mechanism related ta world-perspectives. The differentiation ofvalidity spheres into the three domains of natura1, social and inner reality aliows agents to raise clairns to validity in processes of open-ended argumentation. The introduction of the uhypotheticaI attitude" or recognition that claims to validity are in principle contestable is necessaIy for the principled morality associated with postconventional stages of interaction. A panicular fonn of cognitive deoentration can therefore be seen as a neoessary precondition of the moral decentration exemplified in the highest stages of moral judgement. See Habennas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habennas, MCC4 139, 141 & 159. 117 Table 1. Reinterpretation of Koblberg's Stages Using DE Stage of Speaker Phase oflife Reciprocity Justice Kohlberg's Interaction PerspectiveConcept Concept Stage structure Prereciprocal mid-childhood noncamplcmcntarity 1 conventional: interconnection to early symmetrical oforderand interaction ofaction adolescence reciprocity obedience; controlled by perspectives (authoritysymmetryof authority or govemed ) or compensation cooperation symntetrical 2 based on selfreciprocity interest (interestgovemed) Conventional: coordination adolescence symmetrical confonnity to 3 Role ofobserver reciprocity roles behaviour; or and associated nonn participant with social behaviour perspectives roles and confonnity ta (social (Selman's nonns existing 4 generalisation level3) system of of roles ioto nonns system of nonns) Discourse coordination adulthood idealized orientation of system of reciprocity towards 5&6speaker universal perspectives principles of and world justice and perspectives procedures for justifying nonns Adaptedfrom Habermas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habermas (1990). The notion of reciprocity a1so provides the key to Habennas's claim that bis stages of interaction, and thus Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness, meet the conditions placed upon a lagie of development. Recall that a stage model organised as a developmental-logical account must satisfy severa! requirements. The most important of these stipulates that the 118 stages he demonstrated to form a hierarchy which unfolds with an internai logic towards an end point representing a cumulative gain. This is equivalent ta showing that the cognitive structures embodied in the higher stages can replace those in the lower stages while preserving the skills acquired therein in reorganised form. The stages of interactiõ according ta Habennas, represent precisely such a development. The performative perspectives of speaker and hearer present at the preconventional stage fonn the building blocks for an increasingly complex set of communication roles which cuIrninates at the postconventional stage in a decentered understanding of the world displayed by subjects who have mastered the art of discourse. As Habennas explains: '~iewed in terms of a progressively decentered understanding of the world. the stages of interaction express a development that is directed and cumulative."~ A good deal turns on Habermas's success in demonstrating this point. What is at issue is the claim that Kohlberg's moral stages represent an unambiguous ordering from lower to higher fonns of moral consciousness, in other words, the daim that postconventional structures of moral consciousness are distinct from and superior to both conventional and preconventional forms. This would provide an evidentiary basis to support Habermas's conception of the moral point of view as embodied in the principle of universalisation. First, it provides a justification for the possibility and legitimacy of making the separation between morality and ethics necessary for the successful functioning of (U). Second, it shows why Habermas is right in thinking that (U) should lead to consensus. The features of Stage 6 moral judgements imply that solutions at this level are more stable. The key to the substantiation of this claim lies in the way in which the structures of reciprocity are transfonned in the progression from stage to stage. Habennas argues that 119 actors at the postconventional stage of interaction have mastered a practice of reciprocity which constitutes a cumulative advance over the fonn of reciprocity in the other two stages, as judged by the formai criteria of increasing generality, abstraction, complexity, and most especially, ret1exivity, which Habermas sees as universally relevant. Habermas argues that any competent speaker of a language must bave mastered at )east an incomplete form of reciprocity, as this is a minimal requirement of the speaker-hearer relationship. The distinction between incomplete and complete fonns of reciprocity is defined by Habermas as follows: "ln communicative action a relationship of at lcast incomplete reciprocity is established with the interpersonal relation between the involved parties. Two persans stand in an incompletely reciprocaI relation insofar as one may do or expect x onIy ta the extent that the other may do or expect y (e.g. teaeher/pupil, parentlchild). Their relationship is completely reciprocal if both may do or expect the same thing in comparable situations (x=y) (e.g. the norms of civil IaW).,,85 Because reciprocity structures are acquired naturally in the acquisition of communicative competence in any context, Habennas caUs reciprocity the "naturalistic kemer' ofmoral consciousness. In Habennas's view, therefore, reciprocity is common to alilinguistic forms of life, and as such serves as a footing for the moral point of vie\\". As we have see~ Habennas equates the moral point of view \\ith a point of view that agents cannot help but accept regardless of the particular views of the good and just life they may hold. Ta put the point in tenns of the problem raised at the beginning of the chapter, reciprocity is a structure available to all practitioners of conventional forms of argumentation (Argumentation1 ). Ail Iinguistic agents must have mastered at least the incomplete reciprocity structure contained in the preconventional form of interaction. A symmetrical fonn of reciprocity making use of a more complex set of communication structures makes the development of raies and norms S4Habermas. "Moral Consciousness.'* in Habennas, A-fCCA: 168. 8~berrnas. "Moral Development and Ego-Identity." in Habennas, CES: 88. 120 possible at the conventional stage. At the postconventional stage the fonn of reciprocity is idealised in postconventional practices of argumentation (Argumentation2 ), making possible the ')torming ofnorms. ,. As Habennas sees i~ this fonn of reciprocity represents a cumulative advance over the other foons in terms ofthe abstraet criteria indieated.B6 However, as Steven White observes, the argument for the universal validity of postconventional moral judgements cannot he conelusively established by these means. If correct, Habermas bas thus far shown that the "viewpoint of reciprocity" is available to ail speaking agents and that it can hence serve as a point of reference for resolving conflicts of interests consensually. However, that the form ofreciprocity embodied in postconventional structures of moral judgement must he taken as the standard is less than clear. The developmental lagie presented by Habennas makes it clear why conventional forms of moral consciousness constitute an advance over preconventionaI forms. The reasons are roughly twofold: (1) Conventional fonns of moral consciousness pennit the agent a clearer grasp of the domain of the normative as against for example the coereive. (2) ln contrast to the preconventional level, a fully developed set of speaker perspectives embodying a symmetrical form of reciprocity is present al the conventionallevel of moral consciousness. Aetors at this stage are fully capable of adopting a standpoint of reciprocity to decide moral questions. However, this does not show t.h4t reciprocity in its idealized form must he accepted as the appropriate standard in resolving moral disputes. Others MaY be available to the discussants. White puts the point as follows: Clearly this makes reciprocity a vicwpoint avai/able ta mature individuals in all societies; but just as clearly there is no natura! necessity for this viewpoint being consciously accepted as the standard for resolving moral confliets. The reflexive use of the viewpoint of reciprocity as a requirement in moral deliberation cao ooly be conclusively justified when one bas assumed the 860yne question ofwhether these criteria are appropriate will be touched on in the next chapter. 121 superiority of the moral point of view associated with a decentered, postconventional coDSciousness.17 The advance of postconventional forros of moral consciousness over conventional ones is held by Habermas ta be established on a threefold basis: (a) because it is more deoentered; (b) because titis extraets the kemel ofduty as against (selfor group) interest (Kant); (c) because the difTerentiation of validity spheres in modemity undercuts the tenability of other valuepositions. Reciprocity becomes accepted as the sole standard for resolving moral disputes only when others are devalued, as they are in modemity. The next section will briefly outline Habermas's theory of social evolution, in which this claim to the superiority of the modem worldview is articulated. We can conc1ude our discussion of the development of moral consciousness at the individual level by saying that Habennas bas succeeded in clarifying the conceptual framework set out by Kohlberg through discourse ethics, and that this provides sorne measure of indirect support for each. However, as Habennas is weIl aware, it does not in itself demonstrate the adequacy of either Kohlberg ~s or bis own guiding assurnptions conceming the nature of the moral point of view. 3.4 Habermas'5 Theory of Social Evolution We have so far been considering Kohlberg~s and Habennas's accounts of individual maturation in the domain of moral judgement primarily from the standpoint of the modern, Western societies in which they were developed. As we have seen, Kohlberg's theory takes its starting point from certain Western liberal ideas of justice and morality embodied most especially in Kantian philosophy in conjunetion with tests on a group of 75 American boys. The crucial question from our point of view is whether Kohlberg's theory describes a path of 8iWhite (1988): 64. 122 development valid universally across the species, or a path specific to our own culturet perhaps even a particular segment of that culture.Il The support derived from empirical data generated by cross-cultural studies is ambiguous in that these studies have not yielded results identical with the American ones. R.ecall that the MOst commonly observed stage of moral judgement among adults in aU societies is Stage 4; however, the higher stages have oot been observed in illiterate or semiliterate village cultures.19 Furthermore, Stage 5 bas been observed \\ith more frequency in the United States than e1sewhere, whereas Stage 6 bas Dot been observed at ail among the test subjects in any studies conducted.90 Kohlberg summarizes the results of bis research as fol1ows: My data indicate that, although cultures differ in MOst frequeot or modal stage, a culture cannot he located al a single staget and the individual 's moral stage cannot he derived directly from bis or ber culture'5 stage. There are, however, differences in the frequences of the higher stages in various cultural grouPSt related to the cognitive and social complexity ofthe group. It is easier to develop to Stage 6 in modem America than in fifth-eentury Athens or firstcentury Jerusalem....Furthennore, there is a historical ~~horizontal decalage" or an casier extension of principles of Stage 6 thought; Sacrates was more aceepting of slavel1' than was Lincoln, who was more accepting of it than King.91 Although Kohlberg does not want to draw a simple equivalency between the modal stage of moral judgement in a given culture and that of an individual in that culture, he does believe that these results suggest a "mild doctrine of social evolutionism." 92 Because the stages of moral consciousoess represent transfonnations in concepts of self, society and the other, progression 18A provocative challenge to the adequacy ofKohlberg's model was initiated by Carol Gilligan, who contrasts the Kantian focus 00 universal mies. rights, faimess. and autonomy \\-lth an ethic anchored in the ideas of responsibility and <:are for others, context-sensitivity and interdependence, which she argues come to the fore in the moral experiences ofwomen. As Gilligan sees il. these are two aspects or complementary visions ofmoral maturity, both ofwhich must be acc:ommodated in an adequate account ofhuman moral development. See Gilligan (1982): 151-174. 89tcoblberg (1981): 151. Note that from a functionalist perspective the prevalence of Stage 4 moral judgements seems vel)' plausible. Il seems reasonable that a healthy society be one whose members believe that right action consists in upholding that society's laws and governing principles. ~ohlberg (1981): 100. 91Kohlberg (1981): 129. 123 through the stages depends upon the social environment and the opportunities for taking the role of the other which it provides. "Social environrnents or institutions not ooly facilitate moral development by providing role-taking opportunities, but their justice structure is aIso an important determinant of role-taking opportunities and consequent moral development. The foonation ofa mature sense ofjustice requires participation in just institutions.,,93 Habennas's studies of the evolution of worldviews provide a systen1atic account of social development which corroborates KohIberg,s intuitions conceming the social prec:onditions of the development of moral consciousness. The tenn "worldview" is used by Habennas ta describe the intermeshing cognitive, linguistic and nonnative structures of consciousness available to a given culture or form oflife. Societies as entities "learn" ooly in a derivative sense: worldviews should he viewed as repositories of the insights of individual leaming abilities which have become '4embedded in culture.,194 However, there is a circular relation between individual maturation and species development, in that individuais leam ooly '1mder social houndary conditions.',gs To put the point differently, the learning of individuals is facilitated or constrained by the store of rationality structures available to them in the societal worldview in which they are raised. Social and personality systems are hence complementary in that the development of cognitive and nonnative structures at the individual level turns upon corresponding processes of leaming at the societal level. Nonetheless. the correspondence in level of development between individual and society should not, according to , Habennas, he seen as absolute. He, like Kohlberg, recognises that "[nJot ail individuals are equally representative of the developmental stage of their society. Thus in modem societies, ~e next chapter will consider whether there might not be alternative ways of viCl\ing this data. ~ohlberg (1981): 144. This phrase is echoed by Habermas in severa! articles. Compare e.g. "Discourse Ethics," in Habennas, AlCC4: 98-109, where Habennas argues that discourse ethics depends upon a fonn of life which "meets it halfway." ~e phrase is David Ingram's. See Ingram (1987): 27. 9SSee Habermas. "The Development of Normative Structures," in Habennas. CES: 121. 124 law bas a universalistic structure, although many members are not in a position to judge according to principles. Conversely, in archaic societies there were individuals who had mastered fonnal QPCrations of thought., although the collectively shared mythological worldview corresponded to a lower stage ofcognitive development.,,96 Although cautious about making global comparisons between processes of individual and species maturation, Habermas claims that it is possible ta specify C4abstraet points of reference" which will make such a comparison possible. He speculates that there C4might he a process ofdecentration of world views that corresponds to ego development....,m Specifically, Habennas believes that there are homologies between the development of individuals and that of worldviews in three areas: the development of normative structures, the demarcation of object domains, and the fonnation of personal and group identities. In each case, the process of evolution is refleeted in and explained through advances in the structure of linguistic competence, or communicative action. The theory of social evolution attempts to organize the development of society along these three paraIlel dimensions, of which two-the development of normative structures and the demarcation of object domains-are of particular interest to us. Advances in nonnative development, as we have~ retlect improvements in the ability of agents to "regulate action confliets consensually and thus to maintain an endangered subjectivity of understanding among speaking and acting subjects"; while advances in the demarcation of object domains "makes possible the diiferentiation (and if necessary thematization) of those validity claims (truth, rightness, truthfulness) that we implicitly tie to ail speech actions. ,,98 ~bermas, "Normative Structures," in Habennas, CES: 102. 9'Habermas, "Normative Structures," in Habennas, CES: 103. 9SHabermas, "Normative Struetures.~ in Habermas, CES: 116. 125 The theory of social evolution hence bas the familiar characteristics of a cognitivedevelopmental model: fi~ it involves comparison of worldviews at the level of formai structures ofthought~ rather than at the level of cultural contents. Second, variations across social groups in the rationality structures they passess are to be explained as differences in the level of development. The process of social maturation is, Iike the process of individual maturation, meant ta meet the conditions of a developmental logic. Once again, Habennas associate5 the apex of development with characteristics of a deoentered understanding of the world associated with postconventional foons of argumentation. He envisages the mechanism of transition between the stages as one of leaming in response ta disequilibria: when confronted with evolutionary challenges~ the problem-solving capacities stored in a society's worldviews are challenged. If they are not adequate to the challenge, the society must attempt to survive by advancÎDg these capacities to a new and higher stage~ thereby altering its worldview structures. Habermas~s airn is ta demonstrate by these means that the features of a decentered understanding of the world associated \\ith Western modemity fonn an advance over other structures in the two axes designated, which Habennas views as crucial components of rationality. The theory of social evolution emerges from Habennas ~s early anempts to rethink marxist theories of historical materialism. Orthodox marxism has traditionally regarded nonnative structures as seconda!)' phenomena, which depend for their emergence upon economic modes of production. A1though Habennas recognises the complex interdependency between culture, morality and social identity on the one band, and the economic system on the other, he advances the thesis that normative processes follow their own path of evolution. As Habermas writes "[t]he rules of conununicative action do develop in reaction to changes in the 126 domain of instrumental and strategie action; but in 50 doing they [ollow their own /ogie.,.,99 Moreover, he believes that the development of these nonnative structures is ''the pacemaker" of social evolution as a whole, since new prineiples of social organisation open the way to new methods of generating and implementing productive fOices. loo Societies move ta higher levels of social evolution when they are confronted with either internai or external challenges to survival or legitimacy. Habennas holds that more intemally differentiated and complex societies have a greater capaeity for dealing with bath internaI and extemal challenges to the status quo than do societies organised around a "mechanical 5Olidarity," that is, a solidarity based upon kinship relations. The abstraet categories used to deseribe individual structures of consciousness cart he applied to the level of the collective structures of conseiousness found in worldviews. Habennas outlines severa! phases in the evolution of society, which 1 will divide into three levels for the purpose ofexpositional clari!}'.101 Leve/ 1: Primitive or Neo/ithic Soeiety The first stage of social formation deseribes societies organised around a kinship system, which sets out roles based upon familial, sex and age differentiations. At this stage of social evolution worldviews embody '"structures of consciousness" based upon the recounting of myths. The analogical or narrative accounts provided in myths serve severa! funetions: they legitimate or justify the authority of this mode of social organisation, while unit)ing the various spheres of reality (what Habermas caUs "domains of validity'') into a whole. The domains of nature and culture bave not yet been clearly differentiated at this stage. Habermas explains: 9!1iabennas. UHistorical Materia1i~ n in Habennas, CES: 148. 100000bermas, "Normative Stroetures,n in Habennas, CES: 20. IOIThis material is drawn from Habermas, '~Historica1 Materialism," in Habermas. CES: 56-58~ and also Michael Pusey's Habermas: 41-46. 127 From this reciprocal assimilation ofnature ta culture and conversely culture to nature, there results, on the one band, a nature that is outfitted with anthropomorphic features, drawn into the communicative network of social subjects, and in this sense humanized, and on the other band, a culture that is to a certain extent naturalized and reified and absorbed into the objective nexus ofoperations ofanonymous powers.102 The interweaving of the domains of nature and culture results in difficulties for neolithic societies on two levels: first, Habermas argues that neolithic societies faiI to make a number of distinctions necessary to more sophisticated foImS of moral judgement, such as that between action and intention. He bence attributes to such societies a conventionally structured system of interaction with conventional models for the solution of nonnative conflicts. Second, such societies typica1ly have little power to exercise control over theu environments. Habennas argues that such societies are typically challenged to change their methods of organisation by extema1 crises which threaten their survival by overloading the problem-solving capacities of their social structure. I03 Level II: Traditiona/ Societies Traditional societies are, roughly speaking, those in which the authority of the system of societal organisation is legitimated through cultural traditions. We can distinguish two phases oftraditional society, based upen the degree to wlLch the tradition in question bas been systematised. ( 1) Ear/y civilized cultures such as those of ancient Greece, India, China and Rome generally move away from familial forms of organisation towards forms of societal organisation based upen the ownership of the means of production. The kinship system thus surrenders control to the State. This state fonn of organisation bas a more complex array of problem solving tools al its disposaI, which a1Iow it better to cope with extemal threats, 50ch as the contingencies of the environment and threats from other societies, which threatened the survival of primitive societies. However, according to Habennas, the priee of this greater internaI complexity is a more articulated structure of power and c1ass lO2Habermas, TCA 1: 47. 128 domination based upon a state system. The state apparatus hence stands in a greater need of legitimation than the organisational structure of neolithic societies. To put the point in Habermasian tenninology, the 44level of justification" required ta legitimate the social organisati*on of these societies is higher. In early civilisations mythological worldviews still take on legitimating functions for the occupants of positions of authority; however, the abject dornains of nature and culture are more clearly separated than they are al the neolithic stage. The traditions used to justify societal organisation are now increasingly organised around a systernatised body of unifying principles which introduce what Habennas calls "'an element of counterfaetuality" ioto society, in that they pennit one to challenge existing social practices. Although Habermas believes social interactions at this stage to be conventionally struetured, he believes that the worldviews of such civilisations DOW contain sorne postconventional features for problem-solving. (2) Developed Civilisations, such as those of post-Renaissance ta eighteenth or nineteenthcentury Western Europe, are those organized around a sophisticated State apparatus which involves an institutionalised system of class domination. Normative structures and cultural forms are articulated in an increasingly systematic fashion. However, this systematicity is still constrained through ontologically grounded representations of the world: structures of authority still depend for their legitimacy upon cosmological worldviews invoking metaphysical conceptions of God, Being or Nature. However, advances in scientific and nonnative development render these cosmological worldviews increasingly subjeet to challenge, and more difficult to render plausible. This marks the transition te, the final stage of worldview development. lÕbermas. TC4 J: 47. 129 Level Ill: Modem Societies In modem societies the cosmological justification of nonns of action is no longer viable. The level ofjustification required ta legitimate social organisation is thus raised once agaîn. The validity of even the bighest principles cao now he called into questiõ and must he justified by argument. Habennas argues that at a fonnal levely procedural strategies for justification invoking the principles of discursive reason become the method for justification. Action systems DOW acquire postconventional featuresy the three validity spheres separate out fuUyy and worldviews propagate universalistic fonns of moral thinking. The evolution of worldviews forms a theory complementary ta that of individual psychological developmeñ and isomorphic to it in certain respects. The mythic worldview ellides objective and subjective reality in much the same way as the young child fails to adequately distinguish physical nom social reality. Moreover, there is a failure ta disassociate what it is right ta do trom existing structures of authority, as reflected in the preconventional stages of moral consciousness. With the transition nom archaic societies to traditional civilizations, narrative accounts are increasingly replaced by explanation which cao be justified through argument. The drive towards the rationalisation of tradition is particularly strong in the cultures dominated by monotheistic religions. These religions attempt to unify reality under a single principle, and thereby exhibit a strong impulse toward logical coosistency. Although such worldviews contain many features which are modefIly they retain a dependence on religious or metaphysical conceptions tied to a particular form of life. This is reminiscent ofthe conventional stages of moral consciousness associated with ~~ethics." The transition from developed to modem worldvicws is similar in structure to the transition from conventionaI to postconventional fonns of moral judgement. In the modem era nonnative principles are justified universally, a fcature reminiscent of moral judgement at 130 Stages 5 and 6 on Kohlberg's scale. According to Habermas, this transition is reminiscent of the passage from adolescence ta adulthood in the sphere of individual maturation. If by way of a thought experiment we compress the adolescent phase of growth into a single critical instant in which the individual for the first time assumes a hypothetical attitude toward the nonnative context of bis lifeworld, we can see the nature of the problem that every person must dea1 with in passing from the conventional to the postconventionallevel ofmoral judgment. The social world of legitimately reguIated interpersonal relations, a world to '. which one was naively babituated and which was unproblematically accep~ is abruptly deprived of its quasi-natural validity. Ifthe adolescent cannat and does not want ta go back ta the traditionalism and unquestioned identity of bis past world, he must, on penalty of uttef disorientation, reconstruet...the normative orders that bis hypothetical gaze bas destroyed by removing the veil of illusions from them. Using the rubble of devalued traditions, traditions that have been recognized ta be merely conventionai and in need of justification, he erects a new normative structure that must he soIid enough ta withstand critical inspection....UItimately all that remains is a procedure for rationally motivated choice among principles that have been recognized in tum as in need of justification. (This transition] is like an echo of the developmental catastrophe that historically once devalued the world oftraditions and thereby provoked efforts to rebuilt il at a higher level. 104 1 have schematised the interrelationships bet\veen the theory of the acquisition of moral judgement in the individual and the account ofworldview development in Table 2. I04Habennas. UMoral Consciousness." in Habermas (1990): 126-27. Myemphasis. Note the resemblance to the Enlightenment conception expressed by Kant in "What is Enlightenment?" where Kant o1fers an apology for the value of rational autonomy as contrastOO with a dependence upon traditions: HEnlightenment is man's emergence from bis self-incurred immaturity. Immalurity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance ofanother....The mono of the enlightenment is therefore: Sapere Aude! Have courage to use your own understanding'" Reliance upon tradition is charaeterised by Kant as the source ofan individual's self-incurred immaturity: "Dogmas and formulas, thase mechanical instruments for rational use (or ratber misuse) of bis natural endowments. are the bail and chain of bis pennanent immaturity." In lmmanuel Kañ Kant 's Politica/ Writings. 00. Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press. 1970): 54-55. 1 am indebted to Nigel Desouza for this reference. 131 Table 2. Parallels Between Ontogenesis & Phylogenesis Stage of Organisation Levelof Validity Stage ofLife Kohlberg~s Social Principle Justification Spheres Justice Stage Evolution Primitive, kinship low:myths undifferentiated: childhood preNeolithic or system perform naturaI and Arcbaic justifieatory social conventional Civilisaions role phenomena stages 1 & 2 intenvoven through myth Developed state higher: Somewhat adolescence conventional Civilisations apparatus: authority differentiated: stages 3 & 4 becoming legitimated nature and increasingly through culture seen sophisticated traditions as separate; which are but linked increasingly through rationalised powerofa unifying worldview. Modemity State high: fonnal differentiated: adulthood post* (Western) apparatus: conditions of three validity conventional sophisticated justice spheres stages 5 & 6 themselves obtain legitimating force 3.5 Conclusion: In the last chapter it was demonstrated that the practice of sorne vari~, of communicative action is inescapable for all human agents. This practice, insofar as it imposes obligations of mutual responsibility upen the participants involved ta provide good reasons for daims raised in argumentation, appears ta have sorne nonnative implications. However, it"ëlS 132 argued that proof of the claim that Habermas~s discursive ethics applies universally could not he seen ta follow directly from this: the proposition that communicative action is practised universally by ail agents depends for its plausibility upon the identification of a relatively undemanding sense of communicative actiõ whose associated practice of argumentation we have called "conventional." The claims of discourse ethïcs, however, are supported ooly by the postconventional form of argumentation associated with the modern, Western practicc of communicative action. Habermas's strategy in supporting the claim that discourse ethics should be seen ta apply universally to ail hurnan agents bas hence been ta argue that the ethical implications ofpostconventional fonns of communicative action should hold for practitioners of ail fonns of communicative action, for the fonn of rationality associated with postconventional argumentation constitutes a demonstrable cognitive gain over that associated with conventional modes ofargumentation. Although Habermas advanoes his universality claims through transcendental-style arguments, he rejects the a prioristic approach of traditional Kantian philosophy toward the demonstration of their validity. As he explains: "1 have tried to take up the universalistic [ine of questioning of transcendental philosophy~ while at the same rime detranscendentalising the mode of procedure and the conception ofwhat is ta he shown."IOS Habennas's strategy, as we have seen, is to support the claim to universality of a discursive ethics developed through the transcendental-pragmatic argument by showing its coherence with various lines of empirica1 research. He makes particular use of reconstructive approaches which attempt to set out or "reconstruct" the implicit knowledge contained in basic competences such as speech, cognition or moral judgement into a set of explicit rules. In the sphere of individual maturation, Habennas relies considerably on Piaget's reconstruction of the development of fonnal IOSHabermas. REPLY: 239. 133 cognitive operations and on Kohlberg"s account of the acquisition of moral judgements to support bis position. As we have seen, Kohlberg"s theory of moral stages dovetails with Habermasian discourse ethics in two erucial ways: first., it supports the claim that modem forms of moral judgement represent an advance over other fonns and are hence of universal significance; and second., it validates the procedure of discourse deseribed by Habermas for the resolution of moral dilemmas., by showing the close links between the structure of this procedure and that of Stage 6 moral judgements. However., in order to show that the paths of development set out by Kohlberg and Piaget are more than culturally specifie., Habermas must supplement these theories \\ith an aecount of species maturation demonstrating the cognitive gains realised in modenùty. As Habermas recognises, defending a universalist hypothesis by showing its links with empirical research programmes does not constitute rigorous or necessary proof in the sense aspired to by traditional philosophy. Rather, the strategy is to offer multiple and overlapping sources of support for its central ideas., which work in concert to provide compeUing reasons for their acceptance. It is to a consideration of these reasons which 1 now tum. As we have seen., the cognitive~evelopmental theories employed by Habermas defend the claim that there are universal competences in various areas by appealing to the notion of a developmental logic. A developmental logic depicts the acquisition of the competence in question through a sequence of steps which can be unambiguously ordered according to a scale of development. As Michael Schrnid explains in another context: AlI of these...developmental lagics share one common formaI eharaeteristic, namely that if a change does accur in response to such a logic., then it is possible ta bring the various phases of this development into an unequivocal sequence and ta order the different content of each phase according to a criterion ofhigher value (Hôherwertigkeit).I06 I06SchmicL "Social Evoiution." in Thompson and Held (1982): 165. 134 Habermas ~s strateg)' in bis accounts of bath ontogenesis and phylogenesis bas been, as we have seen, to identify this criterion of higher value with the features of a decentered understanding of the world. The general structure of the accounts is always to show that ail aetors~ in virtue of necessarily being linguistic agents in the sense of conventional farms of argumentation, find themselves on a scale or ladder ascending towards the highest stages of competence mastery~ which are in tum identified with characteristics ofpostconventional forms ofargumentation associated with modemity. Assessing the success of these arguments is a delicate matter. A1though Habennas wants to prove that bis theory of discourse ethics applies universally across the human race~ he begins by defining the bighest stages of development using visions of maturity dra\W from our culture in order eventually to portray development as universally headed Ûl this direction. Let us reconsider the problems wbich this poses for Kohlberg~s theory. Kohlberg~s stage sequence was developed from concepts dra\,n frorn Western moral philosophy and culture~ on the basis of studies condueted principally on (male) children Ûl Western cultures. From Piaget onY:ards~ the Iegitimacy of extrapolating universal generalisations from studies of a smalI group taken as exemplary bas been regarded \\ith sorne degree of scepticism. Moreover, this approach seems rather more dubious in th" moral realm titan in the logical, where culture plays a less profound role in shaping the process studied. The developmental accounts which Habennas sets out do seem intuitively persuasive in many respects, articulating as they do the central values of modernity; they are at times i1lurninating~ and certainly provocative. However~ in a fonnal sense, the theoretical component ofthis defence of the values ofmodemity is frankly circular. One might argue that what Habermas bas done is set out a series of "conjecturesn which now awaits Ûldireet confirmation or refutation through comparison with the empirical data. However~ the question of how the empirical and conceptual branches of a theory 135 interrelate is a complex one, as Habennas recognises. 107 An indication of the degree of complexity involv~ which points up the difficulties of challenging a scale of measurement such as a developmental logic, can be gauged from the progress of the debate conceming gender bias in Kohlberg'5 theory. Initial studies indicated that Kohlberg"s scoring method placed the average level of women's moral development in the United States behind that of men, at Stage 3. This fàct prompted Carol Gilligan and severa! colleagues 10 undertake a series of alternative studies, which eventually led her to challenge the adequacy of the path of development which Kohlberg had set out. Gilligan argued that Kohlberg"S sca1e was biased in its design in that it was construeted 10 reflect the moral experiences principally of men. Although the wornen studied could certainly respond to the questions asked by Kohlberg, the terms of these questions were set in such a way that the moral experience of women was not recognised, Gilligan argued, resulting in systematic distortion of their responses. When she allowed women to discuss moral confliet in their own voices, she found that they consistently defined these conflicts in a wayat odds with Kohlberg's. Whereas Kohlberg conceived of moral maturity on the Kantian model of rights, universality, justice, and autonomy~ Gilligan argued that women tend to speak of morality in tenns of responsibility, care, sensitivity to context, and interdependence. On these grounds, Gilligan emphasised the need for a redefinition ofmoral maturity capable of encompassing both ofthese perspectives. However, she recognised that this would require a substantial restructuring of Kohlberg'5 theory. A developmental theory, she argued, is not built like a pyramid from its base. Rather, "'a conception ofdevelopment...hangs from its vertex ofmaturity, the point toward which progress is traced. TItus, a change in the definition of maturity does not simply alter the description of I07In recognition of this complexit)' Stephen White suggests vel)' plausibly that Habennas be read as contributing to a research programme in the Lakatosian sense. See White (1988): S-7. 136 the higbest stage but recasts the understanding of developmeñchanging the entire account. ,,108 A complex series of responses to Gilligan's daims bas ensued. Attempts have been made to reconsider Kohlberg's dã to challenge Gilligan's dã te accommodate Gilligan's vision within the general framework of the theory, and so on.109 My interest is less in the twists and -.. tums taken by this debate than in pointing out that analogous and in sorne respects graver difficulties emerge for the assessment ofdata derived from other cultures. If ail children tested in ail societies scored exactly the same on Kohlberg's scale, strong evidence confirming the universality of the process of moral development as he conceives it would have been obtained, a1though such a result would tend to disconfirm the links between this theory and the theory of social evolution. However, titis outcome seems entirely unlikely. The starting point for both Kohlberg's and Habennas's work is the recognition that there is no existing species-wide consensus on what morality is at its highest level, or what it requires of us. Two other possibilities seem more likely. If Kohlberg's theory is correct, it must be possible to translate the moral dilemmas posed in Western contexts for non-Western subjects, in ways which are not only comprehensible to those subjects, but which do not involve substantial impositions of Western concepts onto the problem-definitions. Habennas recognises that this issue cannot he disregarded. He explains: lO8Gilligan (1982): 18-19. l~bennasattempts to show that GiIligan's concems can be largely accommodated \\ithin the structure ofa Kantian-style ethic fonnulated discursively. He offers several interrelated responses to her work. First, according to Habennas, the discursive conception of morality requires for its functioning the qualities ofempathy and sensitivity to context discussed by Gilligan. These are essential to understanding and discussing the needs and interests ofothers, and have largely been ignored by traditional Kantian theories. Such qualities aIso become paramount when the problem of application of moral principles is raised. as the application of norms is not a matter of mechanics, but requires great sensitivity to context and to the others involved. Finall}", Habennas believes that a number of the issues identified by Gilligan should, properly speaking, be identified as ethical rather than moral. They hence do not constitute a direct challenge to the theory. See Habennas, "Moral Consciousness," in Habermas, MCC4: 175-82. An outslallding assessrnent of this debate is offered in Seyla Benhabib's "The Debate Over Women and Moral Theory Revisited," in Benhabib (1992): 178-202. 137 Ifand ooly if the theory is correct are we in a position to find context-sensitive equivalents for the Heinz dilernmas in all cultures 50 that we get Taiwanese responses that can he compared with American responses with respect to important dimensions of the theory. It follows from the theory itself that stories relevant ta it cao he trans1ated from one context 10 another. What is more~ the theory gives us an indication ofhow titis is 10 be accomplished. If it cannot be done without violence and distortion, this very fàilure of henneneutic application is an indication that the dimensions postuIated are heing extemally imposed and are not the result of a reconstroctÏon from withîn. lIO However~ judging whether such "violence and distortioñ'bas occurred is a difficult task. (1) If the scale proposed by the theory is ethnocentric (i.e. Kohlberg's theory is false) in that it imposes a1ien ways of thinking about moral issues and moral dilemmas upon individuals in other societies, the likely outcome would he that these individuals would score systematically lower than their counterparts in the West. What we would he measuring is their ability to perform "our tricks" rather than their õ and it seems unlikely that they could outdo us at this. This is anaIogous to the problem which Gilligan raises for the assessment of the data conceming women's perfonnance on Kohlberg's scaIe. It is important to note that the lower scores of women relative to men in the United States were an anomaly unpredieted by the theory. (2) Systematically lower scores for members of other cultures are not, however, to be seen as anomalous. Because the theory has been built from and designed to accommodate the observation that individuals in culturally distant societies develop less rapidly and progress less far on average on Kohlberg's scale than do those in the modem West, the as5essment of empirical data i5 deeply ambiguous. The same dã indicating systematically lower scores on the part ofother cultures~ could therefore he legitimately înterpreted as bath a confinnation and 11~bennas, "Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences," in Habennas. AICCA: 41. 138 a disconfinnation of the theory. Data assessment requires subtlety and sensitivity when what is at issue are competing visions ofmoral maturity, of the sort described by Gilligan. III Although discrepant data should become more obvious over tinte as a research programme evolves, the difficulties in deriving empirical confirmation for these claims specieswide are bath evident and unIikely to he resolved in advance of further conceptual clarification. 112 1 would hence like ta focus more closely upon the conceptual aspects of Habermas's argument against the relativist, and in particular on the defence of the claimessential to bath the theory of moral development and that of social evolutionthat the modem Western understanding of the worid represents that understanding of the world "in which knowledge can he MOst effectively acc:umulated.,,113 A key component of all cognitivedevelopmental accounts is the concept of a logie of development. With respect to the development of worldviews Habennas argues first, that such worldviews cao he viewed as attempts to solve sirnilar problems; and second, that these problem-solutions can be ranked in tenns of non-relativistic criteria which demonstrate the superiority of the modem, decentered understanding of the world. The issue of whether worldviews cao he seen as commensurable in this sense is precisely the subjeet of Habennas's discussion with Winch, to which we no\'\" tum. 111 A challenge of this sort in the field of personality development is advanced by Sudhir Kakar in The lnner Wor/d. K.akar argues that although it touches on maners ofuniversal human concem. Erikson's account orthe human life cycle represents a distinctively Western reading or il. Indian Hindu society, in bis opinion, stresses the acquisition of qualities of inlerdependency to a far greater degree than thase of strong individualism. Because the apex of individual maturation is defined differently by traditonallndian society than by Western, the pietule presented by Erikson tends to parnay the development of personality in Indians as somewhat "delayed." A more perspicuous understanding ofpersonality development in Hindu society is achieved when this phenomenon is underst~ at least initially. from within the images of maturity held by members of the society themselves. See Sudhir Kakar. The lnner World <Oxford University Press, 1978). 111ne theory of social evolution is even more difficult to assess empirically, as experimental data are not available. Michael Schmid gives a thoughtful evaluation of both the conceptual and empirical plausibility ofHabennas's account in Schmid, "Social Evolution," in Thompson and Held (1982). lI3-yne phrase is Stephen White's. See White (1988): 128. 139 APPENDIX 1: KOHLBERG'S MORAL STAGES 1. PrecoDventionallevel At tbis level the child is responsive ta cultural rules and labels ofgood aDd bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in tenns of cither the physical or the hedonistic consequences of adioe (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciaoe the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages: Stage J: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action detenniDe its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or vaIue of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestiODÏDg deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4). Stage 2: The instrumental reIativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs ofothers. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of faimess, of reciprocity and of cqual sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physi~ pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of lO'yOU scratch my back and rn scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. II. Conventionallevel At this level, maintaining the expe:tations of the individual's fiunily, sroup or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is Dot ooly one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyaIty 10 it, of actively maintaining, supporting and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the foUowing two stages: Stage J: The interpersona/ concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good bebavior is that wbich pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much confonnity 10 stereotypical images of wbat is majority or 1Õ" behavior. Behavior is judged frequendy by intention- ''he means weU" becomes important for the first time. One eams approval by being "nice." Stage 4: The "low and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed mies and the maintenance of the social order. Right bebavior coosists ofdoing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. nI. PostcoDveational, autonomous or princlpled level At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which bave validity and application apart from the individual'S own identification with these groups. This level again bas two stages: 140 Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally utilitarian overtones. Right action tends ta he defined in tenns of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whoIe society. There is a cIear awareness of the reIativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedura1 rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionallyand democraticaUy agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and ~~opinion." The resuh is an emphasis upon the "Iegal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing Iaw in tenns of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and arder"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contraet is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality ofthe American govemment and constitution. Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is detined by the decision of conscience in accord with seIf-ehosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.. These principles are abstraet and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral mIes like the Ten Commandments. At heart these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equa/ity ofhuman rights, and of respect for the dignity ofhuman beings as individual persons. Source: Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," in Theodore Mischel, (00.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (Academie Press, 1971). 141 nus PAGE DELIBERATELY LEYr BLANK 142 Chapter Four The historica/ erp/anation. the erplanation as an hypothesis ofdevelopmenl. is only Q!1g. way ofassembling the dala-oftheir synopsis. Il is jusl as possible to see the data in their relation to one anolher and to embrace them in a general picture without putting if in the form ofan hypothesis abOUI temporal development. .. .perspicuous representation brings about the understanding which consists precisely in the fact that we Usee the connections. " Hence the importance offinding connecting links. But an hypothetical connecting link shou/d in this case do nOlhing but direct the attention to the simi!arity, the re/atedness ofthe facts. As one mighl illustrale an internaI relation ofa circle 10 an ellipse by gradually converting an ellipse into a circle: but not in order 10 assert that a certain ellipse actually, historically. had originated (rom a circle (evolutionary hypothesis), but only in order to sharpen our eye fOr a formol connection. But J can aiso see the evo/utionary hypothesis as nOlhing more, as Ihe c/olhing ofa formol connection. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remaries on Frazer's "Golden Bough " 4.1. Introduction We bave thus far been engaged in tracing the complexly interwoven senes of arguments offered by Habennas in support of the claim that discourse etlùcs defines a procedure for the evaluation of moral nonns valid for all competent human agents. Although this thesis is itself quite bolcL the status Habennas claims for it is, as we have seen, somewhat weaker. 1 The specifically philosophical contribution to the advancement of this universalist claim is found in the transcendental-pragmatic argument, which aims to demonstrate that every communicatively competent actor engaging in argumentation necessarily presupposes the 143 validity of the prineiple of universalisation. 1llis argument is set out in !wo stages. The first points ta the centrality, indeed inescapability, of a very general or "coDventional" fonn of argumentation to human agency itself The second draws a link between a c'postconventional" mode of communicative action associated by Habennas with the argumentative practices of Westem modemity, and the derivation of the principle of universalisation. Habermas's approach to advaneing universalist philosophical theses differentiates itself from others precisely by acknowledging the inherent fallibility of such theses, and their dependence upon the suecess of empirical research programmes. The previous chapter examined Habermas's efforts to use empirical research to bridge the gap between the !wo stages of bis argument, thereby strengthening the claim to universal validity ofdiscourse ethics. As we saw, Habennas uses empirical reconstructions of competence acquisition to support the thesis that mastery of the formal characteristics of "postconventional" modes of argumentation represents a demonstrable cogrùtive gain over those associated \\;th "conventional" fonns, thereby showing the argumentative practices ofmodemity to be of universal significance for all agents engaging in communicative action. The reconstructions make crucial use of the notion of an "internaI" or "developmentaI logic." It is this concept which permits Habermas to portray individual and societal development as follo\\ing an ordered sequence of stages which represents a cumulative path of leaming in a particular dimension. However, as Wittgenstein notes in the passage cited above, there are many possible ways of viewing the data in question, of wlùch the hypothesis of evolutionary development is but one. In this chapter 1 would like to gjve closer consideration to the cogeney and implications of the notion ofa developmentallogjc as used by Habermas to 1Jürgen Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in Habennas, MCC4: 116. 144 tank worldviews, in order both 10 clarify more precisely its raIe in bis wode, and to open the way for an exploration ofalternative ways ofviewing the matters at band. The accounts presented by Habermas of the genesis of the capacity for moral judgement in individuals and of the evolution of worldviews at the societal level are cognitivedevelopmental in fonn. 1 should like briefly 10 recapitulate the salient features of such models. Cognitive~velopmental models are composed of a series of stages viewed as fonning a conceptual hierarchy, where each stage represents a bigher or more adequate level of problemsolving in the sphere under investigation. The stages in question can be portrayed as an ascending sequence just in case the cognitive structures ofthe higher stages replace those of the lower stages in a manner which incorporates the structures of the lower stages in a reorganised or more comprehensive fonn. This is what Habennas means when he daims that the stages in question are conceptually interlinked through an "internai logic." Because the stages are interrelated in this fashion, transitions between stages can he regarded as a form of leaming, in which the subject acquires progressively more adequate techniques for problern-solving. Developmental accounts of competence acquisition thus present an anay of problemsolutions in the forro of an ascending sequence, as a series of successively more adequate approximations toward an apex or optimum. The definition of the apex is hence of crucial importance in defining the path of development as a whole.2 However, as was noted in the previous chapter, the evolutionary stories set forth by Habermas at bath the individual and societal level draw their images of the highest or Most mature fonn of development from a particular reading of what is essential ta the form of rationality implicit in Westem modemity that is, the fonn of rationality associated with what Habennas tenns ~'the decentered understanding of the world." Habermas's recounting of the development of moral 145 consciousness portrays Kohlberg's moral stages as parallel to the sequence of "stages of interaction," where this sequence traces how an individual in a modem, Westem society acquires rnastery of the world and speaker perspectives essentiaI to such an understanding. His narrative of worldview evolution detines the apex of development directly in terms of this decentered understanding ofthe worId. Habermas must next defend the crucial use he makes of the modem Western worIdview as against others in order to define the tenninaI point of bis developmentaI sequences. His defence, as we have seen, cannot rely uniquely upon empirical data, as the data themselves are gathered and interpreted in the light of this ftamework. He must therefore present a conceptual argument sho\\ing that worldviews can be unambiguously ordered according to sorne set of non-relative criteria. This is one of the principal aims of The Theory ofCommunicative Action. As Stephen White explains: What [Habennas tries to accomplish in The Theory of Communicative Action] is a demonstration of why modemity, with its clear manifestation of structures of communicative rationality, should he seen as a progressive development; that is, a demonstration of why modernity represents a universally significant achievernent in human leaming, rather than a way of organizing social and cultural life which is simply different from or incommensurable Ytith pre-modernity.3 Habennas defends a universalist position by arguing that different cultural worldviews represent solutions to similor problems, which can he placed in a sequence according to their adequacyas measured by criteria conneeted with the concept of learning. He daims that the most rational worldview is that associated with the decentered understanding of the world, precisely because this represents the understanding of reality which permits the greatest degree of leaming to take place. These points are developed through Habermas's analysis of the 2Cf. Chapter 3.5; also Thomas McCarthy. "Rationality and Relativism," in Habermas: Critical Dehates. 00. J.B. Thomson and D. Held (Macmillan, 1982): 70*71. 3Stephen K. White. The Recent W'ork ofJürgen Habermas (Cambridge University Press~ 1988): 90. 146 urationality debate~' among philosophers, ootably Peter Winch, and anthropologists, on the issue of how we are to understand a foreign culture. 1 would Iike oext to trace Habennas"s position in this debate more closely, in order eventually ta depiet sorne alternative ways of envisioning the process of cross<ultural understanding. My anaIysis will focus upon wbether the dichotomy which Habermas construets, between seeing cultures as entirely equal in that they are all literally non-comparable, or arguing for the universal significance of the modem worldview, is an appropriate or tenable one. 4.2 The Rationality DebateI: Preliminaries 4.21 Rationality and Re/ativism in Cross-Cultural Understanding Acquaintance with other cultures presses us ineluetably towards the question of how, or indeed whether, we cao understand the beliefs and practices of individuais in cultures which differ significantly from our O\\TI. What initially strikes the observer of other cultures is the sheer variety of systems of belief and interpretation, of praetices and of moral codes; in brief, the multiplicity ofways ofimagining and living a life which is nonetheless recognisably human in its shape. An historically common response to this observation of diversity, often associated with the thinkers of the Enlightenment, bas been to read the wide gamut of cultural phenomena in light ofa notion of "progress," distinguishing what is "backwards" or "unenlightened" from what is "enlightened" or "modem.",4 The temptation bas been to view practices differing sharply from our own as indicative ofa society's deficiencies in rationality or in culture, and to 4An excellent analysis of the Enlightenment position on cultural differenoe and various Gennan philosophicaJ responses to it is found in Patrick Gardiner, "Gennan Philosophy and the Rise of Relativism," in Monist 64 (1981): 138-154. 147 view human history as a process of evolution which represents our own views as being doser ta the tnlth than those which confliet with them. S Any facile adoption of this position bas been decisively undercut in the present context. The multifaceted controversy among philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists which bas become known as ''the rationality debate" begins with the insight that other cultures, languages and systems of belief require understanding '1Tom within." When we move beyond the initial experience of an overwhelming diversity, one of the Most compelling features which emerges from the study ofother cultures is the recognition that different groups plausibly order their experience by means of quite different concepts; that experience underdetermines what it is rational to believe about the world.6 The proper study of cultures seems to require that we take account in sorne significant sense of such alternative systems of interpretation. However, taking seriously the notion that standards of rationality and intelligibility vary, al lcast apparently, according to ooe"s intellectual frarnework, places modem scientists in an awkward position with respect ta the status of their o\\n endeavours to study other cultures. Whether and in what domains of experience the criteria of rationality developed in Western society, and in particular those connected with the developmeot of natural science, can he applied beyood the boundaries of Western cultures is a recurring theme among participants in the rationality debate. The debate focusses specifically on how we, as members of societies heavily influenced by scientific procedures, are 10 understand the beliefs held or actions and rituaIs praetised by members of primitive societies, whose understanding of realit)" is significantly ~chael Krausz and Jack W. MeilancL "Introductiõ " in Re/ativism: Cognitive and Moral, cd. M. Krausz and 1. Meilancl (University of Notre Dame Press, 1982): 1. 6See Manin Holis. however, for the argument that we can never derive such conclusions from anthropology. See e.g. Holis. "The Lioùts of Rationality." and "Reason and Ritual," in Wilson (1970). 148 different iTom ours7 and who engage in sorne fonns of ritual activity~pecially those connected with magic and witchcraft-whicb seem by our standards to he paradigmatically irrational. The task of the social-scientific investigator is a perplexing one: ber role is somehow ta make sense of these rituaI practices, where this can only mean to show the plausibility or reasonability by our standards of practices which strike us7al least initially7as unreasonable. AIl authors we are considering are united in their rejection of an influential line of response te this problem pioneered by Lévy-Bruhl in bis theory of "participation." Lévy-Bruhl in effect abandoned the goal of making sense of many puzzling ritual practices7 arguing that primitive cultures differ from our o\\n precisely in that they are hpre-logical." Members of traditional societies seem frequently to assert that a thing is bath itself, and quite different from itself. To claim, for example7that trees are spirits, or spirits, trees7 is to praetise what LévyBruhl tenns "participation." He accounts for this phenomenon in tenns of a contrast between "mystical" and '~empirical" modes of thought. Whereas on bis account the "mystically oriented'7 observer sees many features of her reality as at once themselves and as things quite different from ho\\' they appear visually, the "empirical" orientation of the Western observer enables her to see most objects as distinct and clearly defined.7 By contrast, philosophers and social scientists participating in the rationality debate agree that our point of departure must he that the members of primitive societies are, like ourselves, bath intelligent and logical. A second line of response, and one in keeping with the 7Subsequent fieldwork by Evans-Pritchard bas cast doubt on the validity of tbis thesis of the omnipresence of participations in prinùtive worldviews. In bis study of the Nuer tribe, EvansPritchard shows that the sense of identity appealed 10 in such claims as "twins are birds" should nol be understood as substantial and symmetrical. Il is bence Dot best understood as a violation of the rules oflogic. The main lines of Evans*Pritchard's account are narrated by Ruth Finnegan and Robin Horton in their "Introduction" to A/odes ofThought: Essays on Thinking in U'estern and NonWestern Socielies. 00., Ruth Finnegan and Robin HOrlon, (Faber and Faber, 1973): 42-43. 149 simple explanation of cultural diversity in tenns of a narrative of uprogress," is to view the practices in question as erroneous or iIIogical, but to offer supplementary psychological, sociological or economic accoun15 of how 5uch erroneou5 practices emerged and took hold in societies whose members are intelligent and logical. Although persuasive in certain respects, this fonn ofexplanation of ritual aets bas seemed to many 10 be intellectually unsatisfaetory in that it disregards the meaning such aets bave for members of the culture in question. In two very influential publications, The ldea of a Social Science and "Understanding a Primitive Society," Peter Winch gave important articulation to the idea that in order to advance adequate interpretations and explanations of another culture, social scientists must take account of the standards of rationality and intelligibility used by members of that culture to explain their o\\n practices. Winch argues that not to do so, to unret1ectively judge another culture as deficient in light of the standards of rationality prevalent in our culture, is not just a fonn of intellectual arrogance, but in an important sense a mistake: blindness to our O\\TI ethnocentricism precludes our ability to fully understand these practices, and thereby to leam from them.8 However, acceptance of the notion that another culture must he understood, at least initially, from within i15 O\\TI categorial system or "conceptual scheme" may seem to vitiate the aim of making cross-cultural comparisons. Our efforts al cross-cultural understanding may be viewed as consisting largely, or in their entire!)', of irnposing the interpretive categories of one culture upon another. Indeed, it may seem impossible to do otherwise. To take the extreme case, if there are alternative methods of classification which provide different, but equally valid, ways of interpreting and organising elements of our experience, amongst which no rational method of choice exists, then our efforts at cross-cuitural understanding may seem inevitably to rely upon categories and criteria which are arbitraf)'. Relativism-the doctrine *Peter Winch. The ldea ofa Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul. 19S8)~ and Peter Winch. 150 that what is true or right is true or right ooly relative la or for a particular unit of reference9becomes a viable theoretical position. It should he noted that what is at issue in the rationality debate is the possibility of relativism about knowledge or cognitive reIativism. Ernest Gellner offers the following very general definition ofcognitive relativism: Relativism is basically a doctrine in the theory of knowledge: it asserts that there is no unique truth, no unique objective reality. What we naively suppose to be such is but the produet-exclusively or in sorne proportiõ which varies with the particular fonn the relativism takes-of the cognitive apparatus of the individual~community~age~ or whatever. 10 The fonn of cognitive relativism of interest to us concems the possibility of relativism on a cultural level. This is~ loosely pu~ the doctrine that truth is relative ta our intellectual framework or what Habermas calis "worldview~" and that it may vary from one worldview ta another. Habennas~ as we shall see, takes a universalist position on this issue, defending the cognitive superiority of the form of rationality inherent in the Western worldview. Although Habermas's central concem in advancing discourse ethics is ta argue against moral relativism- -the doctrine that an action can be judged as morally right only relative ta a particular set of moral beliefs or principles ll •• conceptual links exist between one's stance on the issues of cognitive and moral relativism. His excursus into the debate over cognitive relativism plays a pivotaI role in justifying the universalist claims of discourse ethics, for reasons which will emerge in the course of this chapter. 4.22 Some Conlrasts Between Mythical and Modern Worldviews The discussion of rationality found in Volume 1 of The Theory of Communicative Action juxtaposes descriptions of the "mythical" and umodem" views of the world. "Understanding a Primitive Society.... in Rationality. ed. Bryan R Wilson, (Basil BlackwelL 1970). ~usz and Meiland. "Introduction,'" in Krausz and Meiland (1982): 4. I~mest Gellner. **Relativism and Universals." in Rationa/ity and Re/ativism. 00. M. Hollis and S. Lukes (MIT Press. 1982): 183. I1Krausz and Meiland, "Introduction," in Krausz and Meiland (1982): 8. 151 --Habennas ~s comparison of mythical and modem worldviews takes as its point of departure the question of which circumstal1ces and preconditions render it possible for individuals to lead a rationallife. By a "rational conduct of life" Habennas means a life in which appropriate foons of reasonableness are exhibited across ail dimensions of validity. This notion, he emphasises~ should not be restrieted to the cognitive sphere ofknowledge about the physicaI world. Even when we are judging the rationality of individual persons~ it is not sufficient to resort to this or that expression. The question is, ratber, whether A or B or a group of individuals behaves rationally in general; whether one may systematically expect that they have good reasons for their expressions and that these expressions are correct or successfuI in the cognitive dimension, reliable or insightful in the moral-practicaI dimension, disceming or illuminating in the evaluative dimension, or candid and self~ritical in the expressive dimension; that they exhibit understanding in the henneneutic dimension; or indeed whether they are "reasonable" in ail these dimensions. When there appears a systematic etIect in these respects~ across various domains of interaction and over long periods (perhaps even over the space of a lifetime), we also speak of the rationality of a conduct oflift. 12 The discussion of worldviews is intended to take up the question of which sociocultural conditions facilitate the conduct of a life for bath individuaIs and groups which is rational in this encompassing sense. Habermas's discussion of worldviews in The Theory of Communicative Action complements the account of social evolution developed in bis earlier writings on historical materialis~ which we took up in Chapter 3.4. As we saw in that section, Habennas envisages a mutual influence between worldview structures and the development of individual personality. WorIdviews are interpretive systems which vary from culture to culture~ and which reflect the background knowledge accumulated by the collective. They systematise or provide unity to the actions in which its members engage; they otIer images about possible Iife paths~ from which individuals seeking to shape their lives take inspiration. The development of individuals hence takes place within a space of possibilities opened up by the interpretive 152 structures embedded in their cultural worldviews. The relationship between individual development and worldview structure is nonetheless not a strict one, in that there are individuals who surpass the rationality level of their collectively shared worldviews. 13 However, Habermas conceives there ta be a general correlation between worldview structures and individual development, and sets out 10 investigate what form a worldview must take if a rational conduct of life is ta be possible for the individuals who share it. 14 As he notes, we cannat simply assume that it is the modem worldview as against others which makes a rational conduet of life possible. The intuition, clearly supported by Habennas, that the mode of thought associated with cognitive modemity represents an advance in rationality over that associated \\ith cognitive traditionalism requires clarification and defence. 1S The contrast drawn between mythical and modem views of the world enables Habermas to use the m}thical understanding of the world as a backcloth against which the features of our modem understanding ofthe world stand out more sharply. This sets the stage for bis argument for the superior rationality ofthese features, which we will take up in the next section. Habermas begins bis account by clarifying what he means by the hrationality" of a worldview. Follo\\ing the anthropologist Evans-Pritchard, he rejeets the explanation that what varies between individuals who develop in societies enframed by mythical worldviews and those who mature in societies circumscribed by modern ones is a capacity for perfonning logical operations. 16 Habermas explains: "Our point of departure bas to be that adult members of primitive tribal societies cao acquire basically the same formaI operations as the members of modem societies, even though the higher-Ievel competences appear less frequently 12Habennas. TCA 1: 43. I~bennas, ""Normative Structures." in Habennas. CES: 102. 14Habennas. TCA 1: 44. 151've borrowed the lerms "cognitive modemity" and "cognitive traditionalism" frOID Ruth Finnegan and Robin Honon. "Introduction," in Finnegan and Horton (1973). They will be elaborated more fully below. 153 and more selectively in them~ that is, they are applied in more restrieted spheres of life.,,17 Since individual capacity for cognitive operations is not, in bis view, what varies across worldviews, Habermas must provide alternative grounds ta justify bis intuition for the greater rationality of the modem worldview. He argues that the rationality of worldviews can he assessed in terms of the adequacy of the ~'fonnal-pragmaticbasic concepts" or techniques for interpreting reality which each worldview makes available to individuals.18 The basic concepts should not be construed uniquely in relation to physical nature, as a rational conduet of life is exhibited across the diverse dimensions of human experience. 19 The account presented here complements the account of the superiority of the decentered mode of understanding the world taken up in Chapter 3.2. Habermas next sketches the techniques for interpreting reality which he believes are made available by m~thical and modem worldviews. He paints the general features of mythical worldviews in broad strokes evoking Levi-Strauss's strueturalist anthropology, and in particular those aspects of Levi-Strauss's work stressed by Maurice Godelier.20 ft should be ootOO that this description coheres with the more sociological description of primitive or neolithic society given in the theory of social evolution. Recall that primitive societies are stipulated by Habennas to be those organised around kinship systems. Due to their lack of teehnological advancement, they are radically vulnerable to extemal threats from the 16see footnote #6 above. 17Habennas, TC4 J: 44. 18As we shaH see below in 4.23, this account shares sorne of the intuitions articu1ated in EvansPritchard's study of the Azande. l~bennas, TC4 J: 45. ~bennas. TC4 J: 45. The principal texts referred to by Habennas are the following: Claude LéviStrauss, Structural Anthropologv. vols. 1 and 2 (New York, 1963, 1976) and The Savage Mind (Chicago, 1966); and Maurice Godelier, *'Myth and History: Reflections on the Foundations of the Primitive Mind." in Perspectives in A-farxist Anthrop%gy (Cambridge, Eng., 1977). 154 environment and from other groupS.21 Moreover, the interpretive schema evinced in the mythical understanding ofthe world serves Habennas as a sort ofcounterpoiñ trom which the conceptual contours of the modem understanding of the world emerge with greater definition. He argues that the features of the modem worIdview which thus come ioto focus are those which correspond to what he calls "communicative rationality," or the form of rationality embodied in the decentered understanding of the world. This contrast between worldviews is drawn primarily by showing the disadvantages or Iack of rationality in the mythical way of thinking, which foreshadows bis anti-relativist position in the ensuing rationality debate. In Habermas's view, the mythical understanding of the world presents us with examples of paradigmaticaIly irrational conduet. He writes: 'The deeper one penetrates into the network of a mythical interpretation of the world, the more strongly the totalizing power of the 'savage mind' stands out.,,12 He adds, moreover, that 5uch worldviews "are far from making possible rational orientations of action in our sense.,,23 What Habennas describes as the 'lotalizing power" of mythical worIdviews is the complex interweaving of a skein of interpretations into a unified whole. In contrast with our modem worldview, wherein the various domains of nature, culture, and self are sharply differentiated from one another, the striking feature of the mythical worldview is its holistic interpretive frarnework. Extensive and accurate infonnation about the social and Datural environments-technical knowledge about the production of implements and artifaets, medicinal practices, plant and animal species, geographical terrain, climactic patterns, religious rites, kinship relations, and so on-is organised into a whole in which each element echoes and refers te every other. This complex of infonnation, he explains, 'lis organized in such a way that every individual appearance in the 21See Chapter 3.4 for a more detailed account of the stages and path of social evolution proposed b)' Habennas. 22Habennas, rC4 /: 45. 155 worl<L in its typical aspects, resembles or contrasts with every ether appearance.,,24 The system of infonnation interpretation embodied in mythica1 worldviews is nõ he will Iater argue, an optimal one. His present concem is to trace its aetiology. Habermas views the ~'totaIizing power" of the mythical worldview as attributable to two features: ~ the form of thought embodied in such worldviews is uconcretistic and analogical." Analogica1 thinking facilitates the creation of a holistic interpretive framewor~ in that it permits a wide varie1y of data to he synthesised and explained through the construction ofa network of correspondences. However, these interpretations remain bound to a perceptual or tactile understanding of the world. Hahennas, following the structural anthropologists~ explains the unifying quality ofmythical worldviews panly .....through the faet that the ~savage mind' fastens in a concretistic way upen the perceptual surface of the world and orders these perceptions by dra",ing analogies and contrasts. Domains of phenomena are interrelated and classified from the vantage points of hom%gy and heterogeneity, equivalence and inequality, identity and contrariety."zs Second, the basic concepts in tenns of which analogies are dra\\n derive from the kinship system. The structures of the kinship systems, the intricate relations hetween families, sexes and generations, provide an interpretive schema which can he deployed in a variety of contexts ta explain phenomena in both the social and natura! worlds. 26 The mythical interpretations of the world charaeteristic of archaic societies ref1ect what Habermas regards as their fundamentai experience: the eXPerience of vulnerability in the fàce of the contingencies of an unmastered environment. The categories of action prevalent in myths, typically those of success and failure, active and passive, attack and defence, ref1ect this central experience. Because archaic societies have not yet acquired the degree of ~bermas,TC4 J: 44. 24Habermas, TC4 J: 4546. ~bermas,TC4 J: 46. 156 teehnological sophistication which would offer them an appreciable measure of control over the vicissitudes of the physical environment or the incursions of extemal groups, such societies rely upon myths te render the invisible causes and forces goveming events in the universe comprehensible. The narrative explanations of the world contained in myth allow members of neolithic societies to gain an imaginary control over the cosmos.27 The aspect of the mythical worldview which stands out from the perspective of members of modem cultures is the blending of two categories which we sharply distinguish, those ofphysicaI nature and of culture. Habennas sometimes describes this sort of interpretive schema as involving a "Ievelling" of the domains of realityt in that it projects nature and culture onto the same plane. This categorial blending accounts, in Habennas*s view, for the feelings of disorientation and frustration which initially strike the modem Western individual who cornes into contact \\'ith m}thical worldviews. He \\ntes: "What irritates us members of a modem lifeworld is that in a mytlùcally interpreted world we cannott or cannot \\ith sufficient precision, make certain differentiations that are fundamental to our understanding of the world. ,,28 This "confusion" between nature and culture lies at the root of two important contrasts between the m~thical and modem worldviews. First, Habermas argues that the confusion between nature and culture can be seen as a conceptual blending of two object domains, those of physical nature and the sociocultural environment.. Because these object domains are not clearly separated, the differentiations which we take as fundamental, for exarnple between things and persons, or between objects and agents, are Dot made clearly. The existence of magical practices is a correlate of this categorial blending. Because primitive societies do not recognise a clear distinction between 2~bennas. TC4 J: 46. 2:Habennas. TC4 J: 47. 28Habennas. TC4 J: 48. 157 teleological and communicative aetiõ between instrumental actions taken to influence objectively given states of affairs~ and the establishment of various fonns of interpersonal relationships~ their magical practices attempt to exert influence over spheres through methods which strike us as irrational or misguided.29 The "demythologization" of worldviews, which fonns an integra1 part of the transition towards modemity in the process of social evolution described by Habennas~ leads towards a sharp distinction between the object domains of nature and culture. The process~ in which the abject domains of nature~ culture~ and subjectivi~*are progressively differentiated, can best he described in tenns of the acquisition of the appropriate basic attitudes towards worlds. He explains: ...as saon as we are ta specify explicitly wberein things are distinct from persons, causes from motives, happenings from actions, and 50 fõ we have ta go beyond differentiating object domains to differentiating a basic attitude toward the objective world of what is the case and a basic attitude toward the social world of what can legitimately he expectecL what is commanded or ought to he. We make the correct conceptual separations between causal connections of nature and nonnative orders of society to the extent that we become conscious of the changes in perspective and attitude that we effect wben we pass from observing or manipulating ta following or violating legitimate expectations.30 The acquisition of these basic attitudes towards different object domains necessitates that we differentiate such domains. Habennas believes that this differentiation of domains represents a conceptual advance, in that it provides a more aceurate understanding of reali!)' than the undifferentiated interpretive scheme typical ofmythical worldviews. Second~ Habennas maintains that the confusion of nature and culture represents a failure to differentiate between language and world. Primitive myths and magical praetices often systematica11y confuse the "internaI relations" wweh hold between the meanings of words~ and the "external relations" wwch hold between elements of non-linguistic reality. As ~e shaH return to this theme in the discussion of Azande witchcraft below. ~bennas, TCA J, 49. 158 Habennas explains, ~~[mbthical interpretation of the world and magical control of the world can intennesh smoothly because internaI and external relations are still conceptuaIly integrated.,,31 This Iack of differentiation impedes members of archaic worldviews from taking a reflexive stance towards their worIdviews, that is, from learning ta see these worldviews as worIdviews. This in tum is due ta a Iack of precision in the concept of validity. In bis view, arcbaic worldviews fail not ooly ta separate clearly the three validity claims ta propositional tru~ normative rightness and expressive sincerity, but also ta distill even very general concepts of validity such as tnrth and morality ftom the admixture ofempirical factors, such as causality and health.32 As Habermas explains, " ...a linguistically constituted worldviev.,* can he identified with the world~rder itself to such an extent that it cannot he perceived as an interpretation of the world that is subjeet to error and open to criticism. In this respect the confusion ofnature and culture takes on the significance ofa reification ofworldview. ,,33 In contrast, Habennas regards the modem understanding of reality, in which the three fonnal world-concepts and their associated validity claims are c1early distinguished, as facilitating a critical relation to the corresponding worldview. He argues that the development of the concept of an external world of states ofaffairs identical for aIl observers, or of a social 31Habermas, TC4 1,49*50. 3:!Habennas, TC4 1,50. Habennas's account of the "confusion" among members of primitive societies berween whal is heaithy and what is good bears a strong resemblance to Nietzsehe's perceptive and provocative description of the "aristocratic savages" in Part 1 of On the Genea/ogy of Mora/s. See Friedrich Nietzsche? On the Genea/ogy a/Mora/sand Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Vintage, 1967). 3=ilabennas, TC4 1, 50. Il is crucial to note the similarities between the descriptions of the "closed" charaeter of mythica1 worldviews offered by Habennas and Robin Horton. On the relation of language to reality Horton writes: "00 man can escape the tendency to see a unique and intimate link between words and tlùngs. For the traditional thinker this tendency bas an overwhelming power. Since he can imagine 00 alternatives to bis established system ofcoocepts and words, the latter appear bound to reality in an absolute fasbion. There is 00 way at ail in wbich they can be seen as varying independently of the segments of reality they stand for." He Iater adds: "A vision of alternative possibilities forces men to the faith that ideas somehow vary wbilst reaIity remains constant....Furthennore, snch a vision, by giving the thinker an opportunity to *gel outside' bis o\\n system, offers him a possibilily of bis coming to see il as a system." Sec Robin Horton, "African 159 world of norms shared intersubjectively, requires a detaehment of language from reaJity, and hence of the interpretation of reality articulated in a cultural worldview from the assumed world-order. This opens up the possibility for individuals to take a critical distance to their cultural tradition. It is ooly through reflective awareness of the variety of interpretations of natura! and social reality which are possible that we are able ta fonn the concept of a cultural tradition in the proper sense. In sum, &4•••mythica1 worldviews prevent us from eategorically uncoupling nature and culture, not ooly through conceptually mixing the objective and social wOrlds but also through reifying the linguistic worldview. As a result, the concept of the world is dogmatically invested with a specific content that is withdra\\n from rationa.l discussion and thus from criticism. ~~34 In contrast to the '''closedness'' of the mythical worldview, the decentered, modem worldview is presented as an "open" one. Recall that the modem or decentered manner of understanding the world bas !wo general charaeteristics which account for its superior rationality. First, the decentered conception of the world understands reality as divided into external, social and subjective dimensions, each with its o\\n standards of tnlth and faIsity, as weIl as its o\\n mode ofjustification for their assessment. This is what Habermas means when he says that the modem understanding of the world differentiates three "'domains of validity." Second, this way of understanding validity daims essentially involves a recognition that no such claim can in principle he immune to criticism through argumentation. The decentered understanding of the world hence expresses in Habermas's view bath a more accurate understanding of reality and a radical openness to critique, which together account for its cognitive advantages. Note that the characterisation of mythical and modem worldviews in Thought and Western Science," in Wilson (1970): 156, 159. As we shaH see in J4.52, Honon's work is used by Habermas to corroborate bis own position; however, Horton later revises this acount. ~bennas, TCA J: 51. 160 tenns of the concepts ~'closedn and uopenn is not a neutral one: it plays a crucial role in Habennas"s argument for the universal relevance of the fonn of rationality embodied in the modem worldview. It may he helpful to sumrraarise the resuIts of our discussion up to this point. In Habermas"s view., mythical and modem ways of understanding the worId involve different Uconceptual frameworks"., different ways of ordering and organising our understanding of reality. This does not yet show that the modern way of conceiving reality represents an advance over the mythical, Whether and in what sense the modem understanding of the world can claim universality is the subject of the next section. It is worthwhile recalling the importance for Habennas of taking a universalist stance on this issue: only if the modem Western worldview carl claim to represent a decisive advance in rationality can it be presented as the outcome of a Piagetian learning process or developmentallogic. Furthermore~ support for the claim ta universality of the procedure of discourse ethics hinges on the notion that the Western worldview can he portrayed in precisely this way., as the apex of a species-wide path of development. 4.3 The Rationality Debate II: Peter Winch on Understanding a Primitive Society Habennas's comparison of mythical and modem worldviews began with the intuition that it is the modern worldview that best allows a "rational conduet of life." Howevert the possibility that different worldviews may have alternative conceptions of what counts as a rational aet must make us suspicious of this intuition. It seems te be precisely what we should expect when assessing the situation by our own criteria of intelligibility. Members of other worldviews, assessing the situation by their own standards, could foreseeably reach a parallel 161 conclusion concemïng the preferability of their own worldview. If a situation of complete cognitive relativism obtains, in whicb each cultural worldview or intellectual framework embodies standards of rationality which are literaIly non-eomparable, there will he no noncircuIar way ta assess the rationality of worldviews. In order 10 justify the claim that the modem worldview represents a gain in rationality of universal significance, Habennas argues that there are non-worldview-specific criteria by which the rationality of worldviews cao he assessed. He must, in other words, provide grounds for the claim that ~~e supposed rationality expressed in our understanding of the world is more than a ref1ection of the particular features of a culture stamped by science....,,35 He attempts this through discussion of the debate conceming the rationality of Azande magical praetices initiated by Peter Winch. 1wouId like to present Winch's position in sorne detail. This should enable me subsequently to show with greater clarity the salient points of disagreement between Habennas's position and others in the debate. In "Understanding a Primitive Society," Peter Winch takes up the question ofhow we can understand the beliefs and praetices of a "primitive society" such as that of the African Azande.36 Several Zande cultural phenomena present us with particular difficulties of comprehension due to their intimate connection with magical practices. Like many other primitive peoples, the Azande '"...believe that certain of their members are witches, exercising a malignant occult influence on the lives of their fellows. They engage in rites to counteraet witchcraft; they consult oracles and use magic medicines to protect themselves from harm. ,,37 Because our scientific worldview impels us to view them as irrational, understanding what is 3~bermas. TCA 1: 53. 360zne term "Azande" is a collective noUD., while "lande" can be used cither as a singular noun or adjectivaIly. 37Winc~ "Primitive Societ)'," in Wilson (1970): 78. In an anempt to minimise confusion 1 have decided to confonn to the practice of using the tenn '4prinùtive" to denote the sorts of societies under 162 involved in the comprehension of magical rites requires that we problematise the process of understanding itself. An anthropologist studying a primitive society is faced with the difficult task of presenting an account of magical beliefs and practices, of rendering them comprehensible to us, which can only Mean that they he comprehensible as measured against the standards of our scientific worldview. This places the anthropologist in the maladroit position ofattempting to render intelligible belief in the efficacy of magicaJ rituals, where these rituals seem to invoke relations of cause and effect decisively disconfinned by the natura! sciences. Winch is particularly interested in looking at the strategy for the solution to this problem adopted by the anthropologist Evans-Pritchard in bis study of witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Evans-Pritchard's tieldwork bas been groundbreaking in this regard. It emphasises the need for sociological study of an alien culture to proceed by way of understanding the meanings which cultural phenomena have for the actors involved. 38 The critica1 analysis of Evans-Pritchard's position developed in "Understanding a Primitive Society" carries forward this focus upon meaning. Through advancing detailed criticisms of Evans-Pritchard's position Winch hopes to bring certain incoherencies to the fore, and thereby to set the stage for bis o\\n suggestions on how we might approach this problem. Like Winch and Habennas, Evans-Pritchard rejects the notion that the differences between modern and mythical worldviews should be explained in virtue of the superior intelligence of modems. Rather, he believes that differences in the beliefs and practices of members of mythicaJ and modem societies cao best he accounted for by reference to their reasoning from different socially acquired categories and patterns of thought. What varies between primitive and modem worldviews is thus essentia11y the store of interpretive concepts discussion. Nonetheless, in my vie\\" the pejorative nature of this term and the connotations of linear progress which surround il render il a ven' unfortunate choice. 38See Finnegan and Honon, "Introduetiõ'" in Finnegan and Horton (1973): 31-32. 163 which the worldview makes available to us. This point is developed through a discussion of the significance ofvarious explanations of rainfall. Although Evans-Pritchard himself explains rainfiùl through meteorological causes, whereas memhers of archaic societies often appeal 10 narratives of interventions by deities or magic, bath approaches are, he argues, culturally acquired. It is no sign of superior intelligence on my part that 1attribute rain to physical causes. 1did not come to this conclusion myself by observation and inference and have, in filet, littIe knowledge of the meteorological process that leads to rain, 1merely accept what everybody eIse in my society accepts, namely that rain is due to naturaI causes. This particular idea fonned part of my culture long before 1 was bom into it and little more was requîred of me than sufficient linguistic ability to learn it. Likewise a savage who helieves that under suitable natura! and ritual conditions the rainfall can he influenced by the use of appropriate magic is not on account of this helief to he considered of inferior intelligence....He and 1 are bath thinking patterns of thought provided for us by the societies in which we live. The explanation given by Evans-Pritchard for the major ditTerences in heliefs and practices in mythical and modem societies is hence similar to that of Habennas. Like Habennas, EvansPritchard argues not ooly that the interpretive structures provided by mythical worldviews are different from those furnished by modem ones, but that the categories of the mythicaJ worldview do not accord with the truths of science or "objective reality." The passage quoted continues: It would he absurd to say that the savage is thinking mystically and that we are thinking scientifically about rainfaiI. In either case like mental processes are involved and, moreover, the content of thought is similarly derived. But we can say that the social content ofour thought about rainfail is scientific. is in accord with objective facts, whereas the social content of savage thoughl about rainfall is unscientific since il is not in accord with rea/ity and MaY also he mysticaI where it assumes the existence of supra-sensible forces. ,,39 3~.E. Evans-Pritchard. "Lé\'y-Bruhl's Theol)' ofPrimitive Mentality:' Bulletin ofthe Faeulty ofArts (University of Egypt, 1934). As quoted in Winc~ "Primitive Society:' in Wilson (1970): 80. Emphasis added. 164 A specific conception of the nature of anthropology seems 10 foIlow from this view. It seems that the task of the anthropologist is appropriately conceived as that of explaining how intelligent people could develop and maintain a shared system ofbeliefs tha.t is mistak~ and a shared system of practices that is inefficacious.40 1 should like to examine this idea more closely. Habennas understands Evans-Pritchard as advancing a twofold conception of the task of the anthropologist, according to which the expressions of natives must first he related to one another~ and second to elements of the world.4 ! In fulfilling the first task the anthropologist relies upon "intuitively mastered mIes of formai logic" which hold for members of bath worldviews. The goal is to exhibit a high degree of henneneutic charity towards the natives~ showing the coherence of their worldview to a large extent as it appears to them from within their own categories and standards of intelligibility. As we shaH see below~ in follo\\ing titis practice Evans-Pritchard shows the Azande worldview, including their magical beliefs~ to be relatively consistent. Bath Habennas and Winch agree that Evans-Pritchard's work achieves considerable sensitivity in this regard.4:! The second task is, in Habennas's view, substantial!y more complex. Members of primitive worldviews may categorise the world in ways quite different from our o\\n, and this renders the question of how ta relate their expressions to reality considerably more involved. The anthropologist must assume that the natives start from more or less the same concept of a world of entities as we do, from more or less the same perceptual experiences~ and that they interpret a given situation in ways similar to our o\\n. However, the interpretations of a situation may not necessarily he shared in a detenninate <Wwinch describes Evans-Pritchard's view ofanthropology as foUows: '~AlI we can do then is to show how such a system of mistaken beliefs and inefficacious practices can maintain itself in the face of objections that seem to us so obvious." See Winc~ "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 79. 41Habennas. TC4 J: 56. Habennas presents a summary of the "rationality debate" in a six-round argument and counterargurnent format. [have anempted to structure this chapter to take account of bis very helpful reading of the debate to the greatest extent possible. 165 fashion by bath worldviews. When there is a disagreement between the interpretations of a particuIar situation ofIered by a primitive culture and those offered by a modem culture, the methods of the sciences should detennine which set prevails. As Habennas interprets him, Evans-Pritchard's aim is to develop charitable interpretations of the expressions of natives; y~ "...as an anthropologist, he hoIds fast to the standards ofscientific rationality when if is a question of objectively assessing the views and techniques of this tribe. Evans-Pritchard distinguishes between the requirements of consistency, which the Zande belief in witches largely satisfy, and the methodological requirements that (in our view) empirical knowledge about material processes and teehnical intervention into them are supposed ta satisfy. In this latter respect mythicaI thought is obviously inferior to modem.,,43 Winch bases his objections to Evans-Pritchard aD considerations arising from a Wittgensteinian conception of language. In Winch's view, Evans-Pritchard"s ~ccouñ although subtle and persuasive on many levels, goes crucially wrong in its attempt to characterise the scientific as that which is "in accord with objective reality.'"u Evans-Pritchard seems ta assume that "reality" is a concept intelligible and applicable outside the context of particular discourses which fumishes an independent standard against which their adequac)' can be measured. Evans-Pritchard, although he emphasizes that a member of scientific culture bas a different conception of reaIity from that of a Zande believer in magic, wants to go beyond merely registering this fact and making the difIerences explicit, and to say, finally, that the scientific conception agrees with what reality aetually is like, whereas the magical conception does not.4S It is the cogency of precisely this assumption-that there is a concept of reality as somethÏng outside our schemes of descriptions which cao serve as a measure of adequacy for various 4:.!Habermas, TCA 1: 55; and Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 79. 43Habennas, TCA J: 56. Emphasis added. 44Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 80. 166 ways of reasoning-that Winch v.ishes to question. It should he noted from the outset that Winch"s intent is not to jettison the idea that our beliefs are checkable against an ~'independent rea.lity." The notion that ideas and beliefs cao he verified by reference te something extema1 to them is a crucial one, and must he retained., he argues, ifwe are 10 avoid a form of re1ativism both extreme and paradoxicaI.46 However, Winch does believe tbat we stand 10 benefit from cIarifying the role which this conception ofthe "independently reaI'" plays in human discourses. Brief1y put., he will argue that one"s notion of agreement with reality makes sense ooly within the context ofan established discourse which sets out criteria for what counts as reasonable. The question of what we mean in referring ta a practice as urational'" is obviously central 10 the issues at band. FoUo\\ing upon Wittgenstein., Winch points to the close connection between language, rationality and specifie social practices. In answering the question of what it means to view a practice as rational, he tinds it useful conceptually to distinguish a formai from a substantive sense of this terro.47 We ascertain the rationality of behaviour in the formaI sense by testing it for a high degree of internaI coherence or non- \Xlntradiction. Behaviour can he seen as rational in the formaI sense just in case it involves conformity ta norms. Rationality in the substantive sense defines what is to count as consistency in a particular context: it denotes a reading or interpretation, circumscribed by established use, of what is ta COllOt as conformity to nonns in a given context or society., and what is not. Rationality manifests itself through language. Any language in order to he a language., Winch argues" must lay down features which establish what is legitimate to say. But this is to say that the concept of "reality'" a1so belongs to language. The distinction between what is 4SWinc~ "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 81. ~inc~ "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 81. 47Winc~ "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 100. 167 "reaf' and ''unreal,'' as weil as the notion of a belief's corresponding to rea1ity, acquîres sense ooly from within a given linguistic practiee. In saying this, Winch does not Mean to imply that they are concepts like allY others. Although we could easily imagine languages lacking the concept of 500W, for exarnple, or of wetness, we cannot imagine a language which does not establish a way of distinguishing the real from the unreal Tbese concepts are fonnal features inherent in all languages. However, cath disrourse that plays an assertion raie draws this distinction in a specific way. Zande language systems set out these eategorial distinctions in a manner different from modem ones. Discourses henee aniculate an understanding of reality. They establisb the framework of basic categories within which we interpret everything that appears in the world in a specifie way QS something, thus constituting the condition of the possibility of our inquiries into the world. Although worldviews can he revised, we cannot fully step outside them so as to assess them wholesale asainst an uninterpreted reality. Hence, iftruth or falsity is a matter of agreement with reality, then worldviews cannot he appraised as true or faise in themseIves.48 Evans-Pritchard, in attempting to judge Zande magical practices by the standards of scientifie rationality, tacitly assumes a concept of a reality existing outside our sehemes of descriptions against which such descriptions can he appraised. This reality would, it is assumed, demonstrate the preferability ofthe natural scientific descriptive scbeme. In Winch'5 vie\\' this is an incoherent dernand to place upon any form of discourse. To ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis "agrees with rea1ity" is to ask whether it satisfies criteria internai to the practice of science. We may ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with reality, and test this proposition through experimental methods. When we do 50, 48Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 82; cf Habermas. TC4 1: 57-58. Habennas seems to equate Winch's discussion ofreality~efining discourses with his own notion ofworldview. 168 " ...[g]iven the experimental methods~ and the established use of the theoretical tenns entering into the hypothesis~ then the question whether it bolds or not is settled by reference to sornething independent of what l, or anybody else~ care to think. ,.,49 But this can only he assessed in ligbt of criteria set out by the tradition and practice of the methods of experiment. There is hence in Winch ~s view no identifiable extemal standard which can serve as a measure ofadequacy for these two ways of reasoning. In Iight of these reflections, Winch asles whether we cao in fàct see a primitive system of magic, like that of the Azande, as constituting a "coherent universe of discourse like science" which specifies an intelligible conception of "agreement with reality7~ and clear ways of determining which beliefs are or are not in accord with this. If this is in faet the case we will need ta reconsider the strategy for understanding a primitive society adopted by Evans-Pritchar~and to develop sorne alternatives.so In asking whether we cao regard Zande magical practÏces as constituting a "coherent universe of discourse" which functions in order ta define a specific notion of "agreement \\ith reality~"we are~ in the first instance~ asking whether the practices set out by the Azande can be seen ta he rational or consistent when viewed in their o\\n tenns. Winch insists that answering this question requires us to distinguish a system of magical beliefs and practices like that held by the Azande~ which serves as a pillar of their whole social life, from magical beliefs or rites which might he practised by members of our culture. Practices of \\itchcraft and magic in our culture are~ he argues, defined with reference to our other practices, and gain their sense from this relationship. To take an example, a Black Mass draws its meaning from its complementarity ta the conduet of a proper Mass, and thus from the complex of religious ideas However, it is crucially imponant to note that what Habermas caUs a "worldview" represents for Winch a number of interlocking and complexly related discourses, rather than a single structure. 4~inch, "Primitive Society,n in Wilson (1970): 82. SOWinch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 83. 169 from which the Mass draws its significance.SI The concepts used in the Black Mass hence have an essential reference to other practices in our culture. The judgement that magical practices are "irrational" or usuperstitiousY' is based upon the meaning that they have in our culture, in relation 10 its other elements. In contrast ta uSy the Azande experience magic and witcbcraft as a commonplace occurence. Ifwe want 10 understand their prac:tices of magic we must not equate the two, but rather seek a foothold elsewhere. Winch's discussion gets underway with a general description, condensed from EvansPritchard's field researches y of the beliefs and practices in question. "Witchcraft," as the Azande understand this te~ is a power 10 hann others by mystical means. Rather than requiring special rituals or MediCinal preparations, Zande witches are witches ooly in virtue of an inherited organic condition or ~'witchcraftsubstance." The Azande make regular appeal ta explanations in terms of witchcraft ta account for events in their daily lives. It is important ta see, however, that such explanations do not serve as substitutes for explanations in terms of natural causes. The zande bas a considerable knowledge of natura! events which enables hirn to successfully trace the physical causes of particular misfortunes; the collapse of the wooden supports of a granary due ta a termite infestation, for exarnple, or the burning of a hut due ta lightning striking its thatch. S2 The role of witchcraft is to supplement such explanations. Witchcraft is used ta explain why a particular misfortune occurred; to offer reasons which allow the Azande to make sense of its occurrencey and thereby ta corne to tenns with it. SlWinc~ "Prinùtive Society," in Wilson (1970): 84. Winch also emphasises the internaI relation between idea and context in bis discussion ofpurification rituaIs in Idea ofa Social Science. In the context ofa criticism ofPareto's approach to social science, Winch writes: "It is nonsensical to take severa! systems of ideas, find an element in each which can he expressed in the same verbal fonn, and then claim to have discovered an idea which is common to all the systems." Winc~ The Idea ofa Social Science (Routledge. 1958): 107. s21 refer to the Azande in the masculine 50 as to respect the integrity of Evans-Pritchard's study. His research seems to have focussed upon male members of the tnDe. 170 The most important way of discerning whether witchcraft bas been at play in a particular event is to consult an oracle. The most powerful among these is the "poison oracle," which is a pervasive force in Zande life. AIl life decisions of importance are made in consultation with Ît. Consultation of the oracle takes place in a ceremony which involves the administration of a toxic substance known as ~'benge" ta a fowl, while a question is asked in a fonn pennitting a "yes" or "no" answer. A particular outcome, the survival or death of the fowl, is specified in advance as representing an "affinnative" response. A verification of the result of the oracle is then conducted by administering "benge" to another fowl and asking the question inversely, specifying the opposite outcome as an affinnation or as a negation. Irrespective of what we may view as the strangeness or irrationality of tlùs practice, Winc~ following Evans-Pritchard, emphasises that by following it the Azande do in faet conduct their affairs to their ov.n satisfaction.S3 However, the question which occupies us is whether Zande magical practices make sense, and this is a distinct issue from that of whether the Azande are themselves satisfied with such practices. What criteria can we propose for something's making, or indeed failing to make, sense? As Winch explains, "[al partial answer is that a set of beliefs and practices cannot make sense insofar as they involve contradictions.,,54 oeother words, in asking whether Zande magical practioes are intelligible we are inquiring into their rationality, and it seems an obvious necessary feature of a rational practice that it not be self~ntradietory. This is, to draw upon Winch's terminology, a fonnal constraint upen a praetice's being rational. Consideration ofwhether Zande magical practices involve their praetitioners in acceptance of contradictions is hence crucial. S~vans*Pritchard ran bis o\\n household in this manner when conducting bis field researches. He comments, nI found this as satisfaetoI)' a way of l''Unning my home and affairs as any other 1know of." Cited in Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 87. S4Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 87. 171 There seem to he two generaI ways in which the process of oracular consultation is disposed to issue in contradictions. First, we might expect that predictions of the poison-oracle would on occasion contradiet one another, providing answers of ')tes" and "no" to the same question. However, such an occurrence does not tend ta undennine the Zande's confidence in oracular revelations. The Azande have available to them strategies for the explanation of such aberrations. These strategies often point to evidence that the process of oracular consultation bas been undennined in sorne way, through the administration ofbad "benge:' for example, or because the consultation of the oracle was itself influenced by witchcraft. Alternatively, the ambiguous result may he interpreted as pointing 10 the inappropriateness of posing the question in the manner stated; that is, to the faet that it is not a question admitting of a straightforward "yes" or "non answer. Second, we might expeet contradictions to present themselves through future events contradicting the predictions of a self-consistent oracle. Winch points out, however, that because of the role played by oracular practices in Zande life such contradictions tend not to emerge. Rather than treating oracular pronouncernents as hypotheses ta he tested in the manner of scientific experirnentation, the Azande treat the recommendations of the oracle as guides for action. If the oracle reveals that a proposed course of action is fraught with dangers stemming from witchcraft or sorcef)', this programme of action simply \\i11 not be carried out. In this event the pronouncements of the oracle will not admit of refutation. Moreover, if a particular course of action is recommended by the oracle it will he aeted upon. But in this case there is no control situation against which it can be verified to have been the superior option. The practice of oracular consultation as a source of guidance for actions 172 hence tends to shield itself from obvious contradiction by experience.55 It should he emphasised tha.t the Azande do entertain suspicion about specific claims of the oracle, about certain rites, or certain witchdoctors. A critical distance can he gained by individual Azande to one element ofmagical practice or another; however, the system of mystical thought which lies at the fOUDdation of Zande ways of thinking, cannot he rejected wholesale.56 Evans-Pritchard offers the following assessment of the Zande's ability 10 develop a critical distance vis-a-vis the poison oracle: Let the reader consider any argument that would utterly demolish all Zande claims for the power of the oracle. If it were translated into Zande modes of thought it would serve 10 support their entire structure of helief For their mystical notions are eminently coherent, being interrelated by a network of logical ties, and are 50 ordered that they never too crudely contradiet sensory experience bu~ ~ experience seems ta justify them. The Zande is immersed in a sea ofmystica1 notions, and ifhe speaks about bis poison oracle he must speak in a mystical idiom.57 In light of the foregoing reflections, Winch judges zande magical practices to form a coherent system of beliefs, or what Habermas would cali a ~~orldview." These beliefs are, to a large extent, mutually reinforcing and self-justifying.58 However, Winch provocatively emphasises SThs aspect of the Zande worIdview fonns the basis for an imponant objection to il. We will take up Horton and Habennas's attempts to charaeterise the style ofthinking embodied in the mythical worldview as "closed" in 14.52 below. ~inc~ "Primitive Society." in Wilson (1970): 90. S'Evans-Pritchard, as quoted in Winch, "Primitive Society." in Wilson (1970): 89. SBAs Winch notes, he and Evans-Pritchard might have no dispute on this point. The crucial distinction between them, in Winch's view, is that Evans-Pritchard would have also wished to add .....and the European is right and the lande wrong." It is this move which Winch resists. The intuition underlying E\'ans-Pritchard's stance can be viewed in the following way: worldviews, although neither true nor faIse in themselves, make it possible to develop tnle propositions about the extemal world. One might therefore argue that worldviews cao he assessed in tenns of their indirect relation to tnlth or their "cognitive adequacy." My understanding ofthis point is due to Habennas, who explains it thus: ...it can be objected against the thesis developed by Winch that worldviews can he compared with one another not only from the quasiaesthetic and truth*indifferent standpoints of coherence, depth, eeonomy, completene~ and the like, but also from the standpoint of cognitive adequacy. The adequacy of a linguistically articuIated worldview is a function of the true statements that are possible in this language system. 173 the possibility that our scientific worldview may alsõ and in a parallel fashion, perpetuate its own standards and criteria.S9 This opens the door to the possibility ofcultural relativism. Yet an alternative suggests itself. One might argue that the irrationality of the zande worldview cao he discemed not in terms of the tendency of elements of this worldview to reinforce one another~ thereby avoiding the emergence of contradictions, but on a different level altogether. It might he maintained that this irrationality manifests itseIf in the willingness of the Azande 10 disregard certain contradictions, even when these contradictions are made explicit to them. In certain cases, Winch explains. " ...what appear to us as obvious contradictions are left where they are, apparently unresolved. ~'l6O He bas in mind the following situation, encountered by Evans-Pritchard during bis field research. An apparent contradiction in Zande magical beliefs should be generated by the conjunction of certain of the beliefs about witchcraft with various empirical outcomes. The Habermas believes that Winch would regard this as a "cognitivistic misunderstanding" of the function of worldviews. Winch could argue against this that linguistically articulated worldviews are interwoven with fonns of life so as to be irreducible to the functions of knowing and mastering extemaJ nature. This corresponds to "Round Three'" of the six-round summary of the rationality debate presented by Habennas in The Theory of Communicative Action. 1 think Habennas may misconstrue the nature of Winch's claim. AIl Winch need say al this point in the debate is that the notion of '1ruth" utilised in measuring the "cognitive adequacy" of different worldviews is parasitic on the dubious notion of "reality" as an extemal standard against which worldviews cao be assessed. Cf. Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 89; Habennas, TC4 J, 58-9. 5'1t is interesting to compare on this point Thomas Kuhn's ref1ections on the role which difTerent research paradigms within the scientific worldview play in scientific practice. Kuhn describes paradigms as having a dual function. In the first instance they plã' a cognitive role, in which they aet as the vehicle for scientific theory. In this role paradigms function by supplying the scientist's onlology, or conceptual network. They describe the sorts of entities the world cao and cannot contain, and delimit the sorts ofbehaviour these entities cao exhibit. Yet paradigms aIso have a second role, which is inseparable from the first. They provide scientists with nonnative standards. Paradigms are, in efIect, the source which guides what constitutes acceptable methods, and which demarcates the relevant problem-field for a community ofscientists. Periods ofscientific revolution are hence marked by disagreements among scientists in the criteria detennining the legitimacy ofboth acx:eptable scientific problems and solutions. These periods are charaeterised by Kuhn as noncumulative developmental episodes during which an older paradigm is replaced, in whole or in part, by an incompatible or "incommensurable" new one. See e.g. Thomas Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago, 1970): 109. 6<Winch. "Primitive Society." in Wilson (1970): 91. 174 Azande believe it possible to ascertain whether a man is a witch through postmortem examination of bis intestines. The goal of such an examination is to verify the presence of what is known as "witchcraft substance.n A family may arrange for this procedure in the event of an individual~sdeath in order to clear the family narne of the imputation ofwitchcraft. It seems to us that this practice should engender contradictions which threaten the coherency of the Zande notion of witchcraft. Contradictions should presumably arise due to the rules for inheritance of powers of witchcraft. Because the Zande clan is a group of persons related ta one another biologically through the male line, a few positive examination results scattered among the clans should prove conclusively that everyone is a witc~ whereas a few negative results should prove the converse, that is, that no-one is a witch. Although the Azande do acknowledge the logic of this argument they seem unmoved by it: they do not press it to its conclusions. As Evans-Pritchard explains, "Azande do not perceive the contradiction as we perceive it because they have no theoretical interest in the subject, and those situations in which they express their belief in witchcraft do not force the problem upon them. ,161 This phenomenon might he thought to offer us a foothold from which to assess the "correctness" of worldviews. It seems, as Winch explains, to offer clear grounds for judging European thought superior to Zande thought, in that Zande thought fails ta acknowledge or to mandate the removal of a contradiction visible from the perspective of European ways of thinking. This seems to provide support for the judgement that Zande magical practices are irrational. One may wish to say that the irrationality of the magical belief-system of the Azande shows itself in the faet that they do not press tbeir system of thought far enough to draw the pertinent logical inferences. Suppression of this contradiction 6IEvans-Pritchard, as quoted in Winch, "Primitive Society:' in Wilson (1970): 92. 175 foons an apparent precondition of the continuation of these practices.. and hence of the Zande way oflife.62 Is the lack of theoretical interest in pressing this contradiction demonstrated by the Azande a sign of lesser rationality? In order to appraise this issue we must consider whether someone who does press this conclusion is necessarily more rational than the Azande, who do not. Winch does not believe this is so. Wbat he takes this result te suggest is that the point of the system of zande thought in which beliefs about witchcraft operate may he significantly different from the point of scientific beliefs and practices. As Winch sees it, the function of a worldview is not exhausted by the airn of acquiring knowledge and mastery of extemal nature. He instead draws attention to the role played by worldviews in conferring meaning upon human life: worIdviews open up possibilities of making sense of existential thernes which recur in all cultures, such as those of birth and death, of sexual relations, and of one"s relation to the cosmos and to one's fellows. They chart particular resolutions to common hurnan problems whose boundaries are set by the limits of hurnan existence. Once we recognise this, it is possible to see Zande magical practices not as constituting a rudimentary fonn of science, but rather as atternpts to grapple with and to resolve quite different problems, those of social relations.. for example, or of indi\idual vulnerability before the vicissitudes of fate. 63 Winch speculates that Zande magical practices might fruitfully he considered as a rneans of coming to tenns \\ith such contingencies, in a manner similar to our practice of prayer. To put the issue differently, a belief in witchcraft.. oracles and magic MaY not he weIl<enstrued as a competing theoretical system operating on the same level and with the same goals as scientific theory. It may hence be inappropriate to assess them by the sarne criteria. 62cr Habermas. TC4 1: 60. 63Winch, **Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 104-11~ and Habennas, TC4 J: 60. 176 Winch concludes that in order troly to understand Zande magical rituals, or the practices of any other alien culture, we must grasp their point. This requires in tom that we grasp the criteria embodied in a society's own self-description rather than imposing criteria drawn fram our practices upon them. Ifwe do sa successfully what we cao hope ta leam from a primitive society are, among other things, new possibilities ofmaking sense of human life as a whole.64 It must he emphasised that Winch does not deny that il is possible for us to evaluate Zande magical rites using the criteria and standards of science and teehnology, nor does he deny that by these standards Zande practices seem seriously defieient.6S Yet it must he emphasised as a point of logic that any standards, however spurious, can he used te evaluate any object studied. One could, for example, evaluate the intelligence of Canadians by their heights, or perhaps only slightly less luelierously, by their average yearly incornes. Our ability ta carry out this evaluation does not show that the standards used capture the phenomenon being investigated in an appropriate way, and this is surely the relevant issue. Winch questions the appropriateness of Evans-Pritchard's desire to evaluate the Zande worldview according to the criteria of modem natural science in a paraIlel fashion. Zande notions of \\itchcraft do Dot constitute a theoretical system in tenns of which the Azande try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world. This in tum suggests that it is the Eurõ obsessed with pressing Zande thought where it would not naturally go-to a contradiction-who is guilty of misunderstanding, not the Zande. The European is in tàct committing a category mistake.66 Does this suggest a satisfaetory resolution to the problem of whether the Iack of theoreticaJ interest in contradictions evinced in Zande magical practices, and in the Zande worldview as a whole, is a sign of its lesser rationality? This is, for our purposes, the crucial 64Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 106. 65Winch. "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 102-3. 177 question, and there is considerable disagreement on the nature ofWinch's Oml reply to it. The remaining sections of this chapter set out a number of alternative solutions to this problem, Habennas's among them. My aim is to ilIurninate the philosophical te~ as it were, by cIarifying the range of theoretica1 options available. In 50 dOÎDg, 1 hope to throw the contours ofHahennas's own response ioto relief. Before taking up these alternatives it will prove useful 10 recall how this issue bears upon Habermas's programme ofdiscourse ethics. 4.4 The Notion oC Optimisation in Developmental-Logical Accounts My guiding mterest in this chapter is in the employment by Habennas of developmental-logical accounts to support the claim that discourse ethics defines a procedure for the evaluation of moral norrns which is universally valid.67 As we saw previously, demonstration of the universal validity of discourse ethics requires that a link he sho\\n between conventional and postconventional forms of argumentation, such that it he possible to argue that all practitioners of "conventional" fonns of argumentation shou/d recognise the validity of bpostconventionaI" forms of argumentation. The strategy adopted by Habermas is to argue that these fonns of argumentation stand in a hierarchica/ relationship to one another, in that the postconventional practice of argumentation constitutes a demonstrab/e cognitive gain over conventional fonns of argumentation. This thesis draws support from empirical reconstructions of individual and societal processes ofmaturation. The notion of an '"internaI" or "developmental" logic is vital to these reconstructions. The stages of a developmental model can be portrayed as a conceptual hierarchy just in case the cognitive structures of the higher stages replace thase of the lower 50 as to incorporate the structures of the lower stages in a reorganised or more comprehensive fOIm. In other words, ~inch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 93. 67See Chapter 3 .JJ'3.3,3.4,&3.5~ and Chapter 4 J'4.1. 178 the concept of a developmental logic allows Habennas to represent a process of maturation as an ascending sequence of stages or phases in which leaming processes can he seen both as cumulative, and as exhibiting a certain direction. It provides the conceptual resources which enable Hahennas to represent a process of development as ifif were the optimal.fû/fi/lment of a specifie criterion.68 1 would like to look more closely at the theoretical underpinnings of these models. In bis study of Habermas ~s account of social evolution, Michael Schmid raises the issue of what conditions a developmental-logica1 account must meet in order to be amenable to empirical verification. He observes that the feasibility of advancing hypotheses of optimisation is contingent upon our ability to "factually measure" the augmented value of the variable under investigation.69 If it is not possible to do so, such an hypothesis will clearly be superfluous to an empirical theory. The developmental models employed by Habermas propose to represent a ranking of formaI problem-solutions for a given domain. There is indeed no difficulty in principle in measuring increases in problem-solving capacities in this way. We can, for example~ measure the speed or efficiency with which a rat travels through a particular sort of maze to acquire foodstuff ofIered as incentive, or the efliciency of the approach taken by a chess player in extricating herself from a certain move made by her opponent. It should in such cases he possible to identify strategies which solve the problem with greater or less sophistication. The adoption by an individual of strategies or problem-solutions which resolve 68See Chapter 3 .f.f3.1, 3.32, 3.4, and Chapter 4 J4.1. My interest in Habennas's use of the concept ofoptiDÙsation was spurred by Michael Schmid's outstanding analysis of the use ofdevelopmental logics in Habermasts theory of social evolution. Schmid argues thal the use made by Habennas of developmentallogics in the theory ofsocial evolution re1lects a confusion ofexplanalory and evaIuative viewpoints. This is, he argues, explanatorily redundant al best and obfuscating al worst. Schmid recommends that Habennas abandon their use entirely in the field of social evolution. See Michael Schnùd, "Habennas's Theory of Social Evolution," in Habermas: Critica/ Debales cd. J.B.Thompson and D. Held, (Macmillan, 1982): 172-80. 69Schmid, "Social Evolution," in Thompson and Held (1982): 177*78. 179 the puzzle more efficiently can then he identified as "progressive," while the adoption of strategies which are less efficient may he labeUed "regressive." However, as Schmid emphasises, '1his insight can be used meaningfully ooly as long as we know which problems are being better or worse solved."70 This is, for our purposes, the crucial point. A developmental model records augmentations in a particular variable in response ta changes, for Q given problem. We say that a solution is ''progressive'' if it represents a better solution to this problem. If the empirical data gathered represent responses to different problems, they can neither be assessed against each other, nor evaIuated on the same scale of measurement. To take an example, Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness represent solutions, arranged in ascending order, to a particular sort of problem: the resolution of interpersonal confliets of interest. A1though the success of Kohlberg,s model of optimisation in the domain of moral judgement is open to doubt, it offers a relatively clear theoretical specification ofthe problem under study.11 The challenge posed by the rationality debate is a more fundamental one. 1 began this chapter by noting that the developmental processes of social evolution and of the growth of moral consciousness described by Habennas stand in need of further defence. Bath sets of reconstructions lay out a sequence of stages which purport to represent successively more adequate approximations toward an apex or optimum. However, 1argued that in each case the 7°Schmid, "Social Evolution,'" in Thompson and Held (1982): 178. My italics. 71 As wc saw in ff 3.32 and 3.5, Kohlberg's use of the notion ofoptimisation appeared problematic in al least two major respects. Fi~ it seemed questionable whether the problem selected for study is an appropriate candidate for investigation cross.culturally, or indeed, across the various strata ofour own society. The problem ofhow nonviolently to resolve interpersonal confliets is undoubted1y of great imponance in ail human communities. However, Kohlberg's manner of conceiving this domain, as weU as bis prioritisation of il over all others in the normative sphere, seems clearly tied to ways of thinking about ethics dra\\n from our tradition. The question of how we should interpret data ÏDdicating the relative backwardness of specifie groups in this domain bence emerged as a serious one. A second. related set of issues concemed the definition of what constituted a "better" or 180 optimum refleets Habermas ~s reading of what is essential to the form of rationality implicit in the postconventional practices of argumentation found in Western modernity, namely the "decentered understanding of the world."n His account of moral maturation depiets the development of moral consiousness as parallel to the development of interactive competence, while the stages of interaction trace how an individual in the modem West might acquire mastery of the skills essential to a decentered understanding of the world. His account defines the highest level of worldview development explicitly in terms of the characteristics of the decentered understanding. The justification of the superiority of postconventional over conventional praetices of argumentation is hence as yet incomplete, since it is carried out through criteria borrowed precisely from the understanding of the world associated with those praetices ofargumentation. In light of this, 1 maintained that Habermas be required to provide a conceptual defence of the use he makes of the modem Western worldview as against others to define the tenninaJ point of bis developmental sequence, and thereby to establish the criteria used to interpret and assess empirical data. ft remains for him ta show that worldviews cao he ordered unambiguously according to sorne set of non-relative criteriã and that these criteria establish the ascendancy of the fonn of rationality implicit in the Western worldview. The '~rationality debate" poses a crucial challenge to this agenda. In asking whether there might not be principled differences in the modes of thought used in various societies, it raises the possibility of relativism al the level of worldviews. Evidently, if each worldview establishes standards of "progressive~solution. Kohlberg's specification of the apex of moral maturity is dra\\n notjust from our cultural tradition, but from a specific philosophical schooI within that tradition. 12Recall that the deoentred understanding of the worId bas two defining features: First, this conception of the world differentiates three "domains ofvalidity" corresponding to the externaI, social and subjective dimensions ofreality. Each bas its 0\\11 standards oftruth and faIsity, as weil as its own method of establishing legitimate claims. SeconcL this way of understanding validity claims requires that we recognise thal no such claim can in principle be immune to criticism through 181 rationality valid ooly for that worldview, Habennas's attempt to demonstrate the universal significance of the fonn of rationality implicit in the Westem worldview must fail. But the converse is not true. It is not the case that, if cultural relativism is false, then Habennas's position must he true. Or so 1 wouId like to argue. ln order 10 appreciate the significance of the challenge raised by the rationality debate for Habermas's programme ofjustification, we must clearly grasp the conditions requisite for a developmental model. For the use of a developmental model 10 rank worldviews ta he coDceptually coherent, if must be the case that the worldviews represent solutions to the same-or perhaps. sufficiently similar-problems. If worldviews delineate solutions to different problems, these solutions clearly cannot be assessed or represented on the same scale. Winch's claim that Evans-Pritchard's attempt to evaluate Zande magica1 practices by the criteria of science and technology exemplifies a "category mistake," furnishes a challenge on precisely this level. If the Zande worldview addresses different problems from the Western one, they should not he assessed by the same criteria. It is methodologically wrong to attempt to rank them linearly. Using the account of the Zande response to contradiction as a touchstone, the following section takes up three responses to the problem raised by Winch. My airn is to consider the range of options available, so as more clearly to illustrate the specificity of the stance taken by Habennas. 1 will, however, try to assess the implications for the feasibility of COnstnlcting a developmental account which emerge correlative to each position outlined. The debate between these positions centres around two issues: first, whether and in what sense one should speak of a plurality of standards of rationality; and second, what implications arise argumentation. It bence prompts us to adopt an attitude of radical openness to critique. See 113.21, 3.5 & 4.1. 182 from the resolution of the first point regarding how we should go about making cross-cultural comparisons. The first option 1 consider is a reading of Winch favoured by Habennas, which regards Winch's position as one of strong relativism. Since, for the strong relativist, the interpretive structures of worldviews are non-<:omparable with respect to rationality, they clearly cannot he placed in a üoear ordering of the sort required by Habermas. The second option discussed is Habennas's o\\n strong universalis~ construeted from the writings of Robin Horton, Ernest Gellner and Jean Piaget. This position defends the idea that there are formai criteria of rationality which are non-worldview-specific, and which enable worldviews 10 he ranked in a manner satisfying the requirements of a developmentallogic. Finally, 1 take up a non-relativist position neglected by Habennas. This account is drawn from my reading of Winch and from work by Charles Taylor. Although it argues that principled comparisons can he made between worldviews, titis account is not suitable for the construction of a model of developmental stages. 4.5 Three Perspectives on the Debate Conceming the Rationality of Zande MagicaJ Practices 4.5J Strong Relativism This section sketches the main lines of an influential interpretation of Winch, wwch views bis position on the possibility of making cross-eultural judgements as one of strong cultural relativism. 1 have previously described cultural relativism as the doctrine that truth is relative to our conceptual framework or uworldview," and that it may vary from one worldview to another.73 This reading represents one way of reconstrueting the theoretical 73See 14.21. 183 background to Winch's daim that the assessment of zande magical practices by criteria derived from modem natura! scientific practices constitutes a ~~eategory mistake." The essence of the position can be distilled into two claims. It sees Winch as maintaining (a) that there are a plurality of standards of rationality~ and (b) that these standards of rationality cannot be applied beyond the boundaries of the cultural worldvie\\' in which they originale and are expressed. Because each cultural worldview should be seen as embodying standards of rationality which are 1iterally non-comparable, the possibility of making cross-eultural comparisons with respect to truth is undercut. This interpretation, which 1 shaH henceforth refer to as ~'WinchR ", is particularly important for us because it corresponds to Habennas's perception of Winch's position. Although for reasons which 1 will clarify below 1 do not find it persuasive as a reading of Winch, my first concem is not v..ith the plausibility of this interpretation, but rather \\ith the position it represents. 1 will next narrate its salient elements before considering how it relates te Habermas's project. Let us recall ho,... this interpretation ofWinch's position arase. Our concem with the magical practices of the Azande stems from our interest in the broader questions of whether there might not be principled differences in the modes of thought used in various societies, and what significance these differences might have. One way of distinguishing modem and primitive patterns of thought is to regard modem fonns of thought as urational" where this tenn is equated with "the scientific," while viewing mythical thought as "non-rationar' or "prescientific." Winch questions the cogency of this response, and in 50 doing, urges us to attend more closely to what it means to charaeterise something as rational. An important aspect of our attributions of rationality appears to invoke the notion of consistency. It seems to he a necessary condition of a practice's being rational that it not he self-contradietory. In the first 184 instance this seems to amount to asking whether a given practice can be seen as logically consistent when viewed in its 0\\'0 tenns. Winch foUows Evans-Pritchard in viewing Zande magical practices as fonning a coherent system of beliefs which are, ta a large exteñ mutually reinforcing. Habennas does not dispute this conclusion. The point of division between our authors cornes in assessing the significance of contradictions potentially arising on another level. Evans*Pritchard~s report suggests that the Azande are uninterested in eradicating certain contradictions inherent in the conjunction of various elements of their worldview, even when these contradictions are pointed out to them. In view ofthis observation the question arises: is it the case that this worldview is tenable only if one is uninterested in eliminating contradictions? If so, the Iack of theoretical interest in increasing the cohesiveness or systematicity of their worldview manifested by the Azande would seem to indicate its irrationality. Winch argues that the assessment of Zande magical rituaIs as less than fully rational made by reference to criteria derived from the practices of naturaJ science constitutes a 44category mistake." In advancing this daim he asks us ta consider whether we may not as yet have failed ta grasp the point of Zande magical rituals. Rather than seeing these rituals sirnply as Ua (misguided) technique for producing consumer goods," he suggests that Zande magical rites he viewed as constituting a 4'fonn ofexpression" in which the possibilities and dangers of living a life may he '4contemplated and retlected on-and perhaps also thereby transfonned and deepened. ,,74 Precisely what is meant by this daim is one of the crucial questions separating '''Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 106. 185 the two readings of Winch which 1 take Up.7S However, it is clear that Winch wishes to resist the facile propensity ta see Zande magic onJy as a primitive attempt 10 control nature, as a sort of proto-teehnology, as it were. Those who read Winch as a strong relativist view him as arguing that the religious rituaIs of the Azande are a pure form of S}1llbolic activity entirely unrelated 10 furthering the end of consumption. Furthermore, because the goals of the practices of Zande magic and Western science are entirely distinct, the judgement that magical rituals are somehow deficient in rationality-a judgement which can ooly he arrived at on the basis ofcomparison with practices playing a parallel role in our own culture~ot he made. This account conforms to Habermas's reading of Winch. Habermas interprets Winch as upholding the existence of a plurality of discrete and non-eomparable standards of rationality. On bis description Winch claims that ~~inherent to every linguistically articulated worldview and ta every cultural fonn of life there is an incommensurable fonn of rationality....,,76 Because worldviews MaY employ different concepts, invoke different nonns of rationality, and aim at solving different problems, the construction of a sequential ranking of the kind required for a developmental logic is sirnply oot possible. These interpretive systems admit of comparison ooly 00 aesthetic grounds. Habermas explains: "Worldviews are comparable ooly in respect ta their poteocy for conferring meaning. They throw light on existential themes recurrent in every culture-birth and death, sickness and need, guilt, love, solidarity and loneliness. They open equally primordial possibilities of "making sense of human life." They thereby structure fonns of life that are incommensurable in their value. '~y appreciation of the importance ofthis c1aim bas been greatly enhanced by Charles Taylor's discussion in bis article on rationality. See Charles Taylor, "Rationality," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 92-93 especially. 7~bermas, TC4 1: 66. The use of the tenn "incommensurable" in this debate is somewhat confusing. It is used here by Habennas to indicate that these positions are truly non-comparable. 186 The rationality of fonns of life cannot be reduced to the cognitive adequacy of the worldviews d 1 * th n77un er ymg ern. Hahennas regards this extrerne relativist position as a highly implausible one; however, he does find it valuable in at least two respects. First, Habermas concurs with Winch in the notion that an approach to cross-cultural analysis which attempts ta bypass agent's meaning cannat he successful. He follows Winch in criticising the ethnocentricity of Victorian anthropologists such as Frazer and Tyler, who tended ta impose the purportedly universal standards of rationality found in their own culture upon alien cultures.78 It is in opposition to this sort of error that Winch claims that ~'the concepts used by primitive peoples can only he interpreted in the context of the way oflife ofthose peoples.'~79 In bis discussion ofWinch's essaYt Charles Taylor expresses this intuition in the foUowing manner. The very nature of hurnan action requires that we understand il, at least initially, in its own terms; that means that we understand the descriptions that it bears for the agents. It is ooly because we have failed ta do this that we can falI into the fatal error of assirnilating foreign practices to our own familiar ones.80 In spite of their agreement on this point, Habennas believes that Winch draws the \\Tong conclusion from it. What Habermas sees as mistaken in WinchR' s thesis is the view that we cannot bring critica1 standards to bear upon a society's practices by going beyond its o\\n description of them. Second, Habennas agrees with Winch that it is not possible to measure the rationality of a worldview solely in tenns of the extent to which it makes possible true statements in the cognitive-instrumental domain.81 This point will he of central importance in the follo\\ing section. 17Habennas• TC4 J: 59. 7BHabennas, TC4 J: 55. 7~inch, "Primitive Society." in Wilson (1970): 95. 8Graylor, "Rationality," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 93. 81Habennas. TC4 J: 59. 187 4.52 Habermasian Un;versa!ism Habennas acknowledges that the Azande use concepts substantially different from our ~ and that these concepts fonn a worIdview whose elements are generally consistent and mutually reinforcing. However~ he resists the relativistic resolution of the '~eategory mistake" problem upheld by WinchR. This resistance is largely a reflection of a different understanding of the nature of rationality. 1 would like to paraphrase Hilary Putnam in describing this conception of reason as one which is bath "inunanent" and ''transcendent.'' Reason must he viewed as immanent because our standards of rationality are never entirely divorced from concreoe languages~ institutions and social praetices. However~ reason also transcends this concrete conte~ thereby pennitting us 10 criticise the ~ific traditions in which it is embodied. Putnarn elaborates this view ofrationality in the following passage. 1 have already said thã in my view, truth and rational acceptability-a claim's being right and someone's being in a position 10 make Ît-are relative to the sort of language we are using and the sort of context we are in....This does not Mean that a claim is right whenever those who employ the language in question would accept it as right in its context, however. There are two points that must he balanced, both points that have been made by philosophers of many different kinds: (1) talk of what is "right" and '\wong" in any area only makes sense against the background of an inherited tradition; but (2) traditions thernselves can he criticized.8~ This general intuition about the nature of rationality as both embodied in and transcending specifie social practices~ although rendered concrete in different ways~ is shared by Habennas and by the position described in 14.53. Rather than viewing lande magical practices as entirely different language games govemed by different standards of rationality from Western practices of science, Habennas asles whether the lack of theoretical interest in contradiction manifested by the Azande cannot 188 he traeed ta another source. He speculates that the zande conception of the world may ernploy less exaeting standards of rationality and he in this sense less rational than the modem one.'3 Habennas attempts te show that the rationality of worldviews can be assessed on the extent ta which they facilitate leaming. The basis of bis account is taken from Robin Horton's anthropological studies of "closecl" and "open" mentalities corresponding to traditional and modem forms of Iife. Horton assesses the cognitive merits of worldviews "by the degree to which they hinder or promote cognitive-instrumentalleaming processes.'~ However, superior rationality in the cognitive-instrumental domain alone is insufficient te establish that a fonn of life is "rational" in the sense in which Habennas is interested. Habennas consequently modifies Horton's approach through appeal to the work of Ernest Gellner and Jean Piaget to encompass dimensions of rationality other than the cognitive-instrumental. Horton, like Habennas, reads Winch as a strong relativist. As we have seen, WinchR argues that magical praetices serve a function unerly unlike that served by scientific practices, and in faet represent an atternpt ''ta come to tenns with contingencies" akin to our practices of prayer. The assessment of these practices by the same criteria is hence not viable. Horton defines the fideist as one who likes ''ta think of ail religious life as the expression of an autonomous commitment ta communion with Spiritual Being, and again as something totally different from thought and action direeted by the ends ofexplanation, prediction and control."t!' Horton's work offers a comparative anaJysis of the styles of thought in traditional and in modem scientific societies. He makes a strang stance in opposition to the fideist. Horton 82Putnam, "Why Reason Cao9 t Be Naturalized," in Afler Philosophy. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy eds., (MIT Press. 1987): 227*28. My attention was dra\\n to the importance oftlùs conception ofreason by McCarthy's "General Introduction" to this volume. 8~bennas, TCA 1: 61. 84Habennas. TCA 1: 61. Honon later repudiates this way ofcasting the isue. 8~obin Honon, ••African Traditional Thought and Western Science," in Brian Wilson cd.• Rationa/ity (Basil Blackwell, 1970): 208. 189 believes not only that we can appraise and compare different modes of thought, he is prepared to speak of the superior cognitive powers of scientific modes of thought as against traditional or pre-scientific ones. Focussing on the similarities in the fonnaI goals ofthese theories rather tban on the differences in the substance of wbat they assert, he argues that sttong continuities exist between scientific and traditional African thought. Bath sets of theories attempt to explain our experience; moreover, both give a central place to the goals of explanatiõ prediction and control. HoIton emphasises that these goals are of equal relevance for traditional Afiicans and for modems, citing as evidence for the faet that the most common reason for initiating a search for causes in traditional Africa is the diagnosis of disease.16 Discussion of these continuities in modes of thought serves Honon as an essential prelude to understanding where the differences between them aetually lie. He explains: My approach is also guided by the conviction that an exhaustive exploration of features conunon to modem Western and traditional African thought should come before the enumeration ofdifferences. By taking things in this order, we shaH be less likely ta mistake differences of idiom for differences of substance, and more likely to end up identifying those features which reaHy do distinguish one kind ofthought from the other.,,87 Although my principal interest lies in Horton's conception of the differences between these two modes ofthought, 1would like briefly to outline what he sees as the continuities between them. On Horton's account the most important continuity existing between African traditionalism and Western modemity is the presence of two distinct and yet complementary levels of thought and discourse, which function in a parallel manner in each. 88 \\Inat he tenns ~orton,04African and Westem," in Wilson (1970): 135. 87Horton, "African and Western," in Wilson (1970): 131. D-rhe tenninology used by Horton in advancing the "continuity thesis" bas changed. The distinction originally deployed, viz., that between common*sense observations or discourse versus theoretical dïscourse. seemed to imply a false antithesis in the relationship between them. Horton now acknowledges that to conceive ofobservational or everyday discourse as somehow non-theoretical constitutes a misconstrual. He follows Ma1)' Hesse in criticising the idea that there caR be a theoryneutral observation-language in this sense. As against logical positivist philosophers of science, Hesse argues that "everyday" concepts such as 04earth," "sk)"," "tree," "1ish," and 04man" are described 190 "primary theoryn is tied relatively closely to empirical observations, and does not vary greatly from community to community. This is not to deny that cultures may vary in the degree to which they focus upon certain dimensions of experience: sorne areas may be covered in great detail, while others remain relatively undeveloped. Nonetheless, primary theory remains relatively invariant across places and times.89 Moreover, he argues that the structure of primary theory is intimately interwoven with specific human aims, and with the apparatus available to hurnan beings for achieving these aÏmS. It is well-tailored ta human hand-eye coordination, to the manual teehnology on which the survival of the human species bas always depended, and ta the type of social cooperation mediated by verbal communication essential to this manual teehnology.90 In light of these reflections, Horton characterizes primary theOl)" as follows: Primary theory gives the world a foreground filled with middle-sized (say between a hundred times as large and a hundred rimes as small as human beings), enduring, solid objects. These objects are interrelated, indeed interdefined in tenns of a "push-pull" conception of causaiity, in which spatial and temporal continguity are seen as crucial to the transmission of change. They are related spatially in tenns of five dichotol1Ùes: "Ieft"/ "right"; "above"/ "below"; "in front of'/ '"behind"; "inside"/ "outside"; "contiguous"/ "separate." And temporally in terms of one trichotomy: "before"/ "at the same time"/ "after." Finall)", primary theory makes two major distinctions among ilS objects: fil'st, that between human beings and other abjects; and second, among hwnan beings, that between self and others.91 ln contrast, secondat1' theOl'Y may vary in a startling manner between communities and cultures. It is in faet difficult to make generalizations about the nature of secondary theory in tenns which reflect the theories one holds, and are hence no more or less theoretica1 than concepts snch as "proton," "atom," or "electric current." Honon reformulates bis distinction in the 1982 article to take account of this objection, replacing the previous tenns with those of "primary theory" and "secondary theory." As an undoubtedly anachronistic simplification, 1 have decided to use the terms "primary theory" and "secondary theor)'" in referring to both papers. This should Dot affect any issues of substance. See Honon, "Tradition and Modemity Revisited," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 216,228-9. 8~onon, "Tradition and Modernity," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 228. ~onon, "Tradition and Modernity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 232. 91Honon, "Tradition and Modernity.** in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 228. 191 other than by making comparisons between it and primary theory. It will hence be helpful to tum to the relationsbip between these two. The goal of secondary theory is '~o transcend the limited vision of natural causes provided by common sense" or primary theory.92 Secondary theory attempts to place objects and occurrences in an enlarged causal cont~ by interpreting the diversity of everyday experience in tenns of a few /dnds of forces. '1be quest for expIanatory tbeory," Horton writes, "is basically the quest for unity underlying apparent diversity; for simplicity underlying apparent complexity; for order underlying apparent disorder; for regularity underlying apparent anomaly. ,,93 Secondary theory fulfills this aim by postulating a "hidden" or "underlying" rea1m of entities and processes. The events of everyday experience can then he seen as surface manifestations of these interacting forces.94 Sec:ondary theory hence arises from the lacunae of primary theory. The success of primary theory in explaining, predicting and controlling occurrences in 50 many areas of hurnan experience might have served, Horton speculates, to highlight its deficiencies in a few, and thereby to impel the construction of secondary theory. Nonetheless, although secondary theOl"Y aims 10 transcend the lirnited causal vision of primary theory, it remains inevitably and in complex ways dependent upon it.95 ViC\\-"ing African mysticism in terms of the complementary coexistence and funetioning of these two languages allows Horton to make sense of a number of its puzzling features. However, there are in bis view important differences between Western scientific and traditional African religious thought. Horton's identifies one key difference, and attempts to show how other points of difference between these modes of thought cao he seen as following from it. In 92Horton, "African and Western,» in Wilson (1970): 136. ~orton, "African and Weste~» in Wilson (1970): 132. 94Horton, "Tradition and Modemity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 230. 192 bis 1967 article, "African Traditional Thought and Western Science,n this difference is expressed in tenns of a contrast between the "closed" charaeter of the mythical worldvie\\' and the "open" character ofthe modem worldview. This distinction is later taken up by Habennas. Horton, like Winc~ takes Evans-Pritchard's account of the Azande as bis starting point. Evans-Pritchard, as we have~ argues that Zande beliefs bang together in a cohesive fashion which makes their disconfirmation extremely difficult. He explains: Ali their beliefs bang together, and were a Zande to give up faith in witchdoctorhooc:L he would have 10 surrender equally bis faith in witchcraft and oracles....In this web of belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of its meshes because it is the ooly world he knows. The web is not an extemal structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of bis thought and he cannot think that bis thought is wrong.96 Winch's position was derivevd in part from one reading of the significa.nce of this point. However Horton, unIike Winch, does not view this predicament as applying equally to every worldview. Rather, he holds this passage ta point ou.t the particularly limited or "closed"' charaeter of the m}thica1 worldview. Horton builds here upen an intuition of Evans-Pritchard's. In bis Theories of Primitive Religion Evans-Pritchard explains: Everyone bas the same sort of religious beliefs and practices, and their generality, or collectivity, gives them an objeetivity which places them over and above the psychological experience of any individual, or indeed of aIl individuals.. Apart from positive and negative sanctions. the mere facl lhat religion is general means. again in a closed society. lhat il is obligatory. for even if Ihere is no coercion. 0 man has no option but to occept what everybody gives ossent 10. because he has no choice. any more than ofwhat language he speok.s. Even were he to he a sceptic, he could express bis doubts ooly in tenns of the beliefs held by all around him. And had he been bom into a different society, he would have had a different language. It may 9SSee Honon, "Tradition and Modemit)"." in HoHis and Lukes (1982): 230-31, for a detailed account of how secondary theol}* lakes its point ofdeparture from the deficiencies ofprimary tbeory* and yet is constrained by the resources it offers. ~.E. Evans-Pritchard. Witchcrafl. Oracles andMagic among the Azande, (Oxford, 1936): 19~. As quoted in Honon, "African and Western," in Wilson (1970): 154. 193 here he noted that the interest shown by Durkheim and bis colleagues in primitive societies may weil have derived from the faet that they are, or were, closed communities. Open societies. in which heliefs may no! he transmitted and in which they are diversijied. and therefore less ohligatory, are less amenable to sociological interpretations on the lines pursued by them.97 The distinction between "closed" and "openn societies gestured at here is taken up and refined by Horton. Horton contrasts traditional and modem societies in terms of the cognitive predicaments facing their respective members. He characterises traditional societies in tenns oftheir intellectual closure, wbich he sees as due principally to the absence of an awareness of viable theoretical alternatives. Unawareness of alternatives, he explains, "makes for an absolute acceptance of established tenets~~ and, moreover, "removes any possibility of questioning them." Because any challenge ta established tenets seems to threaten ta bring chaos, Horton argues that it "evokes intense anxiety." The closed predicament hence aets as a brake upon cognitive change.98 ln contrast, thinkers in a society shaped by a scientific outlook face a situation of intellectual openness. Because an awareness of theoretical alternatives is present, established theoretical tenets "'seern less absolute in their validity" and "Iose something oftheir sacredness.,199 The open predicament thus facilitates cognitive change, adaptation and learning. The rnechanisrn of transition between these two predicarnents postulated by Horton is the cultivation of an awareness of conceptual alternatives. He sees this as the key factor in changing how people respond when the existing theoretical framework is challenged in sorne manner or another, and thereby in promoting the positive attitude towards challenging established beliefs necessary ta the development of a scientific outlook. 97E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories ofPrimitive Religion (Clarendon, 1965): 55, as quoted in Finnegan and Horton, "Introduction," in Finnegan and Honon (1973): 39. Emphasis mine. 98Horton, <4African and Western," in Wilson (1970): 154. ~Ol1on, *'African and Western:' in Wilson (1970): 155. 194 Horton maintains that all the major differences between cognitive traditionalism and cognitive modemism can he understood by reference to these two predicaments .100 Two differences articulated by Horton are particularly important in illuminating the Zande response ta contradiction which forms the touchstone for the various accounts we are taking up. The first prominent difference concems the theoretical response ta predictive failures manifested by members oftraditional African and modem Westem societies. The reluetance of individuals in pre-scientific cultures to register repeated failures ofprediction, and to respond to snch failures by attacking the theoretical tenets underlying th~ was documented by Evans-Pritchard. Rather than engaging in modification or abandonment of the theory, '40ther current heliefs are utilized in such a way as to 'excuse' each failure as it occurs, and hence to proteet the major theoretical assumptions on which prediction is based. ,,101 This tendency to pro\-;de ad hoc excuses was described by Evans-Pritchard in bis 6eldwork on the Azande, and bas been designated '"secondar)' elaboration." As Evans-Pritchard narrates, the Azande consult diviners and oracles to discern the spiritual forces underlying the occurrence of troublesome or noteworthy events in the physical world. If the course of action recommended by the diviner fails to remedy the original event or situation, adherents of a pre-scientific worIdview may lose faith in the capacities or integrity of the original diviner. They may accordingly decide to consult another expert. However, according to Evans-Pritchard's observations, members of such cultures do not tend to take this as evidence against the existence of the spiritual beings in question, nor do they abandon the belief that it is pos\Ïble to make contact with such beings in the way suggested by the diviners. As Horton exp1ains: In these traditional cultures, questioning of the beliefs on which divining is based and weighing up of successes against failures are just not among the paths that thought can take. They are blocked paths because the thinkers I~orton, ~African and Western," in Wilson (1970): 155. 10lHorton, uAfrican and Western," in Wilson (1970): 162. 195 involved are victims of the closed predicament. For th~ established beliefs bave an absolute validity, and any threat to sueh beliefs is a horrifie threat of ehaos.\~ By contrast, the awareness of alternatives conjoined te the scientifie outlook brings \\oith it a reduced anxiety about threats to the established body of theory, and a correspondingly greater readiness to demote or discard theories and beliefs. The second difference concems the apparent absence of a practioe of exclusively explanatory discourse in mythical societies. Horton notes that aIthough traditional thought bas an essentially rational charaeler, second-order intellectual activities, which represent ret1ections on the nature or rules involved in primary activities of explanation, appear to he virtually absent from such cultures. \03 Primitive societies have their 0\\11 body of interpretive constructs which may take the form of myths, proverbs, or other forms of narrative. However, these construets rarely have explanation as their sole aim. The practice of explanation for its own sake does not appear to be a focus of concem in primitive societies. In Horton's considered view, the theoretical entities oftraditional thought play a role in ordering the chaos of everyday experience, in soIidifying social bonds, and in working out emotional and aesthetic motives. However, he claims that despite the elaborate and often penetrating theoretical speculations advanced in traditional cosmologies, it bas tended to focus upon the task of explanation, rather than ret1ecting upon the nature of this task. Why should 5uch second-order intellectua1 activities he virtually absent from traditional cultures?\04 Horton accounts for titis by drawing attention to certain implications of I02Horton, "African and Westem," in Wilson (1970): 163. 100000s contrast between modem Western and zande thought plays an important role in Charles Taylor's, "Rationality," in Hollis and Lukes (1982). I~e distinction between secondary theory (i.e., theory developed to explain primaJ)* theoretical phenomenal, and second-order concepts (i.e., those concepts which allow us to think about our theoretical construets and categories), must be borne in DÙnd. Not all fonns of secondaI)' theory need include second~rder concepts. 196 'the lack of awareness of theoretical alternatives which he sees as charaeteristic of the ~"closed" predicament. He claims that because the traditional thinker is unable 10 imagine possible alternatives ta her established theories and classifications, she is unable to conunence the fonnulation of generalized nonns of reasoning and knO\\ing. "For only where there are alternatives can there he choice," he explains, "and ooly when there is choice can there by nonns goveming it.,,105 In the open predicament such second~rder activities arise naturally since one mu~ of necessity, make choices between systems of helief. The development or study ofprincipled mies goveming such choices arises spontaneously in this context. ln developing bis own position, Habennas makes pivotai use of Horton's distinction between "open" and ~~c1osed" cognitive predicaments. Recall that Habennas wishes to argue, against the relativist position exemplified by Winch, that the modem form of rationality bas universal validity. His argument for this appeaJs to the intuition that the Zande worldview imposes less exacting standards of rationality and is hence less rational than the mcxiem understanding of the world. In Habennas's view, Horton's study of the Azande demonstrates the incompatibility of mythical thought with the "reflective basic attitude" essential to the development of a scientific outlook. He adopts Horton's characterization of traditional societies as "closed," drawing from Horton's work the conclusion that "the belief in witches exhibits a structure that binds the Zande consciousness more or less blindly to inherited interpretations and does not permit consciousness of the possibility of alternative interpretations ta arise. ,,106 The ~~identity-securing"character of mythical worldviews is linked 10 an immunization against alternative interpretive structures, which stands in sharp opposition to the "readiness to leam" and "openness 10 criticismn which are the hallmark of the scientific spirit. lbis contrast is not based upon understanding Zande magical practices as fonns of 10~orton,"African and Western," in Wilson (1970): 160. 197 protoseience, and hence does not faIl into the error gestured at by Winch in advancing bis charge of "category mistake." This is, rather, a comparison of the fonnal features of two modes of thinking, which seems to establish the advantages of one. Habermas concludes: 'This dimension of 'closed' versus 'open' seems to provide a context-independent standard for the ra!ionality ofwor/dviews...107 This distinction between "closed" and "open" modes of thought lays the foundation of the defense provided by Habennas of the universaI validity ofthe modem understanding of the world. It is hence important to examine its use more closely. Two issues suggest themselves as critical: first, it will be important to inquire as ta the tenability ofthis distinction in light of the anthropological data. 1 shaH consider this by way of examining Horton"s own response to this question, given in a later article. Second, it is essential to give c10ser examination 10 the precise nature of what Horton's research establishes., so as to assess the use which Habennas makes ofit. To foreshadow the central issue, even ifwe grant the truth of Horton"s researcb, it substantiates the superiority of Western modes of thought only in the cognitive-instrumental domain. Further praof will be required to demonstrate the superiority of the modem worldview across the remaining fonnal-pragmatic dimensions. ln bis 1982 essay entitled ''Tradition and Modemity Revisited,"., Robin Horton reconsiders bis earlier scheme of continuities and contrasts in light of its reception by bis peers. 1 am particularly interested in bis reconsideration of the appropriateness of employing the "closed"'/ "open" dichotomy to charaeterise the differences between traditionalist and modemist modes of thought. A number of important criticisms of this dichotomy have been advanced; however, the line of criticism in which 1am most interested focusses upon the implicit contrast made therein between static and d)namic forms of thinking. Many critics have argued, on the 100000bennas. TC4 1: 61. 198 basis ofexamples drawn from both traditional and modern contexts, that the typical traditional worldview is more open ta change and more responsive to extemal influence than Horten had originally portray~ while the seientifie worldview is somewhat less open ta innovation than Horten had eredited. In bis 1982 paper Horton acknowledges the aptness of these eritieisms, agreeing tbat "[t]he Popperian contrast between 'elosecj7 and 'opeñ did cany implications ofa contrast between starie and dynamie thinking, statie and dynamie worldviews," and affinning tbat "sueh a contrast does not do justice either ta the African or ta the Western subjectmatter."IOl There are nonetheless in bis view several important differences between the modes of thought in questiõ and this 50ggests that the distinction between them requires refonnuIation rather than abandonment. Anthropological researeh sheds doubt on the claim that there are necessarily no possibilities of ehoice between alternatives in traditional societies. A "traditionalistie" mode of legitimation of belief is deseribed by Horton as a mode of thought whieh ''treats a belief as valid when it can he shown to be part of the legacy of the ancients." A1though this type of legitimation favours cognitive conservatism to sorne degree, Horton maintains that, in contrast to bis portrayal of the mythical worldview as "elosed," anthropological research bas demonstrated !hat traditional worldviews permit "a high degree of adaptability and responsiveness to ehange."l09 He now agrees with many of bis eritics on the need to distinguish the conservative tendencies wbich result from the emphasis on traditionalistic modes oflegitirnatiõ from the idea that 50ch worldviev..*s are neoessarily "statie" or "closed." Field research supports the claim that the desire to develop adequate responses to experiential challenges presses individuals in traditionalist societies toward cognitive innovation. This l07Habennas, TC4 J: 62. losHonon, "Tradition and Modernity," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 211. l~onon, "Tradition and Modernity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 218-19. 199 innovation is at tintes purely endogenous, and at others involves the rethinking and adaptation of ideas which are originally allen. 110 Horton Donetheless holds there ta he a significant difference in the mode of change in traditionalist versus modem societies. He argues that secondary theory in traditionalist settings tends ta he articulated in a manner which inhibits the development of a plurality of competing theoretica1 frameworks. Instead it appears to he one in which a single theoretical framework is continually embroidered in response ta novel experiences and challenges. Alien concepts and innovations tend to he reworked and integrated into the dominant framework and often in a syncretistic fasbion, rather than splitting offinto confronting frameworks. Horton sums up bis revised vie\\' oftraditionalist thinking by stressing two points: uFirst, despite its conservatism, such thinking bas an essentially 'open' character. Second, it tends to produce and sustain a single over-arching theoretical framework rather than a multiplicity of such frameworks. ni Il Horton's vie\\' of intellectual modemity and of scientific thinking bas also been revised. In '7radition and Modemity Revisited," he stresses the importance which faith in the idea ofcognitive progress bas as a motive force in the development of science and the scientific outlook. Horton now holds that this was something which antedated and formed an essential prerequisite for the development of modem science. The importance to the scientific outlook of developing an "awareness of alternatives" continues to be stressed. Although Horton now recognizes that "not ail plural situations are modem or scientific," 112 he nonetheless maintains the importance ofthis factor in describing the differences between traditionalist and cognitivist modes of thought. He offers two general reasons why inter-theoretic competition should he viewed as a necessary, if not a sufficieñ condition for the flourishing of science. First, he lI~onon, "Tradition and Modemity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 222. Il 1Honon, "Tradition and Modemity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 224. 200 points out that some if not all judgements of theoretical merit depend upon criteria which are relative rather than absolute in nature. A context of competition between alternatives is hence necessary if criteria such as economy, predictive power, and coverage are to be effectively deployed. Second, he notes that supporters of a theoretical paradigm in competition with a rival are motivated ta search out new configurations of experience in the hope that rival theories will he unable ta cape with them as successfully as the supporter~s own theory does. 'Ibis serves as a stimulus ta theoretical advancement. This defence of the importance of theoretical alternatives will he an important theme in the remaining portions of this chapter. In light of these reflections Horton abandons the closedlopen dichotomy. 11ùs does not alter the fondamental claùn in which Habermas is interest~ viz.. that one mode of thought is superior to the other. 1 have nonetheless chosen to drawattention to Horton's refonnulation so as to point up the limitations of Habermas's conception of the mythical, and to stress the desirability ofhis developing a more nuanced understanding ofit. Horton now differentiates cognitive 'b'aditionalism" iTom cognitive '''modemism'' in terms oftwo contrasts which he takes to be basic. These should in tum establish a foundation for explanation of the salient differences between these modes of thought. The first pair of contrasts is between a "traditionalistic" and a "progressivist" concept of knowledge. Whereas a "traditionalistic" concept of knowledge sees the main outlines of its interpretive structures as having been banded down "iTom the ancients," a "progressivistic" concept ofknowledge is one which sees its body of theoretical knowledge as in the process of undergoing graduaI but steady improvement. 11~e phrase is Ernest Gellner's. See Gellner. "Savage and Mode~" in Finnegan and Honon (1973): 167. 201 The second pair of contrasts is that between "consensualn and "competitiven modes of theorizing. A "consensualn mode of theorizing is defined by Horton as one in which aIl members of a community "share a single over-arching ftamework of secondary-theoretical assumptions, and carry out intellectual innovation within that ftamework." In contrast, a "competitive" mode of theorizing essentially involves competition between members of rivals schools of thought promoting frameworks of secondary-theoretical assumptions which are mutally incompatible. The "open"! "c1osed" dichotomy is replaced with contrasts between two pairs of key factors. Horton defines cognitive 'lraditionalismn in terrns of a traditionalist concept of knowledge closely linked to a consensual mode of theorizing. Cognitive "modemism" is defined in terms of the opposing pair of contrasts; that is, in tenns of a "progressivistic" concept ofknowledge conjoined with a "competitive" mode oftheorizing. l13 It is of great relevance to consider how Horton appraises the claim of cognitive "modemism" to possess sorne fonn ofsuperiority over ''traditionalis~''and precisely where he believes this superiority to lie. Horton's own assessment ofwhat bis work bas demonstrated is encapsulated in the following passage: On the question of cognitive superiority, then, our answer must he: it depends on the domain in which the theorizing is being carried out.* "res" in the domain of non-living things. "No" in the domain of human social lift. "Perhaps" in the middle. 114 To paraphrase bis response, Horton believes that the superiority of the fonn of rationality implicit in scientific practice can be defended against relativist critics in the domain of physical nature. He is more guarded in bis assessment of ana1ogous claims in the social sciences. However, in the domain of human social life Horton's considered judgement is that such superiority cannot he c1aimed. He points out that we have much of psychological and social ll~orton, "Tradition and Modemity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 239. ll~orton, "Tradition and Modernity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 249. Myemphasis. 202 value to leam from traditional African systems ofbelief: and much to esteem in the rich quality of experience in such societies. lIS Let us attempt ta place Horton's evaluation in perspective by examining what conditions an account must satisfy if it is to meet the conditions required by Habermas to constroet a developmental logic. As we discussed above, the construction of a sequential ranking of problem-solutions ooly makes sense if the elements ranked can plausibly he construed as solving sufficiently similar problems. A ranking of worldviews along the lines proposed by Habennas cao hence ooly he construeted if it can he shown first, that worldviews represent a variety of solutions ta the same general problems, and second, that the decentered understanding of the world delineates the fonnal structures of rationality which allow these problems to best he solved. The relativist position advanced by WinchR constituted an objection to the first fcature: although it described the goal of the scientific enterprise as that of explanation, prediction and control, in likening Zande magical practices to prayer, it postulated that the goals ofthese practiccs might differ, and hence that the praeticcs themselves he non-eomparable. Horton criticised this approach for flouting the aetor's perspective. He daims that WinchR 's position ignores the traditional aetor's essential interest in developing theories which advance the goals of teehnologica1 and environmental manipulation. He argues that the 11~orton \'\Tites: "As a scientist, it is perhaps inevitable that 1should at certain points give the impression that African thought is a poor, shackled thing when compared with the thought of the sciences." However, he recognises that he bas chosen to spend ms life in still*heavily-traditional Africa rather than in the scientifica1ly-oriented Western subcu1ture in which he was raised. He explains ms choice thusly: .....one certain reason [for this choioe] is the discovery ofthings lost al home. An immensely poetic quality in everyday life and though~ and a vivid enjoyment of the passing mornent-both driven out of sophisticated Western life by the quest for purity of motive and the faith in progress. How necessary these are for the advance of science; but what a disaster they are when they nm wild beyond theiT appropriate boundsf" See Hotton, MAfrican and Western," in Wilson (1970): 170. 1will discuss a potential response by Habennas to this sort of point in the conclusion to this chapter. 203 "traditionalist" himselfmigbt be brought to accept the cognitive superiority ofWestem science in the domain of non-living things, because the defence of this superiority "appea.Is to criteria of efficacy in relation ta goals which have a high priority in his own approach ta the world: explanation, prediction and control. ,,116 Henec in spite of the fact that Hotton argues trom the perspective ofcognitive modemism, he believes that a traditionalist might accept bis response. However, even ifwe accept Horton's argument as it stands, there is no sense in which the defense ofthe universal applicability of scientific rationality in the realm of physical nature leads us to any conclusions about the superiority or lack of superiority of this forrn of understanding in the two other fonnal-pragmatic dimensions. ll7 Recall that the defence of the universality of the modem understanding of the world is based upon the idea that ''the three specialized forms of argumentation (empirical-theoretical, moral and aesthetic) and their corresponding cultural value spheres represent that organization of consciousness \\ithin which knowledge can be most effectively accumulated."118 It bas not yet been sho\\n what contribution the "closed"f "open" dichotomy makes to these domains. As Habermas acknowledges, ''the structures of worldviews detennine a life-practice that is by no means exhausted in cognitive instrumental interaction with extemal reality. Rather, worldviews are constitutive across the whole breadth of processes of understanding and socialization, in l1~ortOn, "Tradition and Modernity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 249. 117One might plausibly add, in a fashion parallel ta Horton's, that finding effective ways of living together is also ofcentral concem ta all humans. Although the domain of social interaction dealing with intelpCrsonaI resolutions ofconfliet identified by Habennas through the term "moralityt1 must play an imponant mIe in all human socïetiest this argument does not as yet show that this domain must be divided from other elements in the ethica1 sphere as Habennas doest nor that il should he given the priority he assigns il. l1'The description is Stephen Whitets. See White (1988): 128. 204 which participants relate as much 10 the orders of their common social world and to the experiences of their respective subjective worlds as 10 happenings in one objective world. n119 Habermas defends universalism in the remaining two fonnal-pragmatic dimensions by supplementing Horton's account. He offers us two lines of support. The first draws upon a series of criticisms by Ernest Gellner of Horton's manner of framing the "closed"! "open" dichotomy in terms of an awareness of alternatives. The second is drawn from studies in the cognitive development of children condueted by Jean Piaget. Before tuming to a direct examination of these accounts 1 should like 10 ernphasise that this is the crucial step in Habennas's arsument. Not even the strong relativist bas seriously <fisagreed tbat, ifa culture's goals are to seek explanatiõ prediction and control of the physical environment, the methods of the natural sciences are superior to those found in mythical warldviews. The debate between Horton and WinchR turned largely upon the question of whether all worldviews could plausibly he seen as having this goal. If we answer with Horton in the affinnative, what we obtain is a means for the evaluation of modes of thought in this dimension a/one. 1 now tum to an exanùnation of the supporting evidence offered by Habennas. Habennas claims that the anthropological studies carried out by Horton and Gellner "fit easily" ioto the fonnal-pragmatic viewpoints by means of which he charaeterised the ~~closedness"of mythical worldviews and the "openness" of the modem understanding of the world. 120 As 1hope ta show, this construal of the data, a1though certainly conceivable, seerns more a matter of sbaping the data to fit the theory than the reverse. R.ecall that Habermas characterises the mythical worldview as closed on two grounds: first, he argues that mythical worldviews fail to differentiate validity spheres in an appropriate manner, and that they hence l1~bennas, TCA J: 62. This corresponds ta "round five" of the six-round debate presented by Habermas. l~bennas. TCA 1: 63-64. 205 do not promote the acquisition of the appropriate fundamental attitudes towards objective7 social and subjective worlds. Secoñ he argues that mythical worldviews demonstrate a lack of ret1exivity in their self-understanding in that they cannot see themselves as cultural traditions. In bis opiniõ archaic worldviews "are Dot understood by members as interpretive systems that are attaehed ta cultural traditions constituted by internai interrelations ofmeaning7 symbolically related 10 reality, and connected 10 "alidity claims-and thus exposed to criticism and open to revision. 7,121 For Habennas's purposes the first clairn, namely that the "open" mode of thought requires the differentiation of three fonnal world concepts7 is the one crucially in need of defence. Two pieces of evidence are provided in its support. The first cornes from the criticisms of Horton ' s characterisation of the differences between open and closed modes of thought advanced by Ernest Gellner. Habennas surnmarises the import of Gellner's stance as follows: "In bis critique of Horton, Ernest Gellner wams that 10 view the "closedness" and "openness" of worldviews in tenns of a 'sense for theoretical alternatives' is to conceive the matter too narrowly. (1) The phenomena thot Horton adduces in this regard cannat be pressed into this single dimension; (2) they coll instead for a more complex system of reftrence that can grasp the simultaneous differentiation ofthree formaI world concepts. ,,122 Clause (l) does indeed express the thesis of Gellner's paper; (2), what conclusions Habennas draws from it. 1 would like to examine the extent ta which Gellner's paper substantiates this conclusion. 121Habennas. TCA J: 52-53. Ifwe align ourselves with Horton's reflective reassessment of the charaeter of mythical worldviews it should be clear that 50ch world\iews are not hennetically sealed conceptual schem~ but are~ rather, open to criticism and revision. However~ on Horton's revised account, members of mythical worldviews do not approach the process of revision in a manner optimal for the explanatiõ prediction and control ofphysical nature. I22Habennas. TCA 1: 63. ltalics and numbers myaddition. 1should note that Gellner's work played an important mIe in pmmpting Horton to revise bis distinctions. 206 Gellner believes there to he important differences between traditional and modem modes ofthought. Howevery he does Dot helieve that Horton's key differentia, the presence or absence of a developed awareness of alternatives, separates these two modes of thought from one another in an acceptable manner. He doubts whether "conceptualloyalty without option" cau he a reasonable way of conceiving the nature of traditional mentality. Gellner points out that the adoption of this criterion would compel us to accept that in traditional societies there cau he "no syncreti~ no doctrinal plu~ no deep treasõ no dramatic conversion or doctrinal oscillation, no holding of alternative belief-systems up one's sleevey ready for the opportune moment of betrayal." He argues that this notion of the nonexistence of piurality in the primitive worldview is implausible, and this forces us to the conclusion that not all plural situations are of necessity scientific. In spite of the existence of theoretical alternatives, members of traditional societies do not transcend their worldviews by developing a scientific mentality, but rather by syncretistic blending of incompatible belief-systems. l23 Conversely, members of a scientific worldviev.* may aIso experience great difficulty in conceiving an alternative to their own favoured world-vision, and this conceptual narrov."Ïng may even he an essential feature of sorne aspects of the scientific enterprise. Gellner nonetheless helieves that the conceptual predicaments identified by Horton contain important elements of truth. He attempts ta charaeterise these predicarnents not in tenns of one key trait, but in terms of a number of interrelated charaeterstics which are attaehed to each syndrome. He argues that to draw forth ooly one trait as the key differentia is arbitrary and misleading, and that what we need is to gain an understanding of all of these. 124 Because our present interest is in the question of whether the transition to an "open" syndrome of thought requires a differentiation of validity spheres a10ng the lines which Habermas 123Gellner. "The Savage and the Modem Mind" in Finnegan and Horton (1973): 166. 207 suggests, 1 will focus on the aspects of Gellner's paper which might support this thesiS. I2S Gellner argues that the traditional thinker simultaneously displays 54a low cognitive division of labour" and 44a proliferation of roles. nl26 He submits that there is a direct link between increasing role-specialisation and the development of scientifica1ly oriented th<,ught. Gellner explains: uft is of the essence of the savage mind, as of savage institutions, that there is a lower degree of functional specificity....The enchanted vision works through the systematic conflation ofdescriptive, evaluative, identificatory, status-conferring etc. raies of language. A sense ofthe separability and fundarnental distinetness ofthe various functions is the surest "'ay to the disenchanttnent of the world." In bis view, as particular roles and institutions become identified with particular ends, the idea gains ascendancy that activity devoted to one end, if it is to achieve its purposes with efficiency, must not he diverted to the service of other emis. This facilitates acceptance of the idea that activity devoted to the end of explanation must he insulated from other ends and desires if it is to he maxirnally successful, which ultimately fosters the growth ofthe autonomous practice of theory. 1 would now like to relate these points back to Habermas's argument. Gellner does indeed argue that the development of the "open" mode of thought cannot he adequately 124Gellner. "Savage and Mode~" in Finnegan and Horton (1973): 169. 12SGellner contrasts the features of the "Savage Mind" \Vith those of the "Scientific Mind" on precisely four points: (1) "The use of idiosyncratic nonns." ln contrast to the practices of modem science. Gellner argues that a traditional belie! system tends to establish one class of entities and occurrences as "nonnal" and another as "abnormal." Only the members of the latter class are viewed as requiring explanation. (2) "The division of labour:' which is discussed al greater length in my text. (3) "The pervasiveness of entrenched clauses." Gellner divides the stock of ideas and convictions held by imy individuaIs or groups into those which "can be denied or replaced without significantly disturbing my total pieture and composure" and "those which can ooly be budged at the cast ofa \Vide disiocation and disturbance." The tenn "entrenched clauses" mers to the latter group. Gellner argues that the sacred or crucial is more extensive, more pervasive, and less neatly dispersed in traditionaI than in modem societies. (4) "The diplomatic immunity of cognition." This refers whether intellectual endeavours are subject to the same kinds of social and moral obligations and sanctions as are other kinds of conduet. Gellner argues that modem socleties demonstrate increasing immunity for cognition from these sons ofconstraints. See Ernest Gellner, "Sa\'age and Mode~.. in Finnegan and Horton (1973). 126Gellner. "Savage and Modem," in Finnegan and Horton (1973): 169. 208 understood soleiy as an evolution along the cog:Utive-instrumental axis. The advantages of the open predicament in cognitive-instrumental thought m~ he believes, he accompanied by increasing specialisation in other spheres. Gellner argues that increasing specificity of functiõ or what he calls increasing cognitive ~'division of labour," is more efficient; hence that the transition to the open syndrome manifests increasing specialisation of thought in different validity spheres. Moreover, he points out that the advantages of specialisation are general: specialisation heightens the efficiency with which any ends MaY be reali~ and not simply the two special ends of explanation and prediction singled out by Horton. 127 To this extent bis work supports Habermas"s position. However, he does not describe this increasing specialisation as Habennas does. Gellner does not postulate the existence of the three validity domains required by Habermas's theory. In fad., the only theoretical account of specificity of function alIuded to by Gellner is positivist in orientation., and does not allow the existence of a validity domain corresponding to a cognitivist ethics. Gellner explains: Thus in one of the best*known fonns of this kind of theory [a theoretical account of specificity of function], propositions are classified into those which stand or fall in virtue of faetual checking, those which stand or faIl in virtue of fonnal calculation, those which stand or falI in virtue of consonance with the speaker's feelings, and those which have no basis or anchorage at all. 128 On this account, moral statements might find their plaee as true in virtue of the utterer's feelings, or be viewed as staternents not admitting of truth whatsoever. Henee, although there is sorne agreement between Gellner and Habermas on the nature of the open predicament and the process of transition toward it, this agreement is far from complete. Gellner's work certainly does not establish that the transition to the open predicament follows a differentiation 127Gellner. "Savage and Modem," in Finnegan and Horton (1973): 169. 128Gellner, "Savage and Modera" in Finnegan and Honon (1973): 173. 209 into precisely the three validity spheres of objectivating thought, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic-expressive capacity proposed by Habermas. Habennas also uses the work of Jean Piaget ta support the idea that the transition to advanced levels of cognitive development requires this differentiation of three validity spheres. Cognitive development as studied by Piaget "refers ta structures of thought and action that the growing child acquires constructively in active confrontation with extemal rea1ity, with processes in the objective world."I29 However, Habermas notes that for Piaget, cognitive development in this narrow or cognitive-instrumental sense forces the child to differentiate extemal and internaI worlds (i.e., the worlds of the child herself versus what lies outside her) and within the category of the external world, ta distinguish actions between subjects and objects from actions between a subject and another subject. Habermas argues on this basis that the higher levels of cognitive development cannot take place in individuals without being accompanied by a pronounced discrimination of various spheres of validity, and hypothesises that a sunilar thing may perhaps he true with respect to worldviews. He writes: Thus for Piaget there is cognitive development in a wider sense, which is not understood solely as the construction of an external universe but also as the construction of a reference system for the simultaneous demarcation of the objective and social worlds from the subjective world. Cognitive development signifies in general the decentration of an egocentric understanding of the world...130 AIthough this speculation may indeed he a fruitful one, it should he obvious that the burden of proof for its substantiation lies with Habermas. Not ooly must he show that Piaget~s undoubted1y impressive studies of cognitive development, initially conducted on oùddle-elass Swiss schoolboys, are of significance to the evolution of societal worldviews, he must also l~nnas. TCA 1: 68. l:J<Habermas. TCA 1: 69. 210 show that the increased differentiation it requires parallels precisely the three validity spheres and world-<:oncepts he bas identified. 1 should like 10 end this section by offering a critical summary of the results of the discussion 50 far. Habennas seeks 10 defend the universal validity of the form of rationality embodied in the modem understanding of the worid. The claim 10 superiority in the cognitiveinstrumenta.l sphere is defended through appeal to Horton's use of the Uclosed"! '''open'' dichotomy. Horten argues that an ~~open" style of thought is superior in the domain of explanation, prediction and control; and moreover, that these goals are of relevance for traditional as weil as modem societies. His formulation of this claim is by no means uncontested. As we saw above, Horton hirnself bas altered bis portrayal of mythical modes of thought. It is likely that as our understanding of traditional societies deepens, further evolution will take place. Nonetheless, if we accept this clairn as it stands, what we obtain is a justification of the superiority of scientific modes of thinking in the dimension of cognitiveinstrumental dealings with physical nature. Horton explicitly distances birnself from the idea that the superiority claimed for the **open" worldview applies to the sphere ofhuman sociallife. However, the position Habennas seeks to uphold requires that an advance be shown to take place in three fonnal-pragmatic dimensions simultaneously. The claim to cognitive-instrumental superiority serves Habermas as a fonn of **motor" onto which the arguments of Gellner and Piaget are attached. Bath Gellner and Piaget suggest, in different ways, that advances in the cognitive-instrumental sphere cannat take place without some advances in other spheres as weIl. However, even ifwe grant Habennas this point, these articles do not themselves suggest that more soplùsticated fonns ofreasoning must take the specifie form outlined by Habermas. To conclude, even ifwe grant Habennas the truth of aIl the articles upon whieh he relies, these articles do not 211 substantiate bis conclusion in any specific way. They can indeed he read in tenns of the schema Habermas sets out, but that is quite a different thing from saying that they themselves suggest this schema. Habennas offers us an account of worldview development which satisfies the requirements of a developmentaI rankîng. Worldviews can on this account be placed in an ordered sequence, where higher stages reflect increases in the differentiatiOD and elaboration of three, and precisely three, validity spheres corresponding to the domains of the cognitiveinstrumental, moral-praetical and aesthetic-expressive. An increase in problem-solving abilities in the cognitive-instrumental sphere must he accompanied by a paralIel increase in the others. Transitions between stages are viewed by Habermas as alterations in the fOIm of reason-giving considered acceptable. As Habennas explains: With the transition to a new stage the interpretations of the superseded stage are, no matter what their content, eategoria11y devalued. It is not this or that reasõ but the kind of reason, which is no longer convincing. A devaluation of the explanatory and justifieatory potentials of entire traditions took place in the great civilizations with the dissolution of the mythological-narrative figures of thought, in the modem age with the dissolution of religious, cosmological, and metaphysical figures of thought. These devaluative shifts appear to he connected \\ith soci~olutionary transitions to new levels of leaming, with which the conditions of possible learning processes in the dimensions of objectivating thought, moraI-practicaI insight, and aestheticexpressive capacity are a1tered. l3l This image of worldview development enables Habermas to order worldviews in a linear fashiõ with the highest stage specified in tenns of the fannal features of the decentered understanding of the world. Yet Habennas does not wish to deny that the transition to modemity bas been accompanied by losses. He believes each movement to a higher level of worldview development, a1though a formai advance in terms of rationality, gives rise ta unprecedented 212 problems at the level of ~~culturalcontents. ~~ It is in the diagnosis of such problems that he sees the value ofWinch~sviewpoint. Habennas argues that the pull or upathos" of Winch ~s article stems from the ability of comparisons with postmodem fonIlS of life 10 iIIuminate the losses in the path of development taken by the modem West. In Habermas~s view the problems of modemity reflect our one-sided focus upon cognitive-instrumentai-as distinct from communicative or aesthetic~ressive-dimensionsof rationality. Reflection on an alien society may help us to become aware ofthis~ and 10 combat il. Habermas asks: Cao't we who belong to modem societies leam something from understanding alternative, particularly premodem fonns of life? Shouldñt we, beyond aIl romanticizing of superseded stages of development, beyond exotic stimulation from the contents of a1ien cultures, recall the losses required by our oYon path 10 the modem world?132 What seems problematic, he maintains, is not scientific rationality itself~ but its hypostatisation. Habermas's own assessment of the results of the rationality debate is twofold. He concludes (a) that "the rationality debate suggests that the modem understanding of the world is indeed based on general structures of rationality" but (b) ~~t modem Western societies prornote a distorted understanding of rationality that is fixed on cognitive-instrumental aspects and is to that extent particularistic. ,,133 1 have sorne general remarks to make conceming these conclusions . The conclusion that the rationality debate demonstrates the universal validity of the fonn of rationality embodied in the decentered understanding of the world is indeed a possible one. 1 would nonetheless like ta draw attention ta its speciticity. Fir~ it rests upon a confluence of positions dra\\n from a particular subset of arguments which have usually been 131Habennas, TC4 J: 68. 132Habennas, TCA J: 66. 213 interdefined tram the start. These arguments support a universalist stance, by no means uncontested, conceming the general applicability of "our" standards of rationality in the cognitive domain. Secoñ this conclusion extraets from the articles studied certain elements which could he construed as supporting Habennas's position. However, they certainly need not he \ooOnstrued as so doing, and were not in fact so constn1ed by their authors. The arguments Habermas offers seem particularly weak at the crucial place; that is, at the point of demonstrating the universal validity of (bis conception of) modem, Westem rationality structures other than the cognitive-instrumental. But this very lacuna is interesting. 1 believe that light is shed upon Habennas's manner of reasoning in a passage from a recent interview, where he discusses the significance of the rationality debate. 1 think the crucial point in this debate is whether we must take account of an as}mmetry that arises between the interpretive capacities of different cultures in virtue of the faet that some have introduced "second-order concepts" whereas others have not. These second-order concepts fulfill necessary cognitive conditions for a culture's becoming self-reflective, that is, for its members' adopting a hypothetical stance toward their 0\\11 traditions and on this basis grasping their 0\\11 cultural relativity. This kind of decentered understanding of the world is charaeteristic of modem societies. What the argument is about. therefore. is whether such cognitive structures represent a threshhold that demands similar processes of /eaming and adaptation ofany culture that crosses if. According to the contextualists, the transition to postmetaphysical concepts of culture and posttraditional conceptions of luw and moraUty is characteristic ofjust one tradition among others and by no means signifies that tradition as such becomes reflexive. 1 don '/ see how this thesis could be seriously defended 1 think that Max Weber was fundamentally right, especially in the careful universalistic interpretation that Schluchter bas given bis thesis of the universal cultural significance of Occidental rationalism. l34 The term "second-order concept" is used to describe those concepts introduced in arder to allow one to think about the interpretive categories of one's worldview. 135 Habennas argues l3~bennas. TCA J: 66. 134Habennas. "Morality. Society and Ethics," in Habermas, J&A: 157-58. My italics. 135AIthough the existence of alternative interpretive possibilities may be a necessary factor in the development of second-order concepts, many have argued, in opposition to Horton'5 view in his 1967 214 that the introduction of such concepts propels us ta advance a10ng the lines set out by bis developmental mode!. He offers us a choice of seeing the move towards retlexivity in Western modemity as of 00 significance beyond the confines of our cultural worldview, or as the endpoint of a path of development which all cultures must eventually foUow if they acquire second--order concepts. 1 believe that Habermas, through neglecting a range of viable positions different from bis õ bas constructed a false dichotomy. Moreover, 1 would suggest that it is because he cannot see how the opposing thesis of the dilemma he construets '~could he seriously defended" that he is somewhat precipitate in coocluding in favour of bis own view. 1 shaH next look al one such alternative. 4.53 Contextualist Non-Relattvism We have 50 far examined t\\'o lines of response to the question of whether the magicaJ practices of the Azande sbould he regarded as rational. The pbenomenon wbich serves as the focal point of this discussion is the apparent disinterest manifested by the Azande in certain potential contradictions inherent in their system of beliefs, as documented by Evans-Pritchard in bis field researches. Their disinterest seems to violate our sense of the importance of acknowledging sucb contradictions: it seems intuitively to cali into question the rationality of article, that such possibilities do exist even in primitive societies. Moreover, bath alternative interpretive possibilities and second~rderconcepts have previously existed and do presently exist in world civilizations other than our o\\n. To say this is not to deny that there may be significant differences between the modes of thought of these cultures and ourõ or to deny the extent to which our culture is a theoretical one. This point will be taken up in J4.6. See Gellner "Savage and Mode~" in Finnegan and Horton (1913) for the view that there are alternative interpretive 215 this worldview. Notwithstanding this perception, Peter Winch argues that to assess the rationality of these practices by the standards of Westem science constitutes a Ucategory mistake. n According ta Winc~ Zande notions of witchcraft "do not constitute a theoretical system in tenns of which Azande try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world. ,,136 The Iack of interest shawn by the Azande in pressing contradictions which seem central 10 us should hence he seen not as a sign of lesser rationality on their part, but rather as an indication that they are engaged in a different language game from our own. It would hence he a mistake, he argues, to assess them in the sarne way. But wherein does the erraI' lie? Horton and Habermas offer us a c1ear response ta this query. They interpret Winch as a strong relativist who views Zande magical rituaIs as a pure form of expressive activity akin to our practices of prayer, and thus as entirely distinct in aim and form from our scientific practices. Because these practices do not share the same goals they cannot, WinchR argues, he assessed by the same criteria. They hence cannot he ranked relative ta one another in terms of rationality. Nonetheless, as Horton and Habennas point out, this stance seems somewhat irnplausible. It is clear that the flourishing of crops is of central importance to the Azande, for it is c10sely ried to their well-being. 137 Horton emphasises the raie attributed by the Azande to magical rituaIs in fostering crop groY/th. As against the position taken by WinchR he stresses the continuities in aim between magical and scientific modes of thought. By demonstrating the saliency of the goals of explanation, prediction and control for eacl~ he paves the way for the defence of the superiority ofthe scientific. It may seem that a deep understanding of the phenomena associated \\ith Zande magical practices still eludes us. In bis essay entitled "Rationa1ity," Charles Taylor suggests possibilities even in primitive cultures. and Horton's response to this daim in Borton.. "Traditional and Modem." in Hollis and Lukes (1982). J36Winch. "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 93. 216 that ta argue in terms of this sort ofcoñ that is, to understand primitive religion as fully analogous either to our practices of science, or ta our practices of prayer, is to he insufficiently radical in our critique ofethnocentricity.138 Zande magical practices do not fit easily into either of these classifications, Taylor argues, precisely because the Azande do not make these distinctions as we do. Recognising and coming ta tenns with this fact is the central challenge of cross-eultural understanding. The reaJ challenge is ta see the incommensurability, to come to understand how their range of possible aetivities, that is, the way in which they identify and distinguish activities, differs from ours. As Winch says, "we do not initially have a eategory that looks at ail like the Zande category of magic"; but this is not hecause their magic is concemed with ends quite foreign to our society, hut rather hecause the ends dejined in if cut across ours in disconcerting ways. Really overcoming ethnocentrlctty ;s being able to undersland IWo incommensurable classifications .139 1 next consider a response to the controversy raised by Winch's charge of "category mistake" which takes as central the phenomenon of "incommensurable classification" described by Taylor. Although 1 do find this approach to cross-cultural understanding more iIluminating than the previous two, 1should emphasise that my primary aim in this section is to demonstrate the existence of a plausible alternative or "middle-ground" ignored by Habennas. 1will develop an account ofthis third position in two parts. 1first draw from Winch's article an alternative reading of what is involved in the process of cross-cultural understanding, which stresses the challenge involved in understanding a society whose mode of classification does not map simply onto our own. Although 1do believe this to he a more accurate rendering of Winch's position, nothing bangs on the resolution of this textual issue. 1 then argue, drawing principally upon Taylor's article, that this position does not preclude our making 137This point is made by Winch in "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 103. 13B.raylor, "Rationality," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 94. See also 1. C. larvie and Joseph Agassi. "The Problem of the Rationality of Magïc," in Wilson (1970): 172-193 for a discussion of the fonn of explanation appropriate to magical aets. 217 defensible judgements of superiarity across worldviews, and that the superiority of Westem natural science in the reaIms of explanatiõ prediction and control of physical nature may constitute such a judgement. Nooetheless, the conditions involved in making such judgements of superiority do Dot fulfil the criteria required for the construction ofa developmental logic. 1 should Iike ta initiate the discussion by reconsidering Winch's reasons for viewing Evans-Pritchard's approach ta the assessrnent of Zande magical practices as framing a Ucategory mistake." Winch sometimes describes the error in question as one of mistaking 'lhe point" of our activity of science for "the point" of their magical rituals. This seems to me crucial. l40 One way of understanding this claim is ta view these activities as having "points" or goals entirely unrelated ta one another, and hence oot as susceptible of evaluation by the same criteria. This is the sense emphasised in the relativist reading of Winch which we considered in 14.51. However, 1 believe that Winch vie\\'s the aims ofthese activities as rather more intricately interrelated. In Taylor's phrase, the ends defined in the Zande practice of magic may "eut across ours in disconcening ways. ,,141 The intuition Winch is pursuing is that any judgement of whether a particular actor is rational in a gjven context depends crucially upon what one is trying to achieve in that context. An example may help to c1arify his point. 142 Many Britons enjoy solving crossword puzzles, and expend considerable time and effort in the attempt. Yet the solutions could often be much more expeditiously acquired, sirnply by tuming to another section of the newspaper, or by looking for the solution key in the back of the book. It may seem that the tremendous exertion demonstrated by the crossword solver is highly irrational, or al least gravely misplaced. 13~aylor. "'Rationality," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 94. Myemphasis. 1'"1 owe my appreciation of the irnponance for Winch of "'seeing the point of the activity" to Da\id Davies. 141Taylor. "Rationality," in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 94. 1421owe this example to David Davies. His deli\'ery is. regrettably. inimitable. 218 However, to make this judgement would he ta misapprehend the point of solving crossword puzzles. It represents the goal of the game as finding solutions rather than, perhaps, testing one's knowledge, whiling away tirne in the daily commute free of the obligation ta discuss with one's neighbour, or matching wits with a friend who a1so does the puzzle. This is not 10 say that finding solutions is not a goal of the game in question, only that it is not the exclusive goal in tenns ofwhich the game should he understood. It seems ta Winch that our attempts to evaluate Zande magical rituaIs in tenns of criteria drawn from the practice ofnatura! science may reflect our having as yet failed ta grasp the point of these rituals. This is particularly likely because the Azande do not appear to possess categories corresponding ta our categories of science and non-science. Moreover, we do not al present have a category resembling that of Zande magic. ~~Since is we who want to understand the Zande category," Winch argues, "it appears that the ODUS is on us to extend our understanding 50 as ta make room for the Zande category, rather than to insist on seeing it in tenns of our own ready-made distinctions between science and non-science. ,,143 The magical rituals of the Azande cannat he comprehended in terms of our preexisting categories, but instead require us to extend these categories in novel ways. What needs ta he clarified is how such an extension of understanding can be possible. To do 50 will require that we explore Winch's conception ofrationality more fully. The connectian between rationality and "seeing the point of the activity" is an essential one far Winch. In 14.3 we saw that Winch defines rational hehaviour as behaviaur involving confonnity to rules or nomlS. Moreover, he distinguishes two senses of the term "rationality," the "fonnal" and the "substantive." In our quest to detennine whether Zande magical praetices are rational we appeal in the first instance to the formaI requirement that rational behaviour 219 have something to do with acting unifonnly or consistently; that is, with acting in the same way in similar circwnstances. Yet the difficulty arises that ail circumstances can be viewed as similar ta one another in sorne respect. One might view two randomly chosen events, a car crash and a concert, for example, as similar to one another in that bath took place on a Tuesday, or in that both commence with the letter "c". What we require, then, is a principled way of determining which similarities are relevant and which are note Judgements of sameness or identity are hence necessarily relative ta sorne mIe which specifies substantive criteria for detennining what is ta count in judging two events ta he qualitatively similar, what is to count as uconfonnity ta a norm" in this case. In sum, we ascertain that the fonnal condition of rationality is met by testing whether the hehaviour in question manifests a high degree of internal coherence or ooncontradiction. However, in order ta adduce whether the condition of confonnity ta a norm bas been met, one must have access ta the substantive specification of the mIe used in this context as weil. 144 Furthermore, rules goveming specific practices, such as the rules for consultation of the poison oracle, "rest upen a social context of common aetivity. ,,145 In arder for an individual ta follo\,,* a ruIe, she must he able ta apply the rule correctIy to new cases. However, her ability ta "go on" appropriately requires that she have sorne sense of the point of the activity governed by this mIe. This in tum suggests that rules cannot be understood in isolation from one another. l46 Ta understand a role, Winch daims, is ta understand the social 143Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 102. 144Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 93. 14sWinch, "The Idea ofa Social Science," in Wilson (1970): 2. l~S point reflects the central place which Wittgenstein's reflections on the logica1 grammar of rules occupy in Winch's thought. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein argues that any mie can be interpreted in an infinite number ofw3Ys. In J185, he gives the example of someone who extends 3 numerica1 series beyond 1000 wrongly, through misappl~ing the rule 'Add 2.' 220 intercourse into which it enters. What we require is an understanding of the place of the aetivity onder investigation in the overlapping nexus of practices which together constitute the life fonn. This will ultimately require us to see how this particular activity draws its sense from conceptions of what is valuable, important or worth striving for in human life. Understanding the rituaI activities surrounding the Zande poison oracle will in the end necessitate our acquiring a sense ofwhat the Azande hold to he important in human life. Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond l000-and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done!"-He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!"-He answers: "Yes. isn't it right'r' 1thought that was how 1was meant to do il."--or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But 1went on in the same way." Il would now he no use to say: "But can't you see....?"-and repeat the old examples and explanations.-In snch a case we Inlght say, perhaps: It comes natura! to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and sa on." A rule is often viewed as a guarantor of truth. a way of ruling out such misapplications. However. as Wittgenstein demonstrates, even very aberrant modes of continuing the series can be made out to accord \\-lth sorne Me. Moreover, past applications of a rule can never detennine which of the possible interpretations is correct. These reflections are encapsu]ated in the "sceptica1 paradox" presented in 1201 of the Investigations. where Wittgenstein writes: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule. because every course of action can be made out to accord with a ruIe." The issue of how Wittgenstein resolves this paradox is itself highly controversial, which adds additionaJ difficuIties to the interpretation of Winch. In .1202 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasises that "obeying a mIe is a practice." Although it is clear that this is meant to undercul the Platonist or metaphysicaJ reading of how one fo11ows a rule. it is less clear wbat alternative view Wittgenstein himself suppons. There are two important currents 1would like to mention, bath of which take seriously the idea thal misapplications of rules committOO by the individual rule-follower can be identified by appeal to the standards of the community in which the individual rule-follower is situated. The first, given by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Ru/es and Private Language. sees Wittgenstein as arguing that deviant or incorrect applications of rules can be identified based on the agreement ofa community. Il makes no claim that the communily as a whole is either right or wrong. for. it argues, there is no sensible way in which this can be judged. This reading seems to me generally to support the position identified with Wincht in 14.51. However, d. Winch's account of mle-following in chapter one of The Idea ofa Social Science (Humanities Press, 1958). 1favour an alternative reading of Wittgenstein. which gives a more nuañ and less radically relativistic, account of rus constructivism. See e.g. the works on Wittgenstein by G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, especially Scepticism, Ru/es and Language. See aise S.G. Shanker, Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy ofMathematics (Croorn Helm, 1987). A nomber ofoutstanding papers on the issue of rule-following are collected in Wittgenstein: To Fol/ol'.' a Rule, 00., Sleven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). 221 We can summarise by saying that rational behaviour is behaviour involving confonnÏty.to norms. However, we regard what is consist differently ftom the Azande: we adopt different rules specifying different criteria of what makes sense. This is another way of saying that the standards of rationality in different societies do not a1ways coincide. The problem of understanding the institutions of an alien society can hence be viewed as that of bringing into alignment with one another two different ruIe.govemed systems initially baving different standards of rationality. Winch describes this as the task of bringing the Zande conception of intelligibility ioto relation with our 0\\11. This process requires us to extend our way oflooking at things. ...we have to create a new unitY for the concept of intelligibility, having a certain relation to our old one and perhaps requiring a considerable realignment ofour categories. We are Dot seeking a state in which things will appear to us just as they do ta members of [a society] S, and perbaps such a state is unattainable anyway. But we are seeking a way of looking at things which goes beyond our previous way in that it bas in sorne way taken account ofand incorporated the other way that members of S have of looking at things. Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our o\\n- -not simply to bring the other way within the already existing boundanes of our o\\'n, because the point about the latter in their present fonn is that they ex hypothesi exclude that other. 147 1would like to make two points about the notion of extension Winch proposes. First, Winch's position presupposes that reasoIt, although always embodied in specific practices, is never exhaustively defined by them. As Putnam emphasises, reason transcends the limitations of its employment within given praetices. Rule-following is, therefore, never blind "application"; it bas an open quality which makes possible reasoned extensions of existing categories. 148 In seeking to understand an alien praetice we hence need not, and in fact must not, simplyapply 10 this practice criteria dra",n from our existing categories. 149 147Winc~ "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 99. 148Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 96. J*~inc~ "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 99. 222 Second, a1though any attempt ta understand an alien practice must begin from our categories, it is not obvious which fumishes the best point of departure for such an endeavour. Winch proposes that we regard the praetice of Zande magic as analogous ta our practice of prayer in that they both express an "attitude towards contingencies," a way ofcoming to terms with and moving beyond different asPeCtS of human vulnerability and misfortune. This analogy may not he satisfactory in ail respects. Specifically, if the Zande categories are truly different from our own it may (and indeed should) fail to exhaust the goals of this practice. However, the analogy illuminates features of Zande magic, such as its links to individual processes of reflection or to social relations, which may he neglected when the relation of magical rites to consumption is the primary point of reference. ISO Making sense of the practices of an a1ien culture requires that we come to understand the point of these practices in the life of that society as a whole, and this can ooly be done by leaming how they view the significance of hurnan life. What we may learn by studying other cultures are not merely possibilities of different ways of doing things, other techniques. More importantly we may leam different possibilities of making sense of hurnan life, different ideas about the possible importance that the carrying out of certain activities may take on for a man, trying to contemplate the sense ofhis life as a whole. lsl What we can leam from the study of an alien culture, beyond new "techniques," are h new possibilities ofgood and evil" in relation to which hurnan beings may come 10 terms \\ith their lives. That is why leaming from an alien society is, for Winch, connected \\ith the acquisition ofwisdom. One might ask how it is possible to grasp such possibilities; that is, ho\\" we are to relate our conceptions of good and evil to those found in the other society if: by hyPOthesis, lSOWinch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 106. ISIWinch, "PrimitÎ\:e Society," in Wilson (1970): 106. 223 they do not initially coincide. Winch responds to this query by stressing that the conception of human Iife involves oertain limiting notions which have an ethical dimension, and which detennine the uethical space~~ in which the possibilities of good and evil can he exercised. Notions of birth, death and sexual relations occupy a oentral position in ail hWlWl societies~ aIthough their significanoe and the practioes surrounding them may vary considerably. A society's ethical notions develop around these conoems, among others, and its institutions give expression to them. Winch suggests that we attend to the raIe played by these concepts in investigating an alien society. They serve ta provide "a basis on which understanding may he built. ,,152 Winch's article foc:usses on Ûle difficulties of making rational comparative judgements of superiority across groups. As a result, many have viewed him as denying that such judgements are possible. This is clearl)' a non sequitur. Vet because Winch does not address himself directly to this issue~ bis position is difficult ta determine. 1suspect that bis emphasis on the difficulties of making cross"'Cultural judgements is set rather more by bis choioe of opponent than by the desire to develop a positive programme of cross-eultural understanding in wbich such judgements are, in principlet absent. This choice of opponent may in tum reflect where he perceives the greatest-as opposed to the only-risk of error to lie. But these are points of tex1ual dispute, and engaging them is not my primar). interest. As my goal is to sketch a plausible philosophical position ignored by Habermas, 1would like to supplement the account of cross<ultural understanding developed in the reading of Winch with a compatible account describing how rational judgements ofsuperiority may he made cross-eulturally.153 152Winch, "Primitive Society," in Wilson (1970): 107-11. 15~y understanding of Wittgenstein-inOuenced "1heories of the middle ground" as a concept in politica1 philosophy bas been greatly enhanced by the work ofJames Tully. Tullyapplies Wittgensteinian notions directIy to the study ofHabermas in "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," in Po!itico! Theory, 17,2 (1989): 172-204. My present way ofthinking about these issues reflects bis 224 In the article URationality," Charles Taylor takes up the question of whether the disinterest in resolving potential theoretical contradictions in their system of beliefs manifested by the Azande is a sign of titis system's lesser rationality. The pieture of cross~ltural understanding which he presents closely resembles the one sketehed in the discussion of Winch above; however, Taylor's account departs from Winch's in stressing that the existence of a plurality of standards of rationality does not undermine our ability to make cross~ultural judgements ofsuperiority. In faet, Taylor cIaims, "1 believe the kind ofpluraiity we bave here, between the incommensurable, precisely opens the door ta such judgements.,,154 1 would like ta trace the main contours ofTaylor's position by unpacking titis somewhat enigmatic cIaim. As we saw above, Taylor regards the central challenge of cross-euiturai understanding as that of seeing and doing justice to the phenomenon of "incommensurability." This term is used in a confusing number of ways in the rationality debate; hence, 1would like to underscore its role in !bis article as a tenn ofart. ISS The term "incommensurability" is drawn from ancient approach. Much ofTuIly"s work focusses on showing the merits ofa Wittgensteinian approach in thinking about cultural diversity. Ofespecial interest in this regard are "Diversity's Gambit Declined," in Constitutiona/ Predicament: Canada afler the Referendum of1992. ed. Curtis Cook (McGill-Queens University Press, 1994): l49-98~ and Strange A-fultip/icity: Constilutiona/ism in an age ofdiversity (Cambridge, 1995). lS+raylor, "Rationality." in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 105. ISSOue to the controversies SUlTounding the use of the tenn "incommensurability" in varions fields of philosophy, 1would like to emphasise that Taylor does not use the tenn Kincommensurabilitf' to describe a situation of complete non-comparability between the entities in question. The tenn "incommensurability" was used by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure ofScientific Revolutions to caIl into question the prevalent conception of science as an enterprise ofcumulative progress. By drawing upon varions historical examples of theory change, Kuhn focussed attention upon the Klack of fif' between the categories ofone paradigm and thase ofanother. An example derived from the dispute between Aristotelianism and Copemicanism will help to clarify Kuhn's meaning. The Aristotelian astronomer refened to the sun as a planet, whereas the convert to Copernicanism deDies that this is so. What Kuhn wants to bring out in bis description of the phenomenon ofuincommensurability" is the faet that this situation is misunderstood ifviewed only as a disagreement about how the tenn "planet" should be applied. Rather, it marks a shift in basic conceptual beliefs about the cosmos, in the following sense. In antiquity, observers recognisedjust !Wo sorts of celestial bodies, planet and stars. Planets were distinguished from stars by severa! features: "They tended to be brighter than stars, to appear only in the zodiacal region of the hea\'ens. and to sbine more steadily than the t\\inkling stars. More salient still, though stars and planets moved steadily together in westward circles around the celestial pole, planets possessed an additional 225 Greek mathematics, where il was used to specify the relationship between two quantities which possessed no common measure. For example, the relation between the radius and circurnference of a circle is one of incommensurability, since there is no unit which each contains sorne integraI number oftimes. Wbat wc who embark on the project ofcross-cultural understanding wish ta do is ta come to sec how ~'the way in wbich they identify and distinguish aetivities differs front ours.,,156 The phenomenon of "Iack of fit" between the categories of different cultures or worldviews appears to present an analogous barrier to oomparison: we ~ at least initially, ta lack recourse ta a common basis which would allow us to fully and precisely state all components ofboth theories. The tenn "incommensurability" points to the fàct that the aetivities in question are not simply diffèrent, but rather "incompatible in principle." Taylor distinguishes aetivities which are incompatible in principle from thase which are incomPatible in practice. Aetivities which are incompatible in practice are those which, as a matter of~ could not bath be carried out at the same rime. He gives as an example of this the attempt simultaneously to play football and chess. Our inability to do bath seems to reflect ooly our physical and mental limitations. The nature of the incompatibility is different in the case ofactivities whose defining mIes are in much slower eastward motion through or among the stars." T.f. Kuhn, "The Presence of Past Science," delivered as the Shearman Memorial Lectures, University College, Landon, 1987, 44. Relying jointly upon these features, the Greeks determined the sun to be a planet. Nor were they wrong to do 50. In order to demonstrate the superiority of the Copernican positiõ the Copenùcan must show !hat her conoeptual scheme nwks an epistemic gain aver the Aristotelian 's, and this issue, Kuhn claims, cannot be resolved internally to the Aristotelian paradigm, nor solely in the tenninology of the Copemican. Philosophers have found it notoriously difficult to gain a clear theoretical conception of the phenomenon described by Kuhn. PutnaIn, for example, interprets Kuhn as advancing a radical and self-refuting form of relativism. According to Putnam, "The incommensurability thesis is the thesis !hat tenns used in another culture, say, the tenn ~emperature" as used by a seventeenth-eentury scientist, cannot be equated in meaning or reference with any terms or expressions we possess." For Putnam, what Kuhn bas failed to see is that "[t]o tell us that Galileo had "incommensurable" notions and then to go on to describe them at length is totally incoberent." HiIaryPu~ Reason. Truth and History, (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 114-15 Altbough this seems to me a rather foroed reading ofKuhn's position, the controversies surrounding the use ofthis term make it important to attend to Taylor's own description of il. 226 tension. As Taylor explains, " ...when we come to soccer and rugby football, we bave two activities which are incompatible in principle. For the ruIes which partly define these games prescribe actions in contradiction to each other. Picking up the bail and running with it is against the rules of soccer." Incommensurable activities can hence he defined as thase whose constitutive rules ''prescribe in contradiction ta one another."IS7 Taylor argues that aetivities govemed by constitutive rules which prescribe in contradiction ta one another are rivaIs. These activities overlap in complex ways~ they MaY share sorne of the same goels, and yet advocate different courses of action. The difficulty in comprehending how magical rituals and heliefs in a traditional society such as that of the Azande MaY relate 10 some of our own practiccs derives from precisely this quality; they are neither identical 10 our practices, nor are they simply different from them. We cao imagine Azande practices which might he simply different from our own, for example, their games or passtimes. However, magical practices seem te pose a different sort of challenge. Zande magic is neither purely expressive aetivity like prayer, nor does it fàll exclusively into the category of science and teehnology. It shares aims bearing a resembIance to each, and likely others unique 10 itself. One cannot simultaneously he a practitioner of Zande magic and of Westem science. As Taylor puts the point, "they are different, yet they somehow occupy the same space."lS8 The Most noteworthy difference which Taylor sees between Zande society and our own is that we bave an activity of exclusively theoretical understanding. This fonn of activity, which aims 10 develop expIanations for their own sake, bas no counterpart among the AzandelS6yaylor, "Rationality," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 94. !S7Taylor, "Rationality," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 98. lsa,-aylor. "Rationality," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 99. 227 it does not appear to he a focus of concem among them. IS9 According to Taylor, theoretical unclerstanding aims at developing an understanding of reaIity independent of our quotidian concems. When we engage in theorising, 44[w]e are DOt trying to understand things merely as they impinge on us, or are relevant to the purposes we are PUl"SUÏn& but rather grasp them as they are, outside the immediate perspectives of our goals and desires and aetivities." Taylor calIs the perspective we take on in this sort oftheorising Udisengaged." The irony is, of course, that this disengaged perspective bas had a tremendous technologica1 pay~ff. Entering inta such an explanatory discourse requires that we leam to distinguish the disengaged perspective from our ordinary mode ofengagement, and that we see it as offering a view of reality which is in some sense superior. These heliefs are not found in every culture and this, Taylor argues, ')nakes for an immense difference in the things we think and say."I60 What Winch appears to he asking is whether we can, with legitimacy, judge an atheoretical culture by the standards of a theoretical one. Taylor recognises that the complex relationship between the practioes in question renders such a judgement difficult. However, because these practices are incommensurable we are, he believes, irresistibly drawn to compare them. But how is such comparison possible? Since the two groups do not initially share the same standards of rationality and the practices in question do not share identica1 goals, there is no way to establish the tenns of the comparison in advance. Ta do so, it is argued, would in the nature of things he ta judge in tenns acceptable to ooly one culture. We must hence eschew the view "that there is sorne common criterion by which one is proved inferior 10 the other, ifthat implies sorne criterion alreadyacoepted by both sides.,,161 What we need 10 do is rather to construct criteria acceptable to serve as the basis of such a judgement. The criteria lS~inHonon also insists on the imponance of this contrast. See 14.52 above, and also Honon, ~African and Western," in Wilson (1970): 159-60 especially. l~aylor. &4Rationality." in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 89. 228 will necessarily be specifie to the case at band. However, Taylor does illustrate how a comparative assessment of the virtues of one particular theoreticaI cuIture~r own-against tbat of the Azande might run. l62 He argues that the speâaCUlar teclmologica1 successes achieved in modem scientific culture can serve as the basis for generating mutually recognised criteria because they "command attention and demand explanation." These successes are difficult to ignore, Taylor argues, even if such teclmological control were not at the OUtset a highly valued goal of the other culture. The presence of an obtrusive success challenges bath parties to account for it. This process resembles how the superior explanatory ability of a seientifie theory in one area challenges its rivais, on pain of losing credibility, ta develop their OWD persuasive explanations of it. What we have here is not an antecedently accepted common criterion, but a facet of our activity-here the connection between scientific advance and teehnological pay-off-whieh remains implicit or unre<x>gnized in carlier views, but which cannot be ignored once realized in practice. The very existence ofthe technolosical advance forces the issue. In this way, one set of practiccs can pose a challenge for an incommensurable interlocutor, not indeed in the language of this interlocutor, but in tenns the interlocutor cannat ignore. 163 The account for this success given by modem natura! science bas the virtue of simplicity; with respect to physical nature, it bas greatly advanced our understanding. ft is not clear what sort ofaccount the Azande could provide in lieu ofsuch explanations. 1 would like ta complete this very brief sketch by making a few points about the programme for deveIoping cross~ultural judgements proposed by Taylor. First, unIike Habermas's approach, which sets out fonnal criteria for making judgements of superiority 161Taylor, "Rationality,n in Hollis and Lukes (1982): 103. l~aylor's papcr does not focus exclusively on the case ofthe Azande. He gives a detailed and subtle argument showing the superiority for understanding nature of the "disengaged" stance of modem natural science which eschews human "projectionsn onto the cosmos, as contrasted with the "engaged" approach to understanding reality, round in an earlier phase ofour European culture, 229 drawn from the decentered understanding of the world in advance of the case, on Taylor's account, criteria for making judgements of superiority must emerge a posteriori. The establishment of these criteria is likely ta he bath difficuh and controversial, as it requires the bringing into aligmnent of two outlooks initially incommensurable. Yet because reason is viewed as capable of extending itself beyond its original CODtext, the establishment of sueh criteria is theoretically possible, aIthough its feasibility and success in any given case are not guaranteed. Secoñ the sorts ofjudgements of superiorlty will always he comparative. As Robin Horlon argued in bis discussion of mythical and modem modes of though~ much of the importance of developing theoretical alternatives resides in the fact that many judgements of theoretical merlt are relative rather than absolute in nature. l64 Criteria successfully esta.blished and brought ta bear would issue in judgements of the form '''view 'b' is better than 'view a'," in a specified dimension. It would nõ by contrast, license any elaim ta have established that 'view b' is the best, simp/iciter. Finally, judgements of superiority need not all fall together. Whereas Habermas presents a pieture on whieh advances in rationality should he seen as taking place simultaneously in three domains, Taylor explieitly allows for the possibility that there may he judgements telling in the other direction as well. l65 One might imagine judging a traditional form of life ta be superior ta our own in its hannony with the lived environment, for instance, or in the domains of aesthetie development, psyehological or social integration, etlùcal which views the world as meamngfulI)" ordered. Sec Taylor, "'RationaIity," in Hollis and Lukes (1982). J~aylor, "'Rationa1ity," in HoUis and Lukes (1982): 104. 164In arder to substantiate this point, Honon refers to wark in the history and philosophy of science by Larry Laudau, Imre Lakalos and Paul Feyerabend. Sce Honon "Tradition and Modemity,» in HoIIis and Lukes (1982): 225-26. 165oy'aylor, "RationaIity," in HoIlis and Lukes (1982): 101. 230 development or sorne other aspect entirely. 1 will consider a possible rejoinder by Habermas to this point in the conclusion ta this chapter. At this juncture 1 would like to note that the manner of conceiving cross-eultural comparison proposed here does not confonn 10 the requirements of a developmental logic. Judgements of superiority can indeed be made; however, the tenns of the contrast cannot be set in advance. Because the establishment of these terms will require an expansion ofour way of thinking, and because the judgements may not tell ail in one direction, they are unsuitable for the sort of linear ranking tequired by a developrnental model. 4.6 Conclusion My primary object in this chapter bas been ta exhibit Habennas's method for ranking the rationality ofworldviews, and 10 elucidate its philosophical underpinnings. 1 have attended particularly ta the role played by the concept of a developmental logic. In so doing 1 have hoped bath to clarify what philosophical commitments its implementation presupposes, and to open the way for a consideration ofother ways of viewing differences manifested in the modes ofthought characterising different worldviews. The notion of a developmental logic is an essential one in Habennas's programme ta establish a universalist ~c, as it a1lows Habennas ta use empirica1 reconstructions ta support the daim that the rationality structures associated with discourse ethics are the outeome of a cumulative path of leaming valid species-wide. However, these reconstructions seemed in a pUlzling sense 10 presuppose the truth of precisely what Habermas wished ta demonstrate: the superiority of (Habermas's reading of) the rationality structures ofthe Western worldviev.*. 231 Recall that a cognitive-developmental model is composed of a series of stages viewed as fonning a c:onceptual hierarchy, where each stage represents a higher or more adequate level of problem-solving in the sphere under investigation. These stages are arranged in an asoending sequence 10wards an apex or optimum. The selection of this apex is of crucial importance in defining the path of development as a wbole. As Carol Gilligan observes, "a concept of development...hangs from ifs vertex of maturity, the point ta which progress is traced." Rather than building upwards &om a base, the construction of a developmental account begins from the top down, and is particularly sensitive to variations in the specification ofthis optimum. Gilligan argues that "'a change in the definition of maturity does not simply alter the description of the bighest stage but recasts the understanding of development, changing the entire account. ,,166 This observation seemed to point up a difficulty for Habennas. As we noted in Chapter 3, the empirical stage models employed in support of bis theory seem invariably to draw their specification of the optimum point from Habermas's understanding of what is essential to the fonn of rationality implicit in the worldview of Western modernity. 1 asked whether there might not he alternative images ofmaturity in various domains such as those of cognition or morality, from which new paths of development might conceivably he sketched. Although this question poses itself in various ways from within our own cultural horizons, 1 was particularly concemed about this possibility as it relates 10 other cultures. 1 maintained that Hahennas he required 10 provide a conceptual defence of bis use of the modem Western worldview 10 define the terminal point of bis developmental sequences, and thereby 10 establish the criteria used 10 interpret and assess empirical data. 166Gilligan (1982): 18-19. 232 The rationality debate seemed to pose a particularly pertinent chaUenge to Habennas's programme. It raises the possibility tbat standards of rationality may vary between worldviews; this possibility bas the potential ta undereut Habennas's attempt ta demonstrate the universal significance of the form of rationality implicit in the Western worldview. As 1 argued in 15.52, Habennas eodeavours ta surmount this challenge by reading this debate in tenns of a dichotomy: he maintains that one shouId either sec worldviews as fully commensurable with respect to rationality structures, or abjure rational comparison entirely. He argues moreover that the latter option is highly implausible. In its place Habennas presents a picture of worldview development which satisfies the requirements placed upon a developmental account. This account places worldviews in a sequence ordered in terms of their approximation to certain formai features of rationality, with mythical worldviews at the base and the modem, Western worldview at the apex. Higber stages reflect increases in the differentiation and elaboration of three, and precisely three, validity spheres corresponding to the domains ofthe cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical and aesthetic-expressive. Although Habennas's view represents one possible reaction to the rationality debate, 1 have attempted 10 illustrate its SPeCificity by showing that there are other viable alternatives. This seems to me an essential step in clarifying Habermas's proposai for the justification of the validity of discourse ethics universally, an issue ta which 1 will retum in Chapter 5. At this juneture 1would like simply to point out that our discussion bas touched on several proposais for making rational comparisons of worldviews in addition 10 Habermas's own. Robin Horton advocates cognitive but not moral universalism, whiIe Ernest Gellner argues that cognitive universalism must bring with il a nomber ofchanges of sociologica1 importe Taylor argues for the superiority of our theoretical culture over an atheoretical culture such as that of the 233 Azande, at least in the realm of knowledge of physical nature, while leaving open the possibility that there may be judgements of superiority that tell in the opposite direction. And 1 would argue tbat Habennas's conclusion is limited in a further sense. His defence of the supenority of the rationality structures embodied in the modem Western worldview rests on the common assumption that an development must follow the pathroughIy, tbat ftom magic ta science-taken in the transition ta modemity in Western Europe. This idea requires further defence. Even ifHabennas tan show the Western worldview to be superior ta the Zande worldview on ail scores, it does not follow that the Westem worldview is superior in these dimensions 10 the Chinese, the ancient Greek, or any other worldview as yet UDconsidered. Having looked at a comparison between ooly two groups we cannot legitimately infer that our results hold for aIl other civilizations, unless we have implicitly assumed that mythical and Western European civilizations represent the endpoints of a spectrom. This seems ta beg the question at band, since whether worldviews can be seen on such a spectrurn is precisely the point at issue in this debate. Giving detaiIed consideration 10 other civilizations might substantially change the mcxiels of development MOst ftequently proferred in the rationality debate. ln one sense, the illustration of the limited and controversial nature of Habermas's conclusion satisfies my purpose in this chapter. However, worries conceming the potential ethnocentricity of Habermas'5 position have led me to voice a preference for the approach to cross-eulturaI understanding outlined in 15.53. 1should now like to discuss this issue further. Wbat 1 see as problematic in Habermas lls approach is not that he advocates making judgements of superiority cross-culturally. 1 object rather 10 the way in which these judgements are made, and this in at least two respects. (1) 1 am suspicious of Habermas's claim that an advance in any one of the three rationality complexes necessarily implies a 234 parallel advance in both others. 1 argued in 14.52 that Habermas's position relies rather tao beavily for its defence on the plausibility of arguing for the superiority of the West in the cognitive-instrwnental sphere. It seemed to me a virtue of Taylor's acoount tbat it does net presuppose that ail judgements of superiority must fàl1 together in this way. (2) 1 worry that Habermas's approach sets the terms for making judgements of superiority in advance, using criteria drawn from our civilization. The bw of developmental theory is towards ordering differences in a hierachical mode, such that differences front wbat bas been defined as the apex-in this case, from the decentered fonn of rationality embodied in our worldview-must he thougbt ofas backwards ~es on the route toward it. This wouid seem ta impede our ability to lea.m ftom another culture, in that it renders it difficult for alternative visions of maturity to show themselves. These concerns might appear 10 Habermas onIy ta reflect my failure to take seriously additional features of bis position. 1 would therefore like to consider sorne possible rejoinders open ta him. (1) In response ta my reluetance to adopt a theoretical model premised on the view that judgements of superiority fall exclusively ioto one camp, Habermas might point to the ways in which bis theory can accommodate many judgements indicating the superiority of another culture in a particu1ar domain. SpecificaIly, he migbt argue that 1 have failed ta grasp the sense in which the claim ta superiority of the rationality structures found in the Westem worIdview is a formaI one, which leaves open the possibility of equality at the leveI of cultural contents. 1bis strategy is exemplified in Habermas's assessment ofthe significance of sorne of Robin Horton's conclusions. Horton observes that daily Iife in traditional Africa evinces valuable features not present in the modem West, among which "an intensely poetic quality in everyday life and 235 thoughtn and "a vivid enjoyment of the passing moment'~ figure prominently.167 The persuasiveness of judgements of this sort is thought by Habennas ta reside in failures in the practical realisation of the potential for rationality inherent in the process of decentration concomitant with modemity. These judgements should he understood, in effect, as judgements at the level of cultural contents. Recall that the theory of communicative action accounts for the problems of modemity by viewing these as stemming from the failure ta develop and institutionalise in a balanced way the three dimensions of rationality opened up by the decentered understanding of the world. Each advance to a higher stage of social evolution is accompanied by a potential for new problems, and those of modernity in particular stem from the hegemony of the cognitive-instrumental over the ather dimensions of rationality. Habennas believes that the study of other cultures, particularly primitive cultures, may reveal to us distortions in our path of modernisation. We may hence have a great deal to learn from primitive societies, since it is precisely by looking at the superior psychological inte8ration of such societies, for instance, or their more solidaristic social structures, that we recognise what is missing in our own. Judgements indicating the superiority of certain features of primitive society at the level of cultural contents are hence to be understood on Habermas's model as refleeting the problems incurred by our advancement to a higher stage of rationality. They do not themselves caU into question the occurrence of this advance. In faet, the superiority of a traditional culture in this domain appears to he precisely an intuition of its not having left the relative simplicity of its stage of evolution. The perception of deficiencies in our own way of life is indeed one of the important motivations behind the study of other civilizations. However, 1 do not believe it constitutes a satisfactory answer to the problem 1 have PQsed, which questions the appropriateness of the 167Honon. **African and Western." in Wilson (1970): 170. 236 particular stage model used by Habennas. My reservation centres on the faet that the distinction between foml and content is not an unambiguous one. Habermas~s stage models are inspired by Piaget ~5 mooel of cognitive developmeñ which was developed around the hypothesis that cognitive advance requires of individuals an increasing separation of the formai aspects of thought from their contents. ...if we consider the development and progressive elaboration of [logical] structures independently of the subject9 5 awareness ofth~ then it seems that this elaboration consists in the separation of fonn from conteñ and in the creation of new forms by reflective abstraction starting from those of a lower IC\fel. l68 However, as Piaget recognises, the distinction between fonn and content is not absolute. What is designated as fonn and what as content is, in bis view, relative to the stage specified: the structure wmch serves as form in one stage may serve as content in the next. '" the concepts of form and content are essentially relative and...a fonn or a formaI structure is unable to achieve a complete autonomy. This is clear in the developmental field: the sensori-motor structures are fonns in relation to the simple movements they coordinate, but content in relation to the interiorized and conceptualized actions of the subsequent level; 'concrete' operations are forms in r~!ation to these latter actions, but content with respect to the aIready formai operations of eleven to fifteen years; and these again are on1y content in relation to the operations applying to them at later levels. '69 This is of consequence in two respects. F~ because the distinction bet\veen fonn and content is not an absolute one, it seems that claims to formaI superiority for our culture cannot be 50 easily detached from claims to superiority tout court. Second, 1 would argue that the appeal to the formai character of the model cannot provide an adequate response to the question of whether the optimum bas been appropriately specified. If a different optimum confonning to an alternative conception of maturity were to he designated, the model would need to lay out a different series of stages, and these stages would separate fonn from content 168Jean Piaget, Genetic Epis/erna/ogy (Columbia University Press~ 1970): 63-64. l~get (1970): 67-68. 237 different1y. What Habennas specifies as a fonnal advance is henoe culturally neutral only if Habermas is rlght in the apex he MS selected. Appeal to the fonnal nature of the superiority claimed by the model cannat demonstrate tbat this apex bas been seleded correctIy. 1 shouId like to underscore that my objection does DOt tum on the claim tbat the apex which Habermas bas selected is 1àlse. It is possible that Habermas'5 stage model may he entirely correct. However, the model advocated by Habennas does tend to make bis position unfa/sifiable. If even the problems and deficiencies of modemity are proof of our superior rationality, it is difficuJt 10 know what could tell against this cIaim. (2) My second worry focusses on the potential ethnocentricity of an approach which establishes criteria for making judgements of superiority in advance of the case, and in a manner closely tied ta that of our own society. However, it should he acknowledged that Habermas views this issue as unproblematic, preci~ly because he sees these criteria as non cuIture-specific ones. He argues that any advance in rationality must be an advance along the three dimensions of the cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical and aesthetic-practical which bis theory sets ou~ because these are the only paths in which cumulative leaming is possible. 1should like briefly 10 sketch the basis for this claim. In The Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas attempts to identify '1:hose relations that are sufficiently productive from the standpoint of acquiring Icnowledge to permit...a development of cultural value spheres with their own inner logicS."l70 Through considering the dimensions of reason which the modem understanding of the worid bas opened up, he isolates three domains in which leaming can take place. In Habennas's view, the decentration of consciousness in the modem age bas made it possible for aetors ta adopt three basic attitudes-objectivating, norm-eonfonnative, and expressive, 10wards three different 238 world-eoncepts-objective, social and subjective. This gives a total of nine possible combinations or "formal-pragmatic relations" between aetors and their worids. The question arises as to which ofthese relations are suitable for the accumulation ofknowledge. Habermas argues that ooly six are potentially fruitful for the production of knowledge, which he terms "rationalisation." The six relations fiùl into the three complexes of rationality familiar to us, each ref1ecting one ofthe basic attitudes. Adoption ofthe objectivating attitude to the objective and social worlds issues in the "cognitive-instrumental rationality" of science and technology, including social teebnology. The norm-conformative attitude toward the social and subjective worids circumscribes the sphere of "moral-practical rationality" of systematic law and morality, and the expressive attitude towards the subjective and objective worids circumscribes the "aesthetic-practical" sphere, within which the production of knowledge takes the fonn of "authentic interpretations ofneeds.,,171 Each ofthese three complexes is believed by Habermas to be tied to a specialised fonn of argumentation in which a universal vaIidity claim is raised. Habennas presents this schema diagrammatically. Empty boxes indicate structures unsuitable for rationalisation. 17~bennas. TCA J: 237. 171Habennas. TCA J: 237-8. 239 Table 1: Rationalisation Complexesl72 Worlds~ 1 2 3 1 UBasic Objective Social Subjective Objective Attitudes 3 Art Expressive 1 CognitiveCognitiveX Objectivating instrumental instrumental rationality rationality Science Social Technology technologies 2 X Moral-practical Moral-practical Nonnrationality rationality Confonnative Law Morality 3 X AestheticAestheticExpressive practical practical rationality rationality Eroticism Art If correct, this account would largely vindicate Habermas's choice of criteria for making judgements of superiority, since it would demonstrate that bis selection and manner of conceiving these criteria is not culturally idiosyncratic. Habermas would in other words have provided a reason for thinking that sorne areas in which a traditional culture may appear to have successfully focussed their efforts, such as barmony with the environment, or spiritual 172Adapted from Habennas, TC4 J: 238. The table repeats cenain categories for case of visual representation: Habennas wants to emphasise that there are exaetly three rationalisation complexes. Boxes with an **x" denote combinations of "words" and "basic attitudes" unsuitable for cumulative leaming processes. Empt)' boxes remain 50 in order to avoid repeating information given elsewhere in the table. 240 developmeñ are areas in wbich cumulative leaming cannat take place. They hence should not serve to alter any rational judgements of superiority made. Although Habennas admits that 4~ese three complexes of rationality, derived in formal-pragmatic tenns from basic attitudes and world~ncepts, point to just those three cultural value spheres that were differentiated out in modem Europe," he maintains that "tbis is not in itself an objection against the systematic status of the schema."I73 This is certainly true; however, it does prompt the question ofhow the schema might be justified. A full answer lies beyond the scope of this conclusion. However, 1 would like briefly to draw attention ta sorne features of the response given by Thomas McCarthy in bis article, 4'Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory ofCommunicative Action. " 174 McCarthy states the crucial question raised by this model as follows: 4'ls it the case that the six relations (three complexes) singled out by Habennas permit a continuous and cumulative production of knowledge connected to specialized fonns of argumentation in ways that the remaining three do not?" 175 He regards Habermas's hypothesis as presenting a number of difficulties. On the one band there are difficulties io comprehending ho\\' leaming takes place in the three rationality complexes designated. Although the cumulative and continuous character ofchanges in theory in the cognitive-instrumental domain bas been called iota question by postempiricist pbilosophers of science, McCarthy notes that there seems to be a relatively clear sense in wbich we cao speak of an accumulation of knowledge in this sphere, at least with reference to "phenomenal regularities and instrumental connections." However, the sense in which there is a cumulative and continuous grawth of knowledge in ta'te domains of art and morality is less clear. McCarthy observes that advances at the formaI level in these domains "do not seem to 173Habennas. TCA 1: 239. 1'''Thomas McCarthy. "Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory o/Communicative Action. .. in Richard Bernstein ed., Habermas and Modernity (Polit)* Press, (985): 176-191. 241 entail an accumulation of knowledge at the content level. ,~176 He attempts ta make sense of Habermas's claim that these spheres do permit the development of knowledge; however, in 50 doing he finds that the distinction between these spheres and the areas left blank is blurred. McCarthy does not conclude from these reflections that Habermas's theory is false; nonetheless, he urges us 10 be hesitant in our acceptance of it. He explains that the more problematic the systematic status of that schema becomes, "the more the privileging of just those three complexes does appear ta reflect 'idiosyncratic traits ofWestem culture. ml77 In my view, legitimate worries conceming the potential ethnocentricity of Habennas' s approach have not been allayed. Assuming that Habermas himself is not unaware of these risks, the question arises why he c1ings 50 closely to the notion of a developmental logic and its attendant conception of linear progress. A speculation by Michael Schmid in bis discussion of Habermas's theory of social evolution MaY suggest a response. Asking why Habermas finds it valuable 10 combine explanatory and evaluative viewpoints in his theory of social evolutiõ Schmid notes that Habennas would like bis theory to he applied in discourses where '~competing projections of identity are at issue." Moreover, in Habermas's view, the essential function of rational discourse is that it should, under specific conditions, '"enable those participating in it to come to a consensual agreement for the rational solution of their problems." As Schrnid remarks, "[i]f it were possible to prove the existence of "invariant structures' in moral and cognitive development, this would increase the chances for a rational critique of, for instance, moralities which do not fulfil the possibilities given at a specific level ofleaming."l78 Such a theory would provide hope for an unequivocal critique ofproblems of 17SMcCarthy, "Rationalization." in Bernstein (1985): 179. l '~cCarthy, "Rationalization," in Bernstein (1985): 179. l"McCarthy, KRationalization," in Bernstein (1985): 191. 178Schmid, "Social Evolution," in Thompson and Held (1982): 180. 242 justice. The notion of a developmental lagie is, in other words, esseotial ta the defeoce of a universally valid ethic. 243 nus PAGE DELIBERATELY LEFT BLANK 244 Chapter Fil'e A person who imagines that he isfree afprejudices. basing his lcnow/edge on the objectivity ofhis procedures and denying that he is himse/finj/uenced by historica/ circumstances, erperiences the power ofthe prejudices that unconsciously dominate him. as a vis a tergo. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth andMethod Modemity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which if takes ifs orientationtrom the models supplied by another epoch; if has to creale fIs normativity out offtself Jürgen Habermas, The Phi/osophical Discourse ofModemity The procedure for the adjudification of norms articulated by Habennas bas an undeniable attraction. So much so, in faet, that the argument that the proposaIs of discourse ethics follow logically from preconditions of linguistic agency bas often been accepted as a sufficient one. The close coherence between Habermas's procedure and many of our most deeply held moral intuitions lends it a certain quality of self~dence, and it is precisely this quality which 1 find worrying. My aim in this study bas not been ta devalue the intuitions conceming the importance and nature ofjustice which discourse ethics seeks ta capture. What 1 have hoped is rather to change our way of thinking about the source of this attraction: the persuasiveness of the procedure articulated by Habermas seems ta me ta mask the contestable and sometimes philosophically precarious nature ofthe claims required ta support it. My primary focus in this thesis bas been ta elucidate the nature of these claims. My reconstruction of Habennas's position began in Chapter Two, with an investigation of Habennas's atternpt ta establish the universality of discourse ethics on the grounds tbat all 245 linguistically competent human agents must engage in "communicative action." This fonn of speech is, as we saw, closely tied to practices of argumentation: participants in communicative action coordinate individual plans of action consensually, through raising and redeeming validity claims which must be defended, ifnecessary, through the provision of "good reasons." Habermas aims to show that all aetors who engage in argumentation must thereby accept preconditions from which the principle ofuniversalisation can be derived. Yet 1 argued that Habermas~s justification of the universality of discourse ethics is rendered complex by its reliance upon two quite distinct forms of argumentation. In order to establish its claim to generality, communicative action must be shown to he an inescapable praetice for all human agents. The plausibility ofthis claim rests precisely on the weakness of the conditions placed upon the sorts of rcasons it requires. 1 tenned this form of argumentation "conventional" in order to emphasise its connection with a very generaJ sense of communicative action, which requires only that the agents engaged therein he accountable for providing "good reasons" for their plans of action. These reasons may take a wide varie~' of fonns. Accordingly, practices of reason--giving based on the traditions of any particular society should satisfy this requirement. A lande speaker, for example, might cite as a reason for a proposed plan of action a pronouncement of the poison oracle, and this would presumably be considered adequate by other Azande. However, the proposais of discourse ethics draw support only from a conception of argumentation which places more stringent conditions upon what fonns of reasons are acceptable. The preconditions required by Habermas for the derivation of the principle of universalisation are embodied in the "postconventionar' fonn of argumentation prevalent in Westem modemity. The thesis that any speaker of a language undertakes an implicit obligation to recognise the validity of the principle of universalisation thus overstates what can aetually be demonstrated through the transcendental-pragmatic form of argument. This 246 argument can at MOst show that an agent praeticing "postconventionar~ forntS of argumentation tacitly makes use of the presuppositions of argwnentation from which the principle of universalisation cao he derived. Such an agent MaY find herself in a species of "performative contradiction71 if she fails to recognise the validity of the principle of universalisation. However, it is oot able to show why ail hurnan agents should recognise the legitimacy of the paradigmatic use which Habermas makes of the '1>ostconventional" fonn of argumentation. Chapter TItree delineated Habennas's attempt to draw a connection between these two fonns of argumentation. It drew together supporting material devel0Ped by Habermas through explorations of several fields. 1 began, via Habennas's philosophy of language, by inquiring into the fonnal features of the postconventional mode of argumentation in sorne detail. Habermas aims to show that an agent's ability to communicate in the postconventional sense dePends upon her mastering a set of structural properties and implicit rules, which he refers to as the "decentered" understanding of the world. This understanding of the world bas two defining features, which account in Habennas's view for its superior ratiooality. First, the decentered conception of the world differeotiates three "domains of validity" corresponding to the extemal, social and subjective dimensions of reality. Habermas argues that each bas its own standards oftruth and falsity, as weil as its own method of establishing legitimate claims. Second, this way of understanding validity claims requires that we recognise that no such claim can in principle he immune to criticism. The decentered understanding of the world hence prompts us to adopt an attitude of radical openness to critique. The remaining sections of the chapter made use of this conception of rationality ta clarify and, to a degree, subvert Habermas'5 appeal to scientific reconstructions ta link the two fonns of argumentation in question. Recall that Habermas aims to demonstrate that they stand in a hierarchical relationship ta one another, in that the postconventional practice of 247 argumentation constitutes a demonstrable cognitive gain over conventionaI ones. He supports the universality ofbis claims species-wide by appeal to lines ofempirical researc~ in the hopes that these various theoretical perspectives may overlap in ways wbich corroborate bis findings. My exposition showed that the "overlap" generated by Habennas~s appeal to empirical studies is Jess than surprising. Reconstructions of individual moral maturation and societal development are used in a \'3riety of ways by Habermas. Kohlberg~s wõ for instance~ can he used to corroborate Habennas ~s position in virtue of its description of moral maturation. Because it provides a defence of postconventional over other forms of moral reasoning~ Kohlherg ~s empirical studies enable Habennas to defend the procedure specified in discourse ethics by showing that it exemplifies the charaeteristics of such reasoning. The theory of social evolution portrays the acquisition of the charaeteristics associated with postconventional fonns of reasoning and argumentation in general as the outcome ofuniversalleaming-processes. However, 1 argued that Habennas's attempt to provide bis theory with an evidentiary basis by means of such reconstructions offer empirical corroboration for bis theory is less successful than it might at first glance appear. These theories defend the thesis that there are universal competences in various areas by appeaIing to the notion of a developmental logic. A developmental logie depiets the acquisition of the competence in question by means of a sequence of steps which can he unambiguously ordered according to a scale of development. This concept is vital for Habermas, in that it allows him te represent a process of maturation as an ascending sequence ofstages in which leaming processes can be seen bath as cumulative, and as exhibiting a certain direction. His developmental accounts aim ta show that all aetors~ in virtue of being linguistic agents in the sense of being practitioners of conventional fonns of argumentation, find themselves on a Iadder ascending towards the highest stages of competence mastery, which are in tum identified with characteristies of the postconventional forms of 248 argumentation associated with modernity. These accounts, used by Habermas to establish the superiority of the fonn of reasoning associated with postconventional practices of argumentatiõhence in effect begin by identifying the highest stage of development with its features. Moreover, due ta the complex relation between data and theory, 1 argued that empirical evidence alone is unlikely to fracture this theoretical circularity. The defence of dùs claim therefore requires ofHabennas further clarification on a conceptual level. Chapter Four reconstntcted the shape which such conceptual clarification might take, through examining more c10sely the role played by developmental lagics in Habermas 's work. Because developmental accounts of competence acquisition present an array of problemsolutions in the fonn of an ascending sequence, the definition of the ãx is of crucial importance in defining the path of development as a whole. The narratives of evolution set forth by Habennas at bath the individual and societal level draw their images of the most mature form of development from a particular reading of what is essential to the fonn of rationality implicit in Western modemity. What Habennas therefore requires is a means of defending bis paradigmatic use of the modem Western worldview as against others in arder to define the terminal point ofhis developmental sequences. 1 presented Habermas's discussion of the rationality debate among philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists as precisely such an argument. Habennas defends a universalist position in this debate by arguing that different cultural worldviews represent solutions to similar problems, which can be placed in a developmental sequence according to their adequacy as measured by criteria connected with the concept of leaming. My intent in clarifying the strength of the daims Habermas needs ta make in order to support bis universalist stance was twofold. First, the arguments Habermas offers in defence of this daim are very strong ones, and are not in any sense uncontroversial. In fã Habermas defends a unique position: in arguing that cognitive advance must be accompanied, at least on a fonnal 249 level, by advances in the moral and aesthetic spheres, Habermas makes what is by far the strengest claim in the debate. My analysis aimed to bring 10 the fore how Habennas defends these claims in such a way as to fit bis theory, rather than on the basis of a serious engagement with the problems of cross-eultural understanding. A second, related aim was ta show that there are ether viable alternatives. In my view, the dichotomy which Habennas constroets between seeing cultures as entirely equal and adopting a thorougbgoing relativism, and arguing for the universal significance of the modem worldview across cognitive, moral and aesthetic dimensions, is a false one. On one level the objective of my thesis bas been met if1 have succeeded in explicating Habennas's justifieatory strategy 50 as to show that the obligation to recognise the legitimacy of the principle of universalisation does not follow simply from linguistic agency. But my aim bas oot been siroply expository: 1 have hoped in 50 doing to bring to the fore elements of Habermas•s approach to the justification of discourse ethics which prompt us to question the cogency of its claim to universality, and thereby te reconsider more generally the appropriateoess of the theory as it stands. 1 have endeavoured throughout this thesis to dra\\' attention to the importance for Habermas of demonstrating the superiority of the form of rationality implicit in the Western worldview. In pursuit of this aim, he is lead consistently to portray stances other than bis own (including many, 5uch as religious outlooks, found within modernity itselt) as either backwards or fa.1se, and in need of transcendence. It is, in my view, highly problematic to have such an approach underlie the attempted resolution of problems across differing conceptions of the good. 1 fear that it May reflect the ethnocentricity of the accounts given. If we imagine a sort of meta-principle of acceptability, which would stipulate that the justification of the principle of universalisation must itself he amenable to consensus, we can see the improbability of its meeting with approval. Members of many cultures and social groups would be unlikely to 250 acoept it, as the programme of justification rests upon their accepting the falsity of their worldviews. 1 believe that the approach taken by Habermas towards other cultures retlects the dual, and somewhat incompatible, demands placed upon discourse ethics. Habennas's philosophical work is, in the first instance, motivated by concerns internaI ta modemity. As he explains, u ...the theory of communicative action is intended to make possible a concephJalizatioD of the social-life context that is taiIored to the paradoxes ofmodemity.nl Habermas's broad aim is to develop a critical theory of modernity which can account for its pathologies in a manner which vindicates the faith of the Enlightenment in the power of reason. The principal theorist with whom Habennas is concerned in titis regard is Max Weber. In a number of works, particularly The Protestant Ethic and the Spiriî ojCapita/ism, Weber portrays the growth and spread of reason in the modem sense as releasing individuals from the hold of traditions, cosmologjcal worldviews, superstitions and prejudices. Yet ironically, the process of ~~disenchannnent"described by Weber leads to irnprisonment rather than liberation: its result is an existence void of meaning, in which instrumental relations to ail aspects of the world, including those towards other human beings, become hegemonic. Habennas offers an alternative diagnosis of the problems of modemity which maintains by contrast that the domination of purposive forms of reasoning in modemity is accidentai rather than inevitable. It retlects an unbalanced path of rationalisation, which can be corrected precisely through fostering and ~1itutionalisingthe practice ofcommunicative rationality. This concem with solving the identity-erisis of modernity, which 1 see as the primary motivation underlying Habennas 's work, leads him to a1locate to non-modems a rather secondary role. A major motive for the drawing of cultural contrasts in Habermas'5 work is to help us to recognise ourse/ves: the contours of the modem identity emerge more sharply 251 through contrast with members oftraditional societies, who constitute our presumed opposites. 'The other9 is hence depicted as the mirror image of ourselves. This portrayal, in my view, owes more ta the exigencies of theory than to aetual inquiry. The problematic nature of this approach becomes evident when we recall the second aim of Habennas 9s project, which is ta provide a mechanism for conflict adjudication valid species-wide. In fael, as 1 argued in Chapter One7 the restrieted nature ofthe questions treated by discourse ethics indicates that the procedure's primary role is to regulate confliets across groups who do not share concepts of the good life. The justificatory strategy ernployed by Habennas in defence of bis claim to universality reflects, 1believe, a lack oftrue engagement on bis part with the problem of crosscultural understanding. lbis is not, of course, to say that the procedure itself is biased or invalid. The question of whether and to what extent this may he so will he addressed in future work. 1Habennas. TCA J: xlii. 252 Bibliography Works by Habermas Cited in Tm Habermas, Jürgen. Knowledge and Human lnterests, translated by J, Shapiro. (Beacon Press, 1971), ___. Communication and the Evolution ofSociety. Translated by T. McCarthy. (Beacon Press, 1979). ___. The Theory ofCommunicative Action, voL l, Reason and the Rationa/ization of Society. Translated by T. McCarthy. (Beacon Press, 1981). ___' "Reply 10 my Critics,'" in J. Thompson and D. Held, eds. Hahermas: Critical Dehates, pp. 219-83. (Macmillan Press, 1982). ___. The Theory ofCommunicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System. Translated by T. McCarthy. (Beacon Press, 1987). ___. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. (MIT Press, 1990). ___. Justification and Application: Remaries on Discourse Ethics. Translated by Ciaran P. Cronin. (MIT Press, 1993) . "Reconciliation and the Public Use of Reason: Remaries on John Rawls~s Po/itical--Liberafism." Translated by William Rehg. The Journal ofPhuosophy. Vol.XCII, No.3. (1995): 129-131. Other Warks Cited Aristotle. Politics. Trans. Ernest Barker. (Oxford University Press, 1958). Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. (Oxford University Press, 1992). Baynes, K., 1. Bohman and T. McCanhy, 005. After Philosophy. (MIT Press, 1987). Baynes, Kenneth. "The Liberall Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics." Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 14 (1988): 293-313. ___. The Normative Grounds OfSocial Criticism. (SUNY, 1992). Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender. Community and Postmodernism in 253 Contemporary Ethics. (Routledge, 1992). ___. "Liberal Dialogue versus a Critical Theory of Discursive LegitimatioOy" in Liberafism and the Moral Lift. Nancy Rosenblum, 00. (Harvard, 1989). Ber~ lsaiah. The Crooked Timber ofHumanity. (London, 1990). Cooke, Maeve. Language and Reason. (MIT Press, 1994). Cronin, Ciaran P. "Translator's Introduction." In Justification and Application, by Jürgen Habermas. (MIT Press, 1993). Damon, W. The Social World ofthe Chi/do (San Francisco, 1977). Evans-Pritchard. "Lévy-Bruhl's Theory of Primitive Mentality." Bulletin ofthe Facu/ty of Arts. (University ofEgyp~ 1934). Quoted in Peter Winch. "Understanding a Primitive Society." Rationa/ity, cd. Bryan Wilson. (Basil Blackwell, 1970). Witchcraft. Oracles and Magic among the Azande. (Oxford, 1936). Theories ofPrimitive Religion (Clarendon, 1965). Quoted in Modes ofThought, 00. Ruth Finnegan and Robin Horton. (Faber and Faber, 1973). Ferrara, Alessandro. "Universalisms: ProceduraI, Contextualist and Prudential.~' Phi/osophy and Social Criticism. Vol. 14 (1988): 243-269. Finnegan, Ruth and Robin Horton, eds. Modes ofThought: Essays on Thinldng in Western and Non-Western Societies. (Faber and Faber, 1973). Gadarner, Hans-Georg. Truth andMethod. Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming. (Crosroad, 1988). Gardiner, Patrick. ~~Gennan Philosophy and the Rise of Relativism." Monist 64 (1981): 138-154. Gellner, Ernest. "The Savage and the Modem." ln Modes ofThought, 00. Ruth Finnegan and Robin Horton. (Faber and Faber, 1973). ___. "Relativism and Universals." In Rationa/ity and Re/ativism, 00. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. (MIT Press, 1982). Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Votee: Psychofogical Theory and Women 's Developmenr. (Harvard University Press, 1982). Godelier, Maurice. "Myth and History: Reflections on the Foundations ofthe Primitive Mind." Quoted in Habermas, Theory ofCommunicative Action. (Beacon Press, 1981). Gunther, Klaus. "impartial application ofmoraI and legal nonns: A Contribution to. Discourse Ethics." Phi/osophy and Social Criticism Vol. 14 (1988): 425-32. 254 Hacker, P. M. S. and G. P. Baker. Scepticism. Rules and Language. (Blackwell, 1984). Harding. Sandra. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Comell University Press, 1991). Hollis, Martin and Steven Lukes, eds. Rationa/ity and Re/otivism. (MIT Press, 1982). Hol~ Steven H. and Christopher M. Leich, eds. Wittgenstein: To Follow Â Rule. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). HODD~ Axel and H. Joas, 005. Communicative Action. (polity Press, 1991). Honñ Axel, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe and A1brecht Wellmer. Philosophical Interventions in the Unjinished Project ofEnlightenment. Trans. William Rehg. (MIT Press, 1992). Horton, Robin. uAftican Thought and Western Science." In Rationa/ity, 00. Bryan Wilson (Basil Blackwell, 1958). ___. ~lradition and Modemity Revisitecf' In Rationaiity and Re/ativism, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. (MIT Press, 1982). Ingram, David. Habermas and the Dia/ectic ofReason. (Yale University Press, 1987). Kakar, Sudhïr. The Inner Wor/d: A Psycho-Analytic Study ofChildhood and Society in lndia. (Oxford University Press, 1981). Kant, Irnmanuel. ~CWhat is Enlightenment?" In Kant 's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss. Trans. H.B Nisbet. (Cambridge University Press, 1970). Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMorais. Trans. James Ellington. (Hackett, 1981). Kohlberg, Lawrence. Cognitive Development and Epistemology. (Academie Press, 1971). ___. Essays in Moral Development. Vol. 1. (San Francisco, 1981). ___. The PsychologyofMoral Development. (San Francisco, 1984). Kraus, Michael and Jaek W. Meiland. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. {University of Notre Dame Press, 1982). Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (Harvard University Press, 1982). Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure ofScientific Revolutions. (University ofChicage, 1970). ___. "The Presence of Past Science." Delivered as the Shearman Memorial Lectures. (University College, London, 1987). 255 Lévi-Stauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Vol. 1 and 2. (New York, 1963, 1976). ___. The Savage Mind. (Chicago, 1966). Mahowald, Mary Briody, 00. The Philosophy ofWoman. (Hackett, 1978). McCarthy, Thomas. "Translator's Introductîon.n In Habermas's Communication and the Evolution ofSociety. (Beacon Press, 1979). ___. "Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's 'Overcoming' ofHenneneutics.n In Habermas: Critica! Debales. 00. lB. Thompson and D. Held. (Macmillan, 1982). ___. The Critica! Theory ofJürgen Habermas. (polity Press, 1984). ___. "Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory ofCommunicative Action." ln Habermas andModemity, 00. R. Bernstein. (Polity Press, 1985). ___. "General Introduction." In After Philosophy, 00. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohnman and Thomas McCarthy. (MIT Press, 1987). Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy ofMarals and Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufinann. (Vintage, 1967). Nussbã Martha. Love 's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. (Oxford University Press, 1990). Okïn, Susan Moller. Women in Western Political Thought. (princeton, 1979). Piaget, Jean. Genetic Epistemology, trans. Eleanor Duckworth (Columbia University Press, 1970) Pusey, Michael. Jürgen Habermas. (London Tavistoc~ 1987). Putnarn, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History. (Cambridge University Press, 1981). ____ "Why Reason Cao't Be Naturalized." In After Philosophy, 00. Kenneth Baynes and Thomas McCarthy. (MIT Press, (987). Rawls, John. A Theory ofJustice. (Harvard University Press, 1971). ___. "Law ofPeoples." On Human Rights: The Or/ord Amnesty Lectures. 1993. (Basic Books, 1993). ___. Po/itical Liberalism. (Columbia University Press, 1993). ___. "A Reply ta Habennas." The Journal ofPhilosophy. Vol. XCII, No. 3. (1995): 135-38. 256 Rehg, William. lnsight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics ofJürgen Habermas (University ofCalifomia Press, 1994). Schmi~ Michael. UHabennas's Theory ofSocial Evolution. " In Habermas: Critical Dehates, cd. J.B. Thompson and O. Held. (Macmillan, 1982). Selman, R.L. The Growth oflnterpersona/ Understanding. (New York, 1980). Shanker, S. G .. Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Phi/osophy ofMathematics. (Croom He~ 1987). Taylor, Charles. Philosophica/ Papers. In two volumes. (Cambridge University Press, 1985). ___. "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate." In Phi/osophica/ Arguments. (Harvard University Press, 1995). ___" "Language and Society." ln Communicative Action, cd. A. Honneth and H. Joas. (polity Press, 1991). ___. "The Validity ofTranscendental Arguments." InPhi/osophica/ Arguments. (Harvard, 1995). ___. "Rationality." In Rationa/ity and Relativism, ed. Martin HoUis and Steven Lukes. (MIT Press, 1982). Thomson, 1. B. and D. Held, 005. Habermas: Critica/ Debates. (Macmillan, 1982). Tully, James. ''Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy." Po/itical Theory. Vol. 17, No. 2. (1989): 172-204. ___. "Diversity~s Gambit Declined." In Constitutiona/ Predicament: Canada after the Referendum of1992.00. Curtis Cook. (McGilI-Queens University Press, 1994). ___. Strange Mu/tiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age ofdiversity. (Cambridge, 1995). Wamke, Georgia. Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. (Stanford University Press, 1987). ___. "Communicative Rationality and Cultural Values." ln The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. 00. S.K. White. (Cambridge University Press, 1995). Welbner, A1brecht. "Ethics and Dialogue: Elements of Moral Judgment in Kant and Discourse Ethics." In The Persistence ofModemity: Essays on Aesthetics. Ethics and Postmodernism. (MIT Press, 1991). White, Steven K. The Recent Work ofJürgen Habermas: Reason. Justice & Modernity. (Cambridge University Press, 1988). 257 __-.J' ed. The Cambridge Companion ta Habermas. (Cambridge University Press, 1995). Wilsõ Bryan R., ed. Rationality. (Basil BlackweIL 1970). Winch, Peter. The ldea ofa Social Science. (Humanities Press, 1958). ___. uUnderstanding a Primitive Society." In Rotionality, ed. Bryan Wilson. (Basil BIackweU, 1970). Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. (Basil BlackweIL 1958). ___. Bemerkungen über Frazer's ~TheGolden Hough." Synthese. Vol. 17 (1967): 233 -53. 258 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3) 10 ~ 12.8 125. ~ - ~ :: I~ 11111 2.2 I,;.~ 1.1 ~ ~ ~ 11111 2.0 L. ..... 111111.8 111111.25 111111.4 111111.6 1 J '..----150mm ---J'_1 ~ 6" -----.J-...... APPLIED .:iâ II\MGE 1_ . ne ~ 1653 East Main Street ~ Rochester. NY 14609 USA-=--= Phone: 7161482*0300 __ Fax: 7161288*5989 C 1993. AppIied lmage. lne.. Ali Rights Reserved